WHEN IS ETHNIC IDENTITY SALIENT?


1. The Setting (Zambia vs. Malawi) and Outcome: Salience of Ethnic Identity
   a. In Zambia: Chewas and Tumbukas are small relative to the country as a whole and, thus, not useful to mobilize as bases of political support. The cultural cleavage between Chewas and Tumbukas has almost no political salience in Zambia.
   b. In Malawi: Chewas and Tumbukas are each large groups vis-à-vis the country as a whole and, thus serve as viable bases for political coalition-building. The cultural cleavage between Chewas and Tumbukas is highly politically salient.

2. The approach: A natural experiment afforded by the division of the Chewa and Tumbuka peoples by the border between Zambia and Malawi. Interviewing respondents in similar villages across either side of the border.

3. The theoretical mechanism
   a. The viability of a group as a political coalition partner: “The political salience of a cultural cleavage will depend on the sizes of the groups that it defines relative to the size of the arena in which political competition is taking place. If the cultural cleavage defines groups that are large enough to constitute viable coalitions in the competition for political power, then politicians will mobilize these groups and the cleavage that divides them will become politically salient.”

4. The mechanism at work in Zambia and Malawi
   a. In Zambia: Neither the Chewa nor the Tumbuka community alone has the size to be an effective political vehicle (they constitute 20% of the national population). These groups therefore go unmobilized by Zambian politicians
and the cultural differences between them remain politically inconsequential.

b. **In Malawi:** “Both the Chewa and the Tumbuka communities are sufficiently large as to constitute viable political coalitions in the competition over national power. Thus, when Malawian politicians from the Northern and Central Regions seek to build political support bases, they find the Chewa and Tumbuka groups to be useful building-blocks, and their mobilization of these communities renders the cultural cleavage between them politically salient.”

5. **Case selection**
   a. Similar villages in Zambia and Malawi: “I was also careful to select villages that were equally exposed to:”
      i. National political affairs in their respective countries
      ii. Domestic markets
      iii. Members of the other cultural community

6. **Interview results**
   a. Would you marry a member of the other group?
      i. In Zambia: 24% said they would not
      ii. In Malawi: 55% said they would not
   b. Would you vote for a presidential candidate from the other group?
      i. In Zambia: 24% said they would not
      ii. In Malawi: 45% said they would not

7. **Ruling out alternative explanations**
   a. Institutional differences: both Zambia and Malawi have identical single-member plurality electoral rules and very similar, highly centralized, candidate selection procedures
   b. Modernization differences: there are no discernable differences in the level of Chewa and Tumbuka respondents/villages in each country
   c. Electoral timing: “If anything, the timing of the electoral calendar should have heightened the salience of group divisions in Zambia rather than in Malawi. The survey work for the project was conducted in July and August of 2001, at a time when Zambia was preparing for a general election to be held four months later, in December of that year. Malawi, by contrast, had most recently held a national election in 1999 and was not scheduled to hold its next one until 2004.”
HOW DOES ETHNIC DIVERSITY IMPACT PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION?


1. The Setting: Kenya and Tanzania and Outcome: Public Goods Provision
   a. Tanzania: Consistently pursuing more serious nation-building policies in the postcolonial period. The Tanzanian approach has allowed ethnically diverse communities in rural Tanzania to achieve considerable success in fund-raising for local public goods.
   b. Kenya: Less vigorous nation-building policies. Given the weaker, Kenyan approach, diverse communities typically fail to provide public goods.

2. The approach
   a. Comparing the relationship between local ethnic diversity and public goods across two nearby rural districts, one in western Kenya and one in western Tanzania, using colonial-era national boundary placement as a natural experiment. Using household level school and local government survey data in Kenya and Tanzania between 1996 and 2002, along with a few structured qualitative interviews.

3. How might ethnic diversity reduce public goods provision?
   a. Different ethnic groups have different tastes/preferences over public goods: Individuals from different ethnic groups prefer distinct types of public goods – roads versus libraries, for instance – and this leads to less agreement on public choices and thus to lower funding in diverse areas. (ex: Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2004))
   b. Sanctioning to promote collective action is difficult across ethnic groups: Social sanctions play an important role in sustaining collective action necessary for public good provisions. It becomes difficult to sustain cooperation across ethnic groups in areas where members of different groups tend not to have frequent social interactions or personal affinity (ex. Miguel and Kay 2004).

4. How might the effects of ethnic diversity be cauterized?
   a. Institutionalizing power-sharing within organizations: Under power-sharing, ethnic minorities are assured some minimum representation in government and some influence over policy, including veto power over certain policies.
      i. These have often failed in Africa, however
   b. Promoting within-group policing: Group leaders punish violators from within their own ethnic group

5. The theoretical mechanism
a. The success of nation-building to cauterize ethnic diversity: Nation-building was substantially more successful in Tanzania than in Kenya.
   i. As national identity gains political salience, “taste” theories become less important, since individuals increasingly identify with all citizens and are thus willing to fund public goods that benefit other groups.
   ii. Nationalization reforms increase inter-ethnic social interactions, and increase the likelihood of stronger social “sanctions” traveling across ethnic groups, reducing free-riding and improving collective action

6. The mechanism at work in Tanzania and Kenya
a. In Tanzania:
   i. National language policy has been promoted in Tanzania, and nearly all speak Kiswahili.
   ii. The public school curriculum in Tanzania has been aggressively employed as a nation-building tool.
   iii. A reform package was carried out to completely overhaul local government institutions, with the aim of strengthening village councils and district councils.
   iv. Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere forcefully downplayed the role of ethnic affiliation in public life, instead emphasizing a single Tanzanian national identity.
   v. Public investment in education, health, and infrastructure has been equitable across regions in Tanzania
b. In Kenya:
   i. Although Swahili is the lingua franca in Kenya, it competes with English and local vernacular languages.
   ii. The central government in Kenya has not used the school curriculum to promote a coherent national linguistic or ideological identity.
   iii. Kenya has no local government institution comparable in authority to the elected Tanzanian village council.
   iv. The first two postindependence presidents, Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, are perceived within Kenya as “tribalists,” political opportunists who thrived on the politics of ethnic division.
   v. Public investment in education, health, and infrastructure has been regionally heterogeneous on the basis of ethnicity

7. Empirical results from school/local government surveys
a. Dependent Variable: school funding, school infrastructure quality, and well maintenance.
b. Independent Variable: local ethnic diversity (proxied by ethnolinguistic fractionalization)
c. In Kenya: A change from ethnic homogeneity to average levels of diversity is associated with a drop of 25% in average funding for schools. Similar results hold for infrastructure spending.
d. In Tanzania: A change from ethnic homogeneity to average levels of diversity is associated with a positive but insignificant increase in average funding for schools. Similar results hold for infrastructure spending.

8. Empirical results from qualitative interviews
   a. “The bottom line from the interviews is that while local politics in [Kenyan city] are characterized by ethnic “us versus them” appeals, such arguments are considered illegitimate and downright “un-Tanzanian” in [Tanzanian city].”


1. The Setting, Approach, and Outcome: A Lab Experiment in Uganda; Outcome is Public Goods Provision
   a. Three mechanisms linking diversity and public goods provision: what the authors term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms
   b. Experimental method: A series of experimental games with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood in Uganda characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity and low levels of public goods provision “that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families.”

2. Ethnic Diversity and Low Public Goods Provision: Three Mechanisms
   a. Preference/taste mechanisms: Different ethnic groups care about different types of public goods, or they may attach positive utility to the welfare of fellow ethnic groups members but no utility (or negative utility) to the welfare of non-group members. Insofar as the preferences over public goods provision or group welfare differ across ethnic groups, then public goods provision may be hampered.
   b. Technology-based mechanisms: homogeneous communities may have an advantage in public goods production because they can draw on a reservoir of common cultural materials. Furthermore, shared membership in a social networks provides members with an informational advantage, facilitating finding, and thus punishing, non-cooperators. Insofar as ethnic diversity pulverizes common cultural materials and the information necessary to punish non-compliance, it reduces public goods provision.
c. **Strategic selection mechanisms:** Adherence to a cooperative equilibrium relies upon expectations that cooperation will be reciprocated and shirking punished. This equilibrium produces a norm or social institution of reciprocity within cooperators and punishment of defectors. These norms may be more likely to exist within but not across ethnic groups.

3. **The Experiments**
   a. **Participants play a “dictator game”** with one another, seeing a picture of one another on a computer displaying a “public information box” viewable to all participants
      i. The first player, or dictator, determines how to split an endowment between himself and the other players
      ii. The other players, the recipients, simply receives the remainder of the endowment left by the dictator. The role of the other participants is entirely passive – they cannot punish the dictator in any way (in theory, player 1 should share $0, but in reality player 1 often shares more than $0)
   b. **Participants played a “puzzle-solving” game,** where they had to work together to decide, based on the information they held collectively but not individually, which of the puzzle pieces should go on top and which on bottom.
   c. **Participants played a “network” game,** whereby some participants were deemed “runners” and others “targets,” and after the targets had parted to a neighborhood location, the runners had two weeks to find them.

4. **Empirical Results (via a survey of participants and the experiment)**
   a. **Via the survey:** Ethnic groups do not have different preferences for public goods: “Using ordinary least-squares regression with dummy variables for each of the major ethnic groups in our sample, we find little evidence that ethnic group differences are associated with differences in either preferences for particular public goods or opinions about how they should be provided.”
   b. **Via the dictator game experiment:** Altruism does not depend on ethnic group: “We still find no evidence that subjects are any more altruistic (where altruists are the participants that share more) toward in-group members than out-group members.”
   c. **Via the dictator game experiment:** Egoists share more with co-ethnics: “Egoists, while offering considerably less on average, offer significantly more to co-ethnics” when they are seen by co-ethnics, “depending on the particular measure of co-ethnicity we use.”
   d. **Via the puzzle game experiment:** Co-ethnicity does not facilitate cooperation to solve a puzzle: “The difference between co-ethnic and non-
co-ethnic pairings (defined by shared ethnicity, regional background, or language group membership) is not statistically significant.”

e. Via the network game experiment: co-ethnicity facilitates information-sharing and findability: the success rate among runners whose targets happened to be members of their own ethnic group was significantly higher (43.1%) than that among runners whose targets were from other ethnic groups (27.8%)

5. Implications

a. Ethnic homogeneity facilitates public good provision via norms and networks that facilitate sanctioning
   i. Co-ethnics are better able to find one another
   ii. Co-ethnicity is more likely to incentivize “egoists” to not free-ride and contribute to public goods


1. What are boundary institutions?

   a. Ethnicity: Affiliations tied to race, caste, ancestral city, tribe, or religion can be considered ethnic when membership is recognized at birth and considered to be largely immutable
      i. Ethnic vs. national identity: If a group identity is coterminous with the boundaries of the national state, it is a national identity, not an ethnic one

   b. The effect of boundary institutions:
      i. They give meaning to and reinforce ethnic group identities
      ii. They shape the preferences of citizens and elites through mechanisms of information and group esteem, which in turn affect the political costs and benefits of providing public goods.
      iii. When internal boundaries are strong, almost any issue may be interpreted in terms of the groups divided by those boundaries, irrespective of common need and benefit.

   c. When are ethnic boundaries “strong”? 
      i. When the same group labels and categories are used across institutional forms
      ii. When state-sanctioned labels and categories correspond with everyday racial or ethnic divisions

2. How do boundary institutions affect responses to risk from AIDS?

   a. When ethnic boundaries are strong:
i. Framing of problems/risk will be differentiated by group
ii. Conflict around policy will be higher: Esteem and social status within group becomes extremely salient, and politicians may blame/shame other groups to avoid stigma
iii. Policy outcomes will be less aggressive

b. When ethnic boundaries are weak:
   i. Framing of the problems/risks will be pooled as issues of general concern
   ii. Conflict around policy will be lower
   iii. Policy outcomes will be more aggressive

c. The effect of strong ethnic boundaries vis-à-vis AIDS:
   i. Policymakers may use shame-avoidance in ethnically divided societies to deflect attention.
   ii. Policymakers may blame marginalized groups who lack political value or those outside the polity (foreigners) as the source of the problem or as conspirators in manufacturing the myth.
   iii. Policymakers will respond less aggressively to the problem than if ethnic competition were not present

3. The Comparative Case Studies
      i. Countries have similar social, political, and economic profiles
      ii. Were plagued by comparable AIDS epidemics around the same time (late 1980s-early 1990s)

   b. Boundary institutions strong in South Africa: The history of S. Africa, marked by institutionalized white supremacy for most of the twentieth century, created increasingly rigid categories of "white/European," "black/African," Coloured," and "Indian." Eventually the S. African state enforced policies of apartheid (apartness). Even post-democratic elections the legacies of these boundaries remain

   c. Boundary institutions weak in Brazil: Following the dawn of republican government in the 19th century, the state began to promote nonracialism and a strategy of whitening, which explicitly promoted sexual relations between people from different race groups. A longstanding policy of promoting Portuguese as a single language helped unite people across the color bar. As a result, racial demographics are hard to pin down in Brazil.

   d. In Brazil – an aggressive response to AIDS, and the country has been recognized as a world leader in AIDS prevention and care.
      i. Brazil established an AIDS bureaucracy earlier than South Africa, and it created a much larger agency that assumed authority in formulating policy by the end of the 1980s
ii. In Brazil, the first appearance of HIV/AIDS as a budget line item occurred in 1988.

iii. In Brazil, education and outreach programs began early: TV spots by 1988, school-based by 1992; targeted outreach as early as 1985. Condom distribution was extensive

iv. In Brazil, 83-100% of those needing treatment received treatment in 2005

e. In South Africa, a laggard response to AIDS:
   i. The development of an autonomous bureaucratic structure has faced a far rockier road in S. Africa, and to a large extent as of 2006 one was still lacking
   ii. In South Africa, the appearance of HIV/AIDS as a budget line item occurred in 2000.
   iii. In S. Africa, the epidemic was already generalized before significant campaigns were initiated, and these campaigns were criticized for conveying inappropriate messages. Condom distribution was a fairly muted program
   iv. In S. Africa, only 13-21% of those needing treatment received it in 2005

HOW DOES ETHNIC DIVERSITY AFFECT VIOLENCE?


1. Explaining Inter-ethnic Cooperation and Cauterization of Violence
   a. Inter-ethnic peace is far more common than inter-ethnic violence: A good theory of ethnic conflict should be able to explain why, despite the greater tensions, peaceful and cooperative relations are by far the more typical outcome than is large-scale violence
      i. Thus scholars have selected on the dependent variable for cases of high ethnic violence
      ii. Yet from 1960 to 1979, communal violence, though horrifying, was extremely rare in Africa
   b. A focus on decentralized, non-state institutional mechanisms: These mechanisms may often arise to mitigate problems of opportunism in interaction between individuals from different ethnic groups

2. Problem with extant theories
a. **Reputation-based/norm of reciprocity theories**: Reputational theories based on repeated games do not capture interactions in complex markets, when interaction with any one individual is seldom repeated.
b. **State-centric theories**: The state can only go so far in preventing ethnic violence. And in many ethnically diverse communities the state is weak.

3. **The problem of inter-ethnic cooperation**
a. **Identification/information diffusion is harder across groups**:  
   i. Ethnic groups are frequently marked by highly developed systems of social networks that allow for cheap and rapid transmission of information about individuals and their past histories.  
   ii. By contrast, individual identification is harder in interactions across groups. Because social networks are less developed, it is more difficult to get information on a potential trading of social partner from “across the tracks.”

4. **Two equilibria supporting inter-ethnic cooperation**
a. **Spiral equilibrium (ex. blood feud)**: The members of group A indiscriminately punish all members of group B for nasty behavior by individual B. Hence disputes between individuals are correctly expected to spiral rapidly beyond the two parties, and fear of this induces cooperation “on the equilibrium path”  
   i. Logic of inter-ethnic deterrence: Individuals cooperate in interethnic interactions for fear of losing future payoffs should they defect and cause a larger breakdown of intergroup relations.

b. **In-group policing equilibrium**: If a B exploits an A, members of group A continue cooperating with members of group B as though nothing had happened, while members of group B identify and sanction the individual who acted badly. Individuals thus ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctly expecting that the culprits will be identified and sanctioned by their own ethnic brethren.  
   i. Logic of reciprocal enforcement: By adopting a policy of "you identify and punish your miscreants and we will do the same," they take advantage of the fact that each group has better information about the behavior of its own members than about the other group and so can target individuals rather than whole groups.

5. **Evidence from computer simulations**
a. **The in-group policing equilibrium is more robust**: The spiral equilibrium is much less robust against the introduction of small amounts of noise in interethnic interactions than is in-group policing. In the presence of noise and asymmetric information, anthropological studies have found that in-group policing plays an important role in cauterizing conflict.
b. The fragility of spiral equilibria: In Spirals, the expectation of noise/mistakes can mean that the groups spend most of the time not cooperating, or that the spiral regime breaks down entirely because the anticipation of noise producing a spiral gives individuals an incentive to defect deliberately in interethnic encounters


1. The focus: The cauterization of ethnic rioting in Indian cities
   a. Ethnic peace in Indian cities: Until we study ethnic peace, we will not be able to have a good theory of ethnic conflict. Thus the “town” or city should be the unit of analysis, because most riots are concentrated within a few cities.
   b. Data: A dataset on Hindi-Muslim riots in India (co-collected with Steve Wilkinson): 2,000 riots from 1950-1995. (coded by leveraging reports in the *Times of India*)
   c. Descriptive findings:
      i. The share of villages in communal rioting turned out to be remarkably small (and concentrated in urban environments)
      ii. Within urban India, too, Hindu-Muslim riots are highly locally concentrated
   d. Research design: Quantitative analysis of riots in India as well as comparative process-tracing in 3 city pairs: Within each pair, one city experienced inter-ethnic rioting following an exogenous shock and the other maintained peace. The qualitative analysis consisted of process-tracing combined with interviews with elites and a cross-section of the poorer population.

2. Extant theories of inter-ethnic violence
   a. Essentialism: The basic intuition is that ethnic conflicts today can be traced back to older animosities between groups
      i. Problem: Essentialism makes it hard to explain why, if animosities are so historically deep and rooted in cultural differences, tensions and violence tend to ebb and flow at different times or in different places
   b. Instrumentalism: Its proposition rests on the purely instrumental use of ethnic identity for political or economic purposes by the elite, regardless of whether they believe in ethnicity.
i. Problem: Why would ethnicity by the basis for mobilization at all? Why do the elites think that ethnicity, not the economic interest of people, is the route to power?

c. Institutionalism:
   i. For Arend Lijphart, in order to be successful and to preempt or reduce ethnic conflict, democracy in a plural society requires elite compromise (consociationalism). Elite compromise can best be assured by a political system that works on intergroup consensus, not competition. A consociational democracy has four features:
      1. A grand coalition of ethnic leaders in government
      2. Mutual vetos given to each
      3. Group proportionality in decision-making positions
      4. Segmented autonomy with respect to matters such as education, language, and personal laws
   ii. For Donald Horowitz, grand coalitions cannot work well if they are not grounded in electoral incentives. The elite should have an incentive to compromise on ethnic matters. Making it impossible for political parties to win power unless they make appeals across ethnic barriers is the best institutions intervention in an ethnically divided society.
      1. Problem with institutional explanations: If the political system and institutions are the same right across the length and breadth of the country, institutional arguments cannot by definition account for why different parts of a country tend to have very different patterns of ethnic violence and peace.

3. The argument: Hindu-Muslim civic engagement cauterizes riots
   a. Theory: The pre-existing local networks of civic engagement between the Hindu and Muslin communities stand out as the single most important proximate cause of inter-ethnic peace and lack of riot escalation.
      i. Where such networks of engagement exist, tensions and conflicts were regulated and managed; where they are missing, communal identities led to endemic and ghastly violence.
      ii. Both associational and everyday forms of engagement promote peace if intercommunal, but the capacity of associational forms to withstand national-level exogenous shocks is substantially higher
   b. Mechanisms I: Promoting communication: By promoting and sustaining communication between members of different religious communities, civic networks often make neighborhood-level peace possible.
   c. Mechanism II: Tying together economic interests: Associations can often serve interests that are not the object of quotidian interactions.
Intercommunal business organizations survive by tying together the business interests of many Hindus and Muslims, not because neighborhood warmth exists between their families. Though valuable in itself, the latter does not necessarily constitute the bedrock for strong civic organizations.

4. **Two types of civic associationalism**
   a. **Associational forms of civic engagement** (best able to maintain peace/diffuse rioting): They tie together the interests (often economic interests) of Hindus and Muslims and consequently are best able to overcome tensions
   b. **Everyday forms of civic engagement**: These include letting children in the neighborhood play with each other.
      i. Informal engagement may often work in villages in keeping the peace, but it does not in cities, which tend to be less interconnected and more anonymous. Size reduces the effectiveness of quotidian interaction; associations are critical when village-like intimacy is impossible

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**Steven Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (2004)**

1. **The electoral motive to riot or not riot in India**
   a. Riots are often planned by politicians for electoral gain: Riots are often planned by politicians, and are best thought of as a solution to the problem of how to change the salience of ethnic issues and identities among the electorate in order to build a winning political coalition. Thus political competition can lead to peace as well as violence
   c. **Data**: A dataset on Hindi-Muslim riots in India (co-collected with Ashutosh Varshney): 2,000 riots from 1950-1995. (coded by leveraging reports in the *Times of India*)
   d. **Research design**: Cross-state regression of inter-ethnic violence (at the state level, as Wilkinson argues that the state level police intervention dominates local political incentives to stir up violence)

5. **Problems with the extant literature on ethnic violence**
   a. **Instrumentalism**:
      i. Scholars have generally looked at political elites who have incited violence, and have not considered those that don’t.
      ii. Many political explanation for ethnic violence fail to account for the variation in patterns of violence within states. They cannot explain
why, within a state, violence breaks out in some towns and regions but not in many others
iii. The role of political incentives in fomenting violence is generally taken to be proven from the simple fact that ethnic violence has broken out and some politician has gained from the outbreak; seldom are political incentives independently shown to exist and to be responsible for the riots

2. The theory
a. Town and state-level electoral incentives account for inter-ethnic violence and state intervention (but state-level dynamics dominate):
   i. Town-level electoral incentives account for where Hindu-Muslim violence breaks out in India
   ii. State-level electoral incentives account for where and when state governments use their police forces to prevent riots. In all empirical cases examined, whether violence is bloody or ends quickly depends not on the local factors that caused violence to break out but primarily on the will and capacity of the government that controls the forces of law and order
   1. State-level patterns of law enforcement dominate local factors: state law enforcement can prevent violence even in so-called riot-prone towns and facilitate it even in towns with no previous history of riots

3. The mechanism: Electoral incentives
a. Politicians will increase protection of minorities when one of two conditions holds:
   i. When minorities are an important part of their party’s current support base, or when the support base of one of their coalition partners in a coalition government
   ii. When the overall electoral system in a state is so competitive- in terms of the effective number of parties- that there is therefore a high probability that the governing party will have to form coalitions with minority supported parties

4. The empirical evidence
a. Political competition is associated with less Hindu-Muslim violence: From 1961 to 1995, higher levels of party competition in the 15 major Indian states are statistically associated with lower levels of Hindu-Muslim violence.
   i. The number of Hindu-Muslim riots goes down as the effective number of parties goes up, with the coefficient for the effective number of parties significant at the 99% level across all models
b. The presence of a Party coalition is associated with less Hindu-Muslim violence: When there is a coalition in a state, the predicted number of riots drops by more than half, from 0.56 riots per year to 0.33 riots. This effect applies even when coalitions include parties generally thought to foment violence, such as the BJP


1. **Inter-ethnic trading cauterizes ethnic violence in Indian port cities**
   a. The long-lasting effects of medieval Hindu-Muslim trading: Medieval Hindus and Muslims could provide complementary, nonreplicable services and a mechanism to share the gains from exchange has resulted in a sustained legacy of ethnic tolerance. Due to Muslim-specific advantages in Indian Ocean shipping, interethnic complementarities were strongest in medieval trading ports, leading to the development of institutional mechanisms that supported interethnic exchange.

   b. The data:
      i. A novel town-level dataset that combines hand-collected information from medieval traveller’s narratives, a 16th century Mughal census, colonial-era indicators of demography and development, qualitative fieldwork conducted in port cities in 2006–07
      ii. A 2005 urban sample of household level data on trust, conflict, and local organization (the Indian Human Development Survey 2009)

2. **The causal mechanisms: Non-expropriable complementarities from trade**
   a. Mechanism I: The presence of a nonreplicable and nonexpropriable source of interethnic complementarity
   b. Mechanism II: Access to a nonviolent institutional mechanism to redistribute or share the gains from trade between groups
      i. To guard against times of economic crisis when agents might be tempted to engage in violence to seize the profits of the other ethnic group

3. **The mechanism of path dependence: Enduring institutional legacies**
   a. Institutional path-dependence: Contemporary interethnic civic engagement, interethnic economic competition, ethnically polarized elections, interethnic inequalities, and ethnic violence are all regularities of behavior that in part reflect the institutional legacy of close to a thousand years of the presence or absence of exogenous complementarities between ethnic groups.
4. The counterfactual: Where ethnic diversity leads to violence
   a. Where ethnic groups compete (trade complementarities or redistribution mechanisms are absent):
      i. Where the source of one group’s complementarity can be violently seized (e.g., physical capital)
      ii. Where the source of one group’s complementarity can be replicated (e.g., low skilled human capital)
      iii. Where an effective nonviolent mechanism for sharing the gains from trade (like commercially oriented trading communities) is lacking

5. The empirical results:
   a. Medieval port cities are far less likely to witness riots: Medieval ports, despite being more ethnically mixed, were five times less prone to Hindu-Muslim riots between 1850 and 1950, two centuries after Europeans disrupted Muslim overseas trade dominance, and remained half as prone between 1950 and 1995.

RELATED ARGUMENTS: SOLIDARITY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES


1. The four social cleavages that “froze” post-19th century
   a. Center-periphery cleavage: Derived from the process of nation-building, or “the conflict between the central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations”
   b. Church-state cleavage: Similarly spurred by nation-building, where “the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing Nation-State [conflicts with] the historically established corporate privileges of the Church”
   c. Urban-rural cleavage: Arising from industrialization, consisting of “the conflict between landed interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs”
   d. Worker-employer class cleavage: Equally a product of industrialization, consisting of “the conflict between owners and employers on the one side and tenants, laborers, and workers on the other”

2. Cross-cutting cleavages engender centripetal party competition
   a. “Processes of interaction can be observed […] in the development of the continental party system. Conflicts between mobilizing elites and
peripheral cultures have in some cases been reinforced, in some cases dampened, by conflicts between the State and the Church and by oppositions between urban and rural interests”

i. Mutually reinforcing cleavages (when the cleavages align with one another): Cause a fragmented, polarized multi-party system

ii. Cross-cutting cleavages (where the cleavages are orthogonal/or counteract one another): Cause a more integrated, centripetal form of party competition


1. Overcoming mutually reinforcing cleavages via elite compromise
   a. Problematizing Lipset and Rokkan (1967): “The political stability of a system can apparently not be predicted solely on the basis of the two variables of political culture and role structure. According to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, one would expect the Low Countries [Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark] with subcultures divided from each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages, to exhibit great immobilism and instability. But they do not.”
   b. Elite compromise in consociational democracy: political elites are statesmen, possessing sufficient discretion and credibility to “make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation.” This is a government by cartel of elite statesmen who hold “the desire to avoid political competition.”

2. The institutional mechanisms that foster consociationalism
   a. A grand coalition of ethnic leaders in government
   b. Mutual vetoes given to each
   c. Group proportionality in decision-making positions
   d. Segmented autonomy with respect to matters such as education, language, and personal laws


1. The dynamics of party competition mediate social cleavages
   a. Problematizing Lipset and Rokkan (1967): If we do not focus on “the political structures – and particularly the party structuring – we are likely to miss this crucial question: How is it that similar socio-economic structures are not translated into similar party systems?”
2. **Centripetal (moderating) vs. Centrifugal (polarizing) party competition**
   a. **Centripetal party competition:**
      i. Arises when anti-system parties and centrist parties are absent
         1. Anti-system parties can blackmail main parties into espousing a more extreme position by threatening to withdraw their support of the political coalition
         2. Centrist parties occupy the centrist political “space,” and consequently prevent this space from being up for grabs via partisan competition. Consequently, parties look for constituencies elsewhere
   b. **Centrifugal party competition:**
      i. Arises when anti-system parties and centrist parties are present