Solidarity in Divided Societies:
A Critical Review of Two Waves of Comparative Scholarship

Tommaso Pavone
tpavone@princeton.edu
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Abstract

This essay focuses on the Durkheimian problem of how fragmented societies maintain social solidarity. To explore some of the relevant contributions made by comparative political scientists, this paper argues that we can fruitfully identify and contrast two ‘waves’ of comparative politics scholarship. Section II critically analyzes the first wave that predominated in the 1960s and the 1970s, which I term the system-focused political sociology wave. In this wave, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba and Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan hold the greatest elective affinities with the sociological structural functionalist paradigm, whereas Arend Lijphart and Giovanni Sartori sought to place greater focus on government dynamics and political institutions. Section III turns to the second wave, which runs primarily from the 1990s through the present day and focuses more narrowly on how ethnically divided societies can induce inter-ethnic peace and cooperation. Amongst its most prominent contributors are James Fearon and David Laitin, Ashustosh Varshney, Steven Wilkinson, and Sumitra Jha. I call this the mechanism-driven ethnic conflict wave, since this literature turns from ‘systemic’ concerns to a greater emphasis on causal mechanisms and microfoundations to facilitate comparatively more rigorous empirical testing. Finally, Section IV concludes with a comparative assessment of the two waves, arguing against the displacement of the first wave by the second wave and in favor of a constructive combination of the two.
I. Introduction

This essay focuses on the Durkheimian problem of how fragmented societies maintain social solidarity. While Durkheim’s argument that the division of labor induces organic solidarity in industrialized society\(^1\) has grown out of fashion, the preoccupation with how divided societies can nonetheless maintain social cohesion is a perennial one that transcends perspectival divides and continues to underlie much of the comparative politics literature. To explore some of the relevant contributions made by comparative political scientists, this paper argues that we can fruitfully identify and compare two ‘waves’ of comparative politics scholarship,\(^2\) whose characteristics are charted in Table 1 (Appendix). Section II critically analyzes the first wave that predominated in the 1960s and the 1970s, which I term the system-focused political sociology wave. Its most influential contributors include Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Arend Lijphart, and Giovanni Sartori.\(^3\) In this wave, Almond and Verba and Lipset and Rokkan hold the greatest elective affinities with the sociological structural functionalist paradigm, whereas Lijphart and Sartori sought to place greater focus on government dynamics and political institutions. Section III turns to the second wave, which runs primarily from the 1990s through the present day and focuses more narrowly on how ethnically divided societies can induce inter-ethnic peace and cooperation. Amongst its most prominent contributors are James Fearon and David Laitin, Ashustosh Varshney, Steven Wilkinson, and Sumitra Jha.\(^4\) I call this the mechanism-driven ethnic conflict wave, since this literature turns from ‘systemic’ concerns to a greater emphasis on causal mechanisms and microfoundations, in large part to facilitate comparatively more rigorous empirical testing. Finally, Section IV concludes with a comparative assessment of the two waves, arguing

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1 See Durkheim’s classic 1893 work, *The Division of Labor in Society.*
2 While other literatures also share an interest in social unity, particularly the scholarship on nationalism (see Weber 1976; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983) and public goods provision in divided societies (Miguel 2004; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Lieberman 2009), social cohesion is often derivative/latent vis-à-vis the primary/manifest concepts being explored. For this admittedly unsatisfying reason and for the more pragmatic and compelling reason of space constraints, I do not discuss these literatures here.
3 This section focuses on Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture* (1963), Lipset and Rokkan’s “Cleave Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments” (1967), Lijphart’s “Consciotiational Democracy” (1969), and Sartori’s “A Typology of Party Systems” (1990). Note that the latter is a summary of Sartori’s canonical *Parties and Party Systems* (1976), and for this reason is included in the first wave.
against the displacement of the first wave by the second wave and in favor of a constructive combination of the two.

II. The System-Focused Political Sociology Wave (1960s – 1970s)

The system-focused political sociology wave is best understood as an evolving conversation amongst the most prominent comparative political scientists of the 1960s and 1970s. As such, I organize my analysis chronologically, beginning Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture*.

Almond and Verba (1963) focus on how culturally fragmented societies, particularly in the wake of the second wave of democratization, can nonetheless achieve democratic stability. Building upon Parsonian structural functionalism, the authors begin from the premise that social change does not proceed via a sharp dialectical displacement of one socioeconomic system by another (as in classical Marxist theory); rather, it is best understood as a process of cultural layering. To make this argument, three cultural ideal types are conceptualized: (1) *parochial cultures*, where citizens hold low cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations towards the “generic” system and its constituent political objects, and where “the individual thinks of his family’s advantage as the only goal to pursue, or conceives of his role in the political system in familistic terms” (Almond and Verba 1967: 17; 20; 120); (2) *subject cultures*, characterized high cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations towards the political system and policy outputs, but minimal orientations towards input objects (like political parties) and where the individual perceives “the law [to be] something he obeys, not something he helps shape” (ibid: 17; 20; 118); and (3) *participant cultures*, where members of society have high cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations to the political system, input objects, and policy outputs, and where individuals hold “the virtues of the subject – to obey the law, to be loyal – but [are] also expected to take some part in the formation of decisions” (ibid: 18; 20; 118). Most political cultures are mixtures of the foregoing three ideal types, and the most desirable combination, the *civic culture*, is certainly no exception. In the civic culture,

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5 Particularly from Talcott Parsons’ 1937 work, *The Structure of Social Action*.

6 For Almond and Verba, *cognitive orientation* means “knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs,” *affective orientation* means “feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance,” and *evaluational orientation* means “judgments and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings” (1963: 14).

7 Political objects include (1) the “general” political system, (2) the specific roles or structures in the system (such as legislatures and bureaucracies), (3) the incumbents of roles (such as monarchs and legislators), and (4) public policies (decisions or enforcements of decisions) (Almond and Verba 1963: 14).
the participant role is layered atop the subject and parochial roles\(^8\) (ibid: 339). The virtue of the civic culture lies in its ability to engender democratic homeostasis: brief spurts of intense political mobilization, which validate the “myth” of the fully participatory culture, are followed by periods of normal politics with minimal citizen participation as they retire to their parochial/subject roles. In short, an “equilibrium mechanism” arises where “an issue becomes salient, activity rises, and balance is restored by a governmental response that reduces the salience of the issue” (ibid: 352). It follows that an imbalance in the distribution of the three cultural layers, as in Italy where the parochial culture is predominant (ibid: 37-38; 362), risks engendering citizen alienation and democratic instability.

For Lipset and Rokkan, cultural divisions alone do not capture all relevant fractures in political society. In their classic “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments,” they seek to explain how different party systems derive from four historically emergent\(^9\) and enduring\(^10\) social cleavages: (1) a *center-periphery cleavage* derived from the process of nation-building, or “the conflict between the central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations;” (2) a *church-state cleavage*, similarly spurred by nation-building, where “the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing Nation-State [conflicts with] the historically established corporate privileges of the Church;” (3) an *urban-rural cleavage*, arising from industrialization, consisting of “the conflict between landed interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs;” and (4) a *workers-employers class cleavage*, equally a product of industrialization, consisting of “the conflict between owners and employers on the one side and tenants, laborers, and workers on the other” (1967: 14; 34). What determines whether society fractures and produces a polarized multi-party system is the degree to which the above cleavages are *cross-cutting* or *mutually-reinforcing*: “processes of interaction can be observed […] in the development of the continental party system. Conflicts between mobilizing elites and peripheral cultures have in some cases been reinforced, in some cases dampened, by conflicts between the State and the Church and by oppositions between urban and rural interests”

\(^8\) In short, citizens maintain their traditional, parochial ties (such as church membership) as well as their more passive political role (as subjects accepting of elite decision-making).

\(^9\) The main historical processes analyzed by Lipset and Rokkan include the reformation, the democratic revolution post-1789 and subsequent process of nation-building, and the industrial revolution (1967: 37-39).

\(^10\) This is a reference to the thesis of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) that social cleavages emerging through the 1920s subsequently ‘froze,’ and continued to structure politics through the 1960s.
In contradistinction to Almond and Verba’s logic, Lipset and Rokkan highlight that a layering of all four cleavages does not necessarily spur social unity: the particular alignment of the cleavages matters, for only if they cross-cut and “counterbalance” one another can social cohesion emerge, as in the Swiss state-building experience (ibid).

Yet Lipset and Rokkan did not settle the matter. Indeed, Lijphart’s 1969 article, “Consociational Democracy,” represents the beginning of a lifelong quest to prove Lipset and Rokkan’s conclusions wrong. “The political stability of a system,” writes Lijphart, “can apparently not be predicted solely on the basis of the two variables of political culture and role structure. According to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, one would expect the Low Countries […] with subcultures divided from each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages, to exhibit great immobilism and instability. But they do not” (1969: 211). Lipset and Rokkan’s mistake, he argues, is that politics are not merely epiphenomenal, or derivative of the degree of social fragmentation, but can occasionally become partially autonomous from social structure. In consociational democracies, political elites possess sufficient discretion and credibility to “make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation” (ibid: 212). Here, so long as representatives hold “the desire to avoid political competition,” the elite political class holds the system together by compromising over the heads of a polarized electorate (ibid: 214). In short, one can characterize consociationalism as government by a “cartel of elites” (ibid: 214). No doubt, Lijphart’s personal experience with the politics of the Netherlands and neighboring Belgium served as the primary inspiration for the theory of consociationalism.

Giovanni Sartori’s contribution to the foregoing debate is to explicate consociationalism and democratic fragmentation as an outcome of party competition, representing a longstanding personal effort to advocate for a transition from structural functionalism to the institutional workings of party systems. For Sartori, if we jump to socio-cultural explanations of partisan dynamics without first identifying “the political structures – and particularly the party structuring – we are likely to miss this crucial question: How is it that similar socio-economic structures are not translated into similar

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11 Not unlike Robert Putnam’s logic of two-level games (see Putnam 1988) or George Tsebelis’ concept of nested games (see Tsebelis 1990). In fact, the latter provides an explicit reformulation of consociationalism as a two-level nested game.


party systems?” (1990: 339). Indeed, Lijphart (1969) is surprisingly silent on the issue, implying that elite cooperation is the observable implication of a shared normative predilection for political compromise. In contradistinction, Sartori posits that multi-party systems embedded within divided societies are likely to exhibit either centripetal (moderating) or centrifugal (polarizing) party competition contingent upon (1) the existence of anti-system parties and (2) the presence of a centrist party. When anti-system parties arise and become sufficiently powerful to “blackmail” parties in government, they pull otherwise moderate parties towards the ideological extremes, producing a set of bilateral “counter-oppositions that are, in constructive terms, incompatible” (ibid: 330). Further, the existence of a centrist party is “of great consequence, for it implies that the central area of the political system is out of competition […] the very existence of a centre party (or parties) discourages ‘centrality’” (ibid: 331). When both types of parties are present, the dynamics of party competition switch from being centripetal to being centrifugal, thus transforming segmented multiparty systems\(^{14}\) into systems of polarized pluralism (ibid: 337-339; 329-331). The implication is that divided societies can foster the politics of moderation/convergence so long as the political center is open for partisan competition and anti-system parties do not exist (as was the case in postwar West Germany, where the Communist Party was banned).

To conclude, we can detect areas of continuity as well as development in the scholarship comprising the system-focused political sociology wave. All four aforementioned works maintain a focus on the general system – though only Sartori, thanks to his penchant for taxonomical conceptualization, is clear about the properties comprising the ‘system’ as a conceptual class.\(^{15}\) A political sociology approach underlies all three works, for the object of social inquiry remains the interactions between social structure and the political dynamics of governance.\(^{16}\) The primary area of divergence is captured by the incremental transition from greater proximity to sociological structural functionalism (Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) in favor of greater emphasis on government dynamics and political institutions (Lijphart 1970; Sartori 1990). Finally,

\(^{14}\) This is Sartori’s terminology for consociational democracies.

\(^{15}\) By focusing on the “party system” and clearly specifying counting rules for the number of parties in the system, Sartori avoids conflating regime type, social structure, and party system; something which cannot always be said particularly for Almond and Verba (1963). and Lipset and Rokkan (1967).

\(^{16}\) Even Almond and Verba, who appear almost exclusively preoccupied with sociocultural factors, hold that the civic culture mediates the contradictions inherent in democratic systems, namely the tension between government power/effectiveness and government accountability/responsiveness (1963: 341).
the conceptual strengths of the system-focused political sociology wave are counterbalanced by their comparative empirical weaknesses\textsuperscript{17} and, frequently, by their somewhat cavalier treatment of microfoundational causal mechanisms. It is this deficiency that is remedied by subsequent scholarship, to which we now turn.

II. The Mechanism-Driven Ethnic Conflict Wave (1990s – present)

Another wave of democratization and institutional change diffused across the globe following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, reinvigorating the study of how divided societies can promote social cohesion. This coincided with a burgeoning ontological interest in mitigating \textit{ethnic conflict},\textsuperscript{18} combined with an epistemological turn from general theory to clearly-specified \textit{causal mechanisms}\textsuperscript{19} and \textit{rigorous empirical validation}. It is these traits that define the mechanism-driven ethnic conflict wave and differentiate it from the literature heretofore discussed.

Beginning chronologically once more, James Fearon and David Laitin’s 1996 article, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” is a foundational piece.\textsuperscript{20} In the article, the authors focus below the systemic level and analyze the dynamics endogenous to the structure of ethnic groups. The mechanistic turn is explicit from the start: “we are not offering a full causal theory of either ethnic peace or violence. We specify what we believe are important causal mechanisms that appear to have been systematically neglected” (Fearon and Laitin 1996: 715). Relying on statistical evidence that inter-ethnic violence is surprisingly rare in ethnically heterogenous Africa, the authors posit that ethnic groups are comprised of highly developed social networks that can diffuse information and mitigate a violence spiral via \textit{in-group policing} (ibid: 717; 715). Given the presence of two ethnic groups, Fearon and Laitin describe the in-group policing dynamics as follows: “[by] adopting a policy of “you identify and punish your miscreants and we will do the same,” [both

\textsuperscript{17} True, this assessment is in large part retrospective; Almond and Verba (1963), for example, were the first to conduct a large-scale cross-national survey of democratic attitudes and beliefs, which represented an attempt to combine structural functionalist theory with individual-level survey data. Nonetheless, by more contemporary standards, it is clear that these works’ continuing contribution lies in their theoretical concepts more than their empirical strategies and microfoundations.

\textsuperscript{18} The low emphasis on ethnic conflict in the first wave of literature is largely due to the fact that most of its contributors were Europeanists or focused on West European politics; the growing concern with the politics of the developing world, and particularly of Africa and South Asia, sparked substantial interest in the specific study of ethnic conflict.

\textsuperscript{19} For a particularly lucid statement in support of a turn to mechanisms, see Elster (1998).

\textsuperscript{20} Along with symbolizing the beginnings of an exceptionally productive cooperative venture between the two scholars. For more on this and the foundational impact of their 1996 article, see Munck and Snyder (2007: 601-648).
groups] take advantage of the fact that each group has better information about the behavior of its own members than about the other group and so can target individuals rather than whole groups” (ibid: 722). Leveraging what Laitin later referred to as the “tripartite frame,” the authors construct a formal model to demonstrate that a spiral equilibrium, where an entire group is violently punished for the misbehavior of any given member, is more sensitive to noise, and hence more unstable, than an in-group policing equilibrium (ibid: 732-734). They subsequently corroborate this logic with narrative evidence drawn from brief historical case studies (ibid: 727-730). In short, inter-group violence can be “cauterized” without dampening ethnic identity, as “both spiral equilibria and in-group policing will tend to reproduce and maintain the sense of ethnic difference through time” (ibid: 731).

Building on the framework of Fearon and Laitin, Ashutosh Varshney’s 2002 book, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, incorporates Putnam’s conceptualization of social capital into the analysis of inter-ethnic relations via a study of riots in Indian towns. Yet Varshney focuses less on within-group dynamics than on inter-ethnic engagement: “the focus is on the intercommunal, not intracommunal, networks of civic life, which bring different communities together” (2002: 3). Civic life is conceptually disaggregated into an informal and a formal institutional variant, namely: (1) everyday forms of civic engagement (consisting of “simple, routine interactions of life [such] as Hindu and Muslim families visiting each other”), and (2) associational forms of civic engagement (such as “[b]usiness associations, professional organizations […] trade unions, and cadre-based political parties”) (ibid). Varshney explains that these forms of civic engagement function to engender inter-group solidarity via two mechanisms: (1) an information diffusion mechanism, where civic engagement “[promotes] communication between members of different” groups; and (2) when inter-ethnic associations are present, an interest-pooling mechanism: “Intercommunal business organizations survive by tying together the business interests of many Hindus and Muslims, not because neighborhood warmth exists between Hindu and Muslim families” (ibid: 10). By fusing quotidian interaction with material interest, civic associations are robust to exogenous shocks, such

21 See, inter alia, Laitin (2003) for an overview of the method, which consists of game theory, statistical analysis, and narrative.
22 Some good historical examples of this dynamic are the bloodfeuds of medieval England.
23 As in the cross-cutting cleavage framework of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) or cultural layering logic of Almond and Verba (1963).
as the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque at the hands of Hindu nationalists in 1992 (ibid: 17). Combining statistical analysis of a dataset of all cases of Hindu-Muslim riots in India between 1950 and 1995 with qualitative process-tracing of archival research and interviews conducted within three city-pairs, Varshney concludes that “associational civic engagement is necessary for peace in interethnic urban settings” (ibid: 6; 14; 52).

Leveraging the same aforementioned dataset of Hindu-Muslim riots, Steven Wilkinson’s 2004 book, Votes and Violence, pulls a similar move vis-à-vis Varshney that Sartori (1990) made vis-à-vis Lijphart (1969), namely to focus less on inter-group interaction and norms of engagement and more on inter-party competition and electoral incentives. “[E]thnic riots,” writes Wilkinson, “are often planned by politicians for a clear electoral purpose. They are best thought of as a solution to the problem of how to change the salience of ethnic issues and identities among the electorate in order to build a winning coalition” (2004: 1). Given the presence of certain necessary background conditions, this perspective holds that political parties will make use of state police forces to subdue rioting when either: (1) ethnic minorities comprise the party’s core constituency or the constituency of one of its coalition partners; or (2) when the electoral system is so competitive (measured by whether at least 3.5 effective political parties compete within a given state district) that, regardless of the party’s preferences, it is likely to require ethnic minority support in the future (ibid: 4; 6-7). Statistical results corroborate the causal role of the two foregoing mechanisms: as the effective number of parties in a state district increases, the number of Hindu-Muslim riots decreases significantly, and when a multi-party coalition is present, the “predicted number of riots drops by more than half” (ibid: 150; 152). Thus in contradistinction with Sartori, who feared that in divided societies a fragmented party system could exacerbate polarization via centrifugal competition, Wilkinson concludes that “minorities benefit from high levels of party fractionalization” because of the electoral incentives for political parties to recruit minority support and foster inter-ethnic peace (ibid: 140).

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25 Where within each pair one city experienced inter-ethnic rioting following an exogenous shock and the other maintained the peace (Varshney 2002: 14).

26 Varshney’s preliminary empirical analysis found that most cases of inter-ethnic rioting occurs in urban areas, thus establishing the “town or city” as the unit of analysis” (2002: 7).

27 These background conditions include: (1) multiple politically salient issue dimensions; (2) the fact that “minorities will be willing to “bid low” in terms of what they demand from majority parties across most issues in order to maximize their security;” and (3) that the majority ethnic group does not consider providing for the security of the minority group as fundamentally threatening to its own interests (Wilkinson 2004: 140).
Finally, Saumitra Jha’s recent article, “Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance,” contributes to the foregoing debate by reviving a longstanding belief concerning the ‘civilizing’ effects of trade. As Albert Hirschman famously recounted in *The Passions and the Interests*, political theorists from Savary to Montesquieu to Steuart to Hume all believed in the “gentleness” and “softening,” “calming,” and “polishing” capacities of commercial activity (Hirschman 1977: 60-65; 80). By leveraging historical narrative and census data, a dataset of Indian Hindu-Muslim riots between 1850 and 1950, and contemporary survey evidence, Jha demonstrates that commercial activity can indeed induce peaceful relations amongst potential rivals (2013: 807). For example, Jha notes that ethnically mixed port cities in medieval times “were five times less prone to Hindu-Muslim riots between 1850 and 1950” (ibid: 806). He argues that this occurs through two causal mechanisms: (1) “the presence of a nonreplicable and nonexpropriable source of interethnic complementarity;” and (2) “access to a nonviolent mechanism to redistribute and share the gains from trade between groups” (ibid). In the case of Indian port cities, the “Muslim dominance of overseas trade [which] continued for close to a thousand years” rendered it impossible for mainland Hindus to “steal or replicate” the former’s trading networks (ibid: 811; 810). Further, the relatively low barriers to entry into Muslim trading networks produced a de facto “decentralized mechanism of redistribution of the surplus from trade to the local population” (ibid: 810). Thus, much as Varshney highlights civic associations’ ability to foster inter-ethnic solidarity via interest-pooling, so Jha posits that “higher mutual incentives existed in medieval ports than other towns for residents to invest in and develop complementary mechanisms to maintain the incentives for peaceful coexistence” (ibid: 812). Jha’s historical institutionalist logic then posits that “these mechanisms, once developed, were costly to reverse by any individual agent,” producing a path-dependent and solidarity-inducing “‘institutional’ environment” that “survived to this day” (ibid).28

In short, whether by focusing on state-level electoral incentives (Wilkinson 2004) or city-level trade complementarities (Jha 2013), the turn to mechanisms in this second wave of scholarship is clear. By specifying the microfoundations of posited causal mechanisms, these scholars are able to leverage a plethora of sophisticated methodological tools – from game theoretic models (Fearon

28 Here, Jha echoes much of the new institutionalist literature in comparative political economy that considers how the path-dependent historical legacy of sometimes chance events explains developmental divergences across space (see, *inter alia*, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)).
and Laitin 1996) to qualitative process tracing via archival research and qualitative interviews (Varshney 2004), to empirically test said mechanisms. This move towards specification and empirical validation was further facilitated by restricting the scope of social inquiry to inter-ethnic peace and conflict. Yet there is an opportunity cost to this approach, to which we now turn.

IV. Conclusion: Missing the Trees for the Forest or the Forest for the Trees?
If the system-focused political sociology wave frequented the high clouds of abstract theory, then perhaps the more grounded mechanism-driven ethnic conflict wave has overcompensated by missing the forest for the trees. Where Almond and Verba (1963) and Lipset and Rokkan (1967) understood that cultural and social identities are “thick,” multi-dimensional phenomena that are complementary in some contexts and contradictory in others, the mechanism-driven ethnic conflict wave has collapsed social divisions into a single indicator: ethnicity. Where Sartori (1976; 1990) has spent most of his life conceptualizing party systems, Wilkinson (2004)’s framework relies on a single quantitative indicator of party system dynamics: the effective number of parties. And where Lijphart (1969) highlights that elites can hold normative predilections in favor of compromise in partial defiance of the logic of instrumental rationality, individual agents in Varshney (2002) and Jha (2013) are treated as more pure material interest-maximizers. These are, of course, simplifying assumptions meant to facilitate formal modeling, measurement, and rigorous testing. Yet we must remember that just as there is reason to be skeptical of the system-focused political sociology wave’s opaque microfoundations and relatively weak empirical strategies, so too we should be skeptical of approaches that reduce the complex social dynamics of divided societies to a small set of causal mechanisms and statistical indicators. To gratuitously borrow from Almond and Verba (1963)’s argument, rather than displacing the first wave of scholarship with the second wave, perhaps we should seek to layer one atop the other. The focus of future scholarship should then turn to calibrating the appropriate mixture of the two approaches. This, I argue, is the best way to do justice to the complex and enduring dilemma of how to foster solidarity in divided societies.

29 An excellent example of this problem from the literature on democracy and development is the contemporary treatment of Lipset’s seminal 1959 article, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.” Whereas Lipset highlighted a series of economic and non-economic variables, contemporary treatments (see Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix and Stokes 2003) have focused on an imperfect measure of just one of Lipset’s variables (namely GDP per capita) to assess the validity of his general framework. While these analyses are far more sophisticated than Lipset’s (flawed) correlation analyses, they tend to flatten and simplify what Lipset clearly considered to be a very complicated relationship.
V. Works Cited


