In War’s Wake

*International Conflict and the Fate of Liberal Democracy*

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Challenges with a smaller force, war led American presidents to rely on market mobilization as a way to do more with less. When seen to be more successful than its alternatives, market-based mobilization has thus far generally undermined democratic processes in the United States. War's impact on the character of politics thus follows similar patterns but with widely divergent implications for democracy.

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Concluding Reflections

What Wars Do

Miguel Angel Centeno

What do wars do? They obviously kill and destroy, but ever since Weber and Hirst, if not before, we have known that they do much more. These authors noted the centrality of war and political organization for the political, social, and economic development of the broadly defined “West.” More recently, Charles Tilly has argued that without war, the contemporary state would be unimaginable. The authors in this volume have sought to establish a more precise position: that there exists a positive link between war and democracy.

Such an argument seems paradoxical on many levels. Given our general positive view of democracy, how can it arise from the equal killing, violence, and injustice of war? Given the chaos and destruction that accompanies conflict, how can it produce something as dependent on rules as democracy? And yet the historical evidence does indicate a link.

Proponents of the war-democracy axis often rely on broad correlation rather than direct causation. Simply put, in certain periods and in certain places there were a lot of wars, and afterward there were more democracies than before. Small-n studies allow a better handle on how the specific policies that accompanied a country being at war later led to more progressive measures in one sphere or another. Even rigorous statistical testing does not falsify the claim, but merely suggests that the relationship may be more complex than some attest.

But the arguments always have some causal ambiguity. Are the exchanges that make democratic rule possible directly related to war or only spuriously associated with it? Does any conflict at any time have this effect, or only do some wars, at some times, and in some places help produce democracy? Does the simple size of the conflict (as measured in deaths, perhaps) matter, or is what counts the extent to which the populace becomes involved? If only some wars make democracies, can we really speak of a general rule, or only

This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Charles Tilly.

1 Hirst 1977; Weber 1978.
a regionally and historically defined phenomenon? How long does it take for war to produce these effects? Finally, is war a necessary or a sufficient factor in establishing, bolstering, or extending democratic rule? The preceding chapters all make valuable contributions to answering these questions. By way of conclusion, this chapter discusses how the "war effect" plays different roles in supporting the constituent parts or stages of democracy as defined by T. H. Marshall. Rather than arguing that war supports or does not support the establishment of democratic rule in general, we need to ask about its role in producing and/or defending civil or constitutional rights, political and electoral rights, and social rights. Such a strategy will allow for more rigorous and concrete analysis of the proposed causal links. In the second part of the chapter, I propose that the creation of what Benedict Anderson calls an "imagined community" 4 is the central mechanism through which war supports democracy in its various aspects. This link is largely neglected in the contributions to this volume and needs much more attention. I then discuss the problem of geographical and historical specificity of the "war effect" and conclude with some thoughts on the implications for democracy of the transformation of what we may call the "Western Way of War." 5

WAR AND RIGHTS

While the assertion that war and democracy are linked (in both causal directions) is often cited, much less attention has been paid to the specific aspects of democracy that war actually supports. What is the specific way in which war helps (or hinders) the development of civil, political, and social rights? The foundational right in a democracy is that which recognizes the basic autonomy and inviolability of the individual. Civil rights protect that status by assuring constraints on state actions regarding the life or property of a citizen. How does war affect this? It does so in both negative and positive ways.

As Ronald R. Keesy (Chapter 9) notes, war can have very different effects on the concentration of power inside a regime and how that power is exercised. In some scenarios, wars can have very detrimental effects on civil liberties. Wars provide "emergencies" during which legal rights are perceived as possibly unnecessary and even dangerous luxuries. The suppression of basic civil rights has often accompanied wars. Freedom of speech is limited, the constraints on government are weakened, and individuals are required to give up some of their "negative freedom" to the collective needs of the endangered whole. In these instances, wars are prone to creating what Paul Starr (Chapter 3), following Harold Lasswell, calls "patriotic states." As Daniel Kryder (Chapter 25) demonstrates, perceptions of imminent danger help determine basic policing capacity.

The appeal of such draconian policies is considerable. In the wake of 9/11, and considerably after, it was a brave and rare American public figure who warned about the dangers of giving federal and executive authorities too much power. Even eight years later, debate continues about the extent to which a democracy must "calm" its rules in order to protect itself. The notion that torture might "save lives" (no matter how empirically falsifiable) had (and has) adherents, as did (and does) the notion that constitutional guarantees should not serve as obstacles to strategy. In the absence of dissenting views and with a constant flow of propaganda, states at war can create public atmospheres so consumed with fear of or loathing for an enemy that active suppression may even become redundant. 1984's Winston Smith might well be aware of the lies of dictatorial rule, but he still succumbed to the power of the "two minute hate." 6

The horrible thing about The Two Minutes Hate was not that one was obliged to act a part, but that it was impossible to avoid joining it. Within thirty seconds any pretense was always unnecessary. A hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces in with a sledge hammer, seemed to flow through the whole group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one's will into a grimacing, screaming hysteric. 7

Similar experiences can be found in more democratic societies engaged with their enemies. Wars have the capacity to turn us all into lunatics and to convince us that only the state can protect us from the horrifying foe. The consequences of this form of patriotic euphoria are evident and sinister. In these cases, it is precisely democratic rule that may drive us into the arms of authoritarian temptation. There is a long tradition that blames democratic institutions and practices for such unnecessary measures during wartime. It is popular demands for protection and revenge that may lead governments to repetitive policies they would not take on their own. 8 It is the call of the crowd for blood, rather than the tyranny of leaders, that presents the greatest danger. If the enemy is "foreign" or different enough, the simple drawing of the distinction between the threat and the victims can actually produce euphoric expressions of belonging. The most obvious rub, of course, comes from giving anyone the right to label whomsoever as an enemy, if they come for them today in the "Black Maria," when do they come for me?

Obviously, the effect of this fear sometimes dissipates in the postwar period. In fact, as Keesy notes, the excesses of war often turn into the lessons that help us better protect our rights. "Permanent states of war," however, are not unknown. A variety of regimes justify the continuing limitation on individual freedoms by either claiming that the enemy remains undefeated, or by pulling ever-new terrors from the political magician's hat. This is particularly tempting.
military service may conversely serve as a bulwark of ingrained power. Ethnic minorities may be excluded from the military for fear that their loyalties may be in question. Or military service may be used to legitimize a hierarchical ordering of society. The resistance of the samurai to the Meiji reforms, for example, was in part based on their awareness that these would elevate previously destitute peasants into potential soldiers. Similarly, one could trace many of the gender- or sex-based barriers to full citizenship to the historical male monopoly on military service.

What of voting and war? The complex relationship between electoral democracy and the military, between the polling booth and the barracks, has been the subject of the most study, and Edward E. Mansfield and Jack Snyder’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 3) provides a rigorous foundation for future discussion. When we include the entire globe of democracies, there appears to be a weak relationship between suffrage and conflict, or between war and democracy.

We ought not to be surprised that electoral rights are much more complicated and historically contingent than what we may call civil liberties or even citizenship. Electoral democracy requires both that people be allowed to vote and that their vote actually mean something for political decision making. The relationship between war and the political import of election results is, therefore, harder to unravel than a simple one-time exchange.

A key historical step here, as Deborah Avant (Chapter 12) notes, is the creation of mass armies, where the nobility no longer fights merely supported by a noble, but where the nation as a whole is called to arms. For some, this represents an ideal of citizens voluntarily serving a republic and therefore establishing their ownership of it. For others, it is the mechanism of conscription, which following the logic of the discussion on civil rights, triggers the exchange exemplified in a Swedish folk saying: “One soldier, one rille, one vote.” In this process, each individual willing to risk his life (and again the gender specificity is important) is paid off by the state with a promise of suffrage.

Conversely, wars can elicit states of emergency where elections need to be postponed, as Mayor Giuliani hinted in the aftermath of 9/11. In the same way that “emergency powers” required by war can lead to the trampling of civil rights, military crises may be seen as prohibiting the political expenses of elections. Wars also potentially limit suffrage by forcing the creation of “grand coalitions” that not only obscure political differences, but also retain power through an agreed deferment of elections, as was the case with the British War Cabinet of World War II.

There is also the tricky historical question of causal order. Which really comes first, the soldier or the citizen? Do mass armies produce mass citizenship, or do already massified polities produce mass armies? Avant notes that,
rior to the French Revolution, the concept of a conscript army was already making headway. Conscription regimes in places like Tsarist Russia certainly did not lead to greater political rights. (Except, of course, in that when the army had enough of the slaughter in 1937, the armed population could force regime change.) It would appear that the notion of a participating citizen army already exists for conscription to escalate into democracy. Conscription is, therefore, perhaps best thought of as a critical political stimulus to speed up an already ongoing process. We do not have enough historical detail on these questions. What is needed is detailed research that carefully documents the process through which conscription evolved from an obligation imposed on the most miserable of subjects ("the scum of the earth" in Wellington's phrase) to the expected duty of the free citizen. We know, for example, of Tschechov's approval of "citizen armies" as opposed to the mercenary variety in the sixteenth century, but how did this relate to the domestic politics of the Italian city-states?

Moreover, suffrage does not mean democracy. Even if war plays a significant role in expanding voting rights, there is no reason to believe that these ones will have any meaning. Totalitarian regimes have considerable expertise in managing rituals of popular participation where the regime receives overwhelming support. "Perfect dictatorships," such as pre-1900 Mexico, can have relatively free elections with little hope for regime change. How do elections become actually relevant, and what is the role of war, if any, in that process?

Nancy Bermeo (Chapter 4) comes closest to proposing specific conditions under which military conflict can promote democratic government. Her findings seem to indicate that military defeat is sometimes a driver of democratic reform (but no guarantee, as many cases in interwar Europe attest). Yet note that at the core of this effect there is no necessarily military component. It is the public failure of a regime to accomplish some goal that delegitimizes authoritarian rule enough to provide an opportunity for democracy. Such legitimation could come from an economic crisis or a simple failure to perform adequately. Rather than war making democracy, we might better speak failure doing so. Note, however, that similar failures can also lead to the collapse of democratic regimes.

The final aspect to take into consideration when defining the relationship between war and voting is that other supposed child of war, state development. For democracy to be established in any meaningful way, the state has to have enough capacity not just to run an election, but also to make its results seem something in policy terms. As Charles Tilly argued, the very process of demanding and defending rights was part of the give and take of state-making at the first place. Wars have been cited as producing both states and democracies, but the order of their creation might be critical. It may be that for a sanctioning democracy, one needs two wars: one to create a state, the next to take it democratic. Efforts to do the latter without the former may lead to failure and a return to simpler authoritarian rule.
make the military a leading social service provider in the United States. The extent to which these services then lead to a broader welfare isomorphism needs to be better analyzed. 39

The findings of the chapters in this volume indicate that war has a potentially important role to play in the development of democracy, but it is certainly not necessary or sufficient, and may even contribute to developments antithetical to democracy. As Starr notes, wars may be catalytic moments, but the outcome of transformations are far from certain. Instead of perhaps too broad a claim about the causal relationship between conflict and democracy, the chapters provide a more detailed view of the wake of war: states with more potential interventionist capacity, and citizenship with a greater potential claim for voice. The next step has to be to ask what makes these potentialities real.

WAR AND THE IMAGINED COMMUNITY

Describing the aftermath of an Athenian naval battle toward the end of the Peloponnesian War, Barry Strauss nicely evokes the spirit often associated with war:

For a brief moment they were all Athenians. On an afternoon in September 406 B.C., the city of Athens achieved a unity that usually eluded it. It was imperfect unity, with no women and only a small percentage of Athenian men present—less than one percent. Yet those men represented a cross-section of Athens’ male population. They ranged from the richest to the poorest, from cavalry to kavevo, from representatives of families so old that they seemed to have sprung from the soil itself to immigrants from obscure villages somewhere in Thrace or Sicily. As a group they comprised citizens, residents (resident aliens), foreign mercenaries, and slaves. They spanned the ranks of the Athenian military, from heavymen to hoplites (infantrymen), from drab-soldiers to rangers, from the horse guards to scouts. On this afternoon, men who normally would have scorned each other became brothers. They extended their hands to each other, literally, because they had to hold on for dear life. 40

This passage exemplifies that oft-cited claim that wars make “brothers” of us all (again, the gender/sexual identity question is an important one for democratic suffrage). The centrality of war in nation-making was recognized by the German idealists of the nineteenth century. Herder defined the origin of the German folk in the battle of the Teutoburg Forest, Fichte celebrated the spirit of Jena, and Hegel compared war to an ocean wind purifying the health of the people from the “corruption” of perpetual peace. The great historian of war, Michael Howard, claims that for much of nineteenth-century Europe, “war was the necessary dialectic in the evolution of nations.” 41 Georg Simmel could

For a broad discussion of this relationship, see Mann 1993; Oldenar 1985.

40 In a contemporary example, the dearth and physical conditions of recruits into the Russian military has focused that state’s attention on the families of public welfare provisions.

41 The one policy that has received the most attention is the smaller black-white test gap and the generally higher educational achievement of students in Department of Defense schools on military bases.

42 Strauss 2004.

43 Howard 1994, 39.
celebrate the start of World War I as an opportunity to consolidate national sentiment and cohesion: "[T]he war heralded a purging in the Augustan stables of the urbanized money cultures of the West, rooting out all that was ephemeral, superficial, excessive, and insensate in the experience of life."

More recently, in part as a reaction to the too-quickly-accepted notion of what we may call an "Ambrosian spirit," there has been rigorous questioning of the extent to which wars do create nations. As Jay Winter (Chapter 6) argues, wars can lead to what might even be called antinationalist or certainly antibellistic movements. The "Vietnam syndrome" is an obvious example, and we may expect something similar following Iraq. Yet I would argue that there is fairly clear evidence for war making a strong contribution to, not necessarily a state-centered nationalism, but a less institutionally coherent, united, if imagined, community.

Without that sense of community, the democratizing potential of war is nil. Why? Because war creates the social foundation necessary for the subsequent interactions between war and democracy to play out. Without the existing sense of a "nation," war does not encourage greater popular participation. Many of the classic liberal notions of democracy and the state, beginning in Greece, but more explicitly with the English tradition of Hobbes and Locke, assume the prior existence of a mutually accepted polis whose members recognize communal interests and identities. Democracy involves the elaboration of agreements regarding future political decisions. Such political pacts must remain vague and require considerable amounts of trust to be viable.

Without such a sense of trust, doubts as to the enforceability of contracts and the willingness of others to live with its consequences would undermine the potential for social agreements. Without that pre-existing union, the exchanges described above would not lead to the Marshallian process of ever-acquiring rights, but to a form of political free-for-all where each member or subcommunity sought to protect and expand its position vis-à-vis all others. War, by defining a clear boundary around the community, makes it possible for it to even consider governing itself.

The contrast of "us" and "them" is never clearer than in war. Regions, which had preserved their identities, can merge into a single group, at least temporarily. The best indicator of this is precisely how veterans groups recognize each other's legitimacy even across national boundaries. But most of the time, those who are suffering through a war do not recognize their fellow victims across a political divide. Rather they seek to partner in new ways with those whom they see a common bond, be it ethnic, geographic, political, or ideological. Wars provide opportunities for the elaboration of rituals of sacrifice and reciprocity, which arguably are the foundations of social life. This is the sense of unity that Dankwart Rustow claimed was an essential part of the foundation for democratic rule. It is a unity born out of shared struggle, a sense of danger, and the euphoric celebration of community. This sense of oneness can then translate into a recognition through the less fortunate in the society as worthy of assistance (they are, after all, our "brothers and sisters at arms"); it can serve to expand suffrage ("there are no racists in the foxholes"), and it may also provide the basis for the recognition of minimal civil rights that all in the community can share.

The sense of community often fostered by war is the critical link separating armies of slaves and conscripts from that of soldiers and citizens. For example, one does not have to buy into Greek chauvinism to note the clear distinction between the hoplites, patently aware of their identity as citizens of a polis, and the cowed mass of the Persian army linked only through the common subjecthood to the king. We can thus see the contribution of war to democracy taking two paths: First, it encourages the kinds of negotiations and exchanges between state and populace described above, and, second, it provides the underlying social capital possibly required for these processes to be successful.

This spirit of commonality need not be triumphant. War monuments, the architectural expression of this unity, have gone from the celebratory (Arc de Triomphe in Paris, the Wellington Arch in London) to the commemorative (the Cenotaph in London or the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, DC). The culture of defeat, however, also contains the germ of reactionary responses. Yet, no matter the emotion they seek to elicit, all of these serve to recognize a shared identity and are used to habitually remind the population of such. The particular suffering involved in civil wars may actually create bonds across ideological or ethnic divisions, the commitment of "never again," be it in nineteenth-century United States or twentieth-century Spain.

A final way in which war creates community is by literally bringing together populations long isolated from each other. While many of the European armies well into the twentieth century would rely on locally defined regiments, the identity basis of these disorganized as war progressed and units became less regional and more national. This is true not just of Europe. Scholars of the Mexican Revolution have noted, for example, that being transported from North to South and back again was often the only time the peasant soldiers saw the country that was "theirs." In the case of the United States, boot camp was (and in some ways remains) a place where different members of the society could meet. The differences being gulfed could be based on class

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Footnotes:

1. Harrington 2005, 64.
2. Stephen Ambrose was a well-known exponent of the special community created by war; for example, see 1991. Paul Pappas has been one of the strongest critics of such a romantic image of war, but even when criticizing, he admits to how war does create some sense of shared purpose. See his 2001. For an interesting revisionist analysis of the communization effect of war, see Boula 1960.
especially important in both world wars in almost all countries) or ethnicity exemplified by the United States by the Hollywood cliché of the Italian from Chicago, the Jew from Brooklyn, the cowboy from Oklahoma, and the Ivy Leaguer from Connecticut, meeting on their way to war. After the mid-1960s, the urban black kid would join them. These meetings fostered not just a set of shared identities, but also may have contributed to the creation of a common language and even culture.

Even if we accept the powerful effect of war, it is worthwhile noting that the cohesive potential of war is also highly dependent on the amebellum state of social relations, as noted above. Lewis Cester wonderfully contrasts the British and French responses to the outbreak of war in 1939. In the first case, the Nazi threat increased social cohesion, but in the latter, pressures led not to unity, but to defeat. The pressures of war can make a “happy national family” ever stronger, but it can finish with the destruction of those ready to break apart.

We should not forget, moreover, that inclusiveness, if and when it comes, is defined by exclusion. We are the same because they are different from us. Boundaries both keep us together and them apart. It is this sense of exclusive community, even more than the institutional basis of territoriality, which might make notions of transnational citizenship so difficult to achieve. War is an important part of the construction of this community, but in the absence of collective enemies that serve to underscore what we share, how to create a democratic unity on a non-national basis?

There is perhaps no better example of the “Janus-faced” nature of war, on the one hand welcoming its citizens and on the other seeking to crush others against walls, than the Athenians in Thucydides. On the one hand, Pericles can claim:

It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few... There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private business we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbor if he does what he likes; we do not put our trust in him which, though harmless, are not pleasant.

On the other hand, some pages later, the Athenians can speak to the Melians with nothing but threats and disdain prior to their destruction of the city:

For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences... since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

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44 According to the “school of the nation” has a long intellectual history. For a very interesting discussion, see Krebs 2006.

45 Cester 1936, 59-64.

46 Borrowing from J.H. Elliott's notion of a "composite monarchy" in sixteenth-century Europe, we might wish to analyze the possibility of a "composite democracy."

47 Thucydides. Book 2.34-46.


49 Russett 1999.

50 My thanks to Jay Lyall of Yale University for suggesting this question. He is in the process of answering it with a very interesting new work.
only in the face of such a “planetary emergency” will we develop a non-national sense of an imagined community. No matter the import of bellic cohesion, it is also worthwhile noting that the same mechanism that produces social unity can also lead to centralization of power and to an increase in nondemocratic governance. Over and above threats to civil liberties discussed above, the unification brought on by war can lead to the suppression of dissenting views and the imposition of a single model for being a patriot. Lewis Coser warns, “Groups which are engaged in continued struggle tend to lay claim on the total personality involvement of their members ... [and] are unlikely to tolerate more than limited departures from the group unity.”

BEYOND THE MODERN ATLANTIC

How universal are these legacies of war? The literature on the social effects of war seems to be based on a relatively small number of cases: Napoleonic France, Italo-Sicilian Germany, Meiji Japan, interwar Britain, and post–Civil War United States. This geographical and temporal sampling is partly the reason why scholarship on war and democracy can find so much historical support, and yet fail the statistical significance test when applied to a broader group of cases. For example, the literature on the democratic peace still seems mired in debates on whether it is purely a European and postwar phenomenon or whether we can identify structural links between regime type and international behavior. We need to expand the sampling frame of our scholarship on war if we are to discover truly generalizable principles. What seems to be the evidence for the effect of war and democracy outside of the usual suspects? The literature on the political and social effects of war first neglects many of the European cases outside of the preferred circle. Spain, for example, was engaged in wars almost continuously from the mid-sixteenth century through 1815 and yet, the resulting states, whether Hapsburg, Bourbon, or “Liberal,” were infamous for their inefficacy. The Balkans were at war almost continuously, whether with one of the great powers or with each other, from the mid-nineteenth century through 1914, and yet strong states, much less democratic regimes, failed to develop. Perhaps the most surprising missing case is that of Russia, whose experience of conflict from 1914 through 1945 probably cost nearly 40 million dead. How did that experience shape Soviet society?

The cases of the Middle East are also relatively understudied. The colonial and postcolonial struggles of Algeria and Egypt, for example, did not produce strong democracies, nor has the constant state of war with Israel done much for its neighbors. The Iran-Iraq War arguably did produce more potent if authoritarian) states, but ones also run by either small thuggish cliques or a sui generis alliance of clerics, soldier zealots, and small businessmen. The case of Israel seems to confirm many of the claims made for war and the creation of both a deep democracy and a strong sense of nationhood. Note, however, than even in this case, the unity among Israelis facing external enemies has not trumped the deep ethnic loyalties and identifications of Jews and Arabs. Nor has it guaranteed the rights of Arab veterans.

South Asia provides an excellent and yet barely used laboratory for testing the relative importance of war for democracy. Both India and Pakistan inherited parts of the Raj army. They both faced potentially disastrous wars with clearly demarcated others (each other). Yet, the contrast between Pakistan and India could not be greater in terms of those two classic institutional legacies of war state capacity and democracy. We need scholarship to explore how whatever these legacies might have been were dissipated in Pakistan or strengthened in India.

Outside of the Japanese case, the effect of war in the creation of the East Asian economic miracles has also been unappreciated. We know that expenditures of the Vietnam War helped spur initial growth in some of these economies, but what about their own conflicts? One of the most incredible transformations in contemporary history was that of the Kuomintang from the corrupt and ineffective institution prior to 1949 to the (still corrupt, but much more effective) overseer of Taiwanese development. What role did the trauma of the defeat to the Communists play in the reform of the Kuomintang? Similar arguments could be made about the South Korean regime (tightened by its easy collapse during the Korean War, fear of both Communism and isolation from Malaysia arguably created war-like conditions for Singapore. As in South Asia, counterexamples also abound, as the experience of World War II and later local insurgencies did not create a strong or democratic state in the Philippines, nor did the equivalents do so in Indonesia. Interestingly, African and Latin American wars and their state-building consequences have received the most attention. In both cases, the absence of war or of the “right” kind of wars has been noted as an important potential factor in the construction of states, or the lack thereof. Even here, however, exceptional cases like Chile and South Africa and the possible contribution of war to their political development have been understudied.

The sampling bias also includes a preference for some wars and not for others. The number of studies on the political and social consequences of the Franco-Prussian War would fill a not-so small library. The attention paid to the Russo-Japanese War might fill a shelf.

The Eurocentric perspective on war also applies to discussions of the future of conflict. Books such as James Sheehan’s Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? and many of the chapters in this volume, speak with assurance about the end

11 Coser op. cit., p. 555.
12 Taylor and Russe 2006; Soffer 2008.
14 Woo-Cumings 1999.
of war. If Sheehan is at least explicit that he is speaking of Western Europe, many other commentators are not. Yet, for large parts of the world, war, and even "total war," is not a thing of the past. India and Pakistan maintain fortified frontiers, Iran and Iraq fought something of a copy of the World War I Western front only twenty years ago, the Chinese military thinks geopolitically of challenges to the North and West as well as control of the South China Sea. The Great Lakes region in Africa has witnessed a poor man's version of gomilitary competition, and the Brazilian army does not take control of the Amazon for granted. For many of these countries, war is not only not a thing of the past; it is arguably a path toward a greater future. What do the scholars of war have to say to them?

One other problem with the "sampling" of war studies is the inadequate attention paid to differentiating between forms of warfare. Influenced in part by the availability of the Correlates of War data set, we have learned to speak of war as simply those conflicts rated as such by the number of participants involved. Yet, it would make sense to disaggregate war types. For example, "wars between equals," as in the classic cases of intra-European wars, should be treated differently than colonial wars. The role played in social and political development of occupation duties, as opposed to wars truly ending in decisive battle, also need to be defined and distinguished. (We can imagine that occupation duties would have corrosive elements on the democratic formation or political attitudes of veterans, for example).

A call for a broader set of comparisons is not simply the product of an inclusion fetish or of simply the desire to create ever more analytical categories for their own sake. The strange fact that Europe produced arguably the bloodiest centuries in history and the most progressive and democratic societies deserves recognition, but also demands a broader comparative perspective. That the two aspects of European history are linked seems obvious, but what the precise mechanism may be and how these may be duplicated (hopefully with less blood) are not.

**THE END OF WAR?**

The last half-century has witnessed a dramatic change in the role of warfare in the daily political, social, and economic lives of the developed societies in North America and Europe. What are the implications of this for democracy?

Several of the chapters in this volume have addressed this question, with special attention to the implication for political life of the "War on Terror." Let us begin by analyzing what has happened to the kinds of war that most scholars argue did lead to democratic reforms.

The more functionalist reading of Marx sees capitalism as a product of the steam engine. Similarly, the military may be seen as a product of the relevant technology (from the long bow to the atom bomb). Thus, the "mass-reserve" army of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was partly a product of the transformation of weapons from riling to the machine gun. As many have argued, the mass production of weapons and their increasing lethality both undermined the aristocratic claim to military privilege and allowed the military to become ever more inclusive. In a dialectical shift, however, the development of ever more destructive technology led to the creation of weapons that made reserve armies impractical and even dangerous. Thus, the possibility of a classic "Western War" between the rich became ever less likely, especially after 1989.

The "West," however, did maintain a monopoly over such instruments, and when new powers made the mistake of challenging it in the military areas, the established order was able to use it in an incredibly destructive fashion. Thus, the stupidity or insensibility of Saddam Hussein in challenging the United States to fight a World War II tank war led to his own annihilation.

Nevertheless, the West could not claim a monopoly on more "democratic" aspects of the new technology. Biological and nuclear weapons are potentially the ideal "weapons of the weak" in that, while requiring sophisticated technology, they can be produced by even the most destitute of states (as in the case of North Korea). The very complexity and interconnections of contemporary life also makes the rich societies much more vulnerable to the strategies available to the less developed. The "War on Terror" is particularly challenging, as the enemy is not even another state, but a much more elusive network of potential combatants.

The changes in technology and in the definition of the enemy made it possible, and even imperative, to do away with mass conscription. The capacity of the killing machines was such that one needed fewer men-at-arms to kill an equivalent number of the enemy. Moreover, the technology required so much training that a drafted recruit would only begin to become useful around the time his enlistment ended. These changes made it possible for the wishes of both the professional military and the burgeoning middle class to be satisfied: A professional (and in some cases privatized) military fit perfectly with the political and technological transformation of the "West." The new form of threat makes the old-style military even less practical. How is a mass army to deal with an enemy whose identity might be unknown and whose presence might be distributed across thousands of miles?

Will the new form of war change the relationship of conflict with democracy? Again, explicit limiting ourselves to the developed countries that have experienced this transition, the answer has to be yes. Consider the links discussed above. The "exchange" mechanism of rights for service clearly breaks down when only a relative (and socially segregated) few can claim that they have served. When veterans are no longer part of the mass, but simply another interest group, the "back and forth" between state and populace is much less consequential.

* There is the ongoing debate about the existence of a "military revolution." For perhaps the most technologically driven analysis, see McNerly 1984.
More ominously, the segregation of military service also breaks down the positive contribution that war can make to the creation and maintenance of the imagined community. In the United States, the perception and reality of who has served since the Vietnam War has fed a class- and even region-based sense of an international them and us. The unpopularity of the Iraq War has made discussions of who serves politically charged. The oft-cited difference in discipline, demeanor, and success of those with military background has also served to highlight the supposed "decadence" of the average civilian. The heretographic worship of the "warrior" in contemporary American political rhetoric is potentially dangerous, no matter how well deserved such attention and praise may be.

Finally, the very nature of the new form of war represents a much more intense potential threat to civil liberties. In a war where the identity and plans of the enemy are the key unknowns, the temptation to favor one side of the balance between safety and liberty is great. The "War on Terror" risks all the dangers associated with threats to democracy from war, while providing few of its benefits. The potential to manipulate an ever constant, yet secretive, threat from those with whom we (supposedly) share so few values is both obvious and immense. The ease with which the threat of war can and has been used to distinguish between "degrees of Americanness" should give us considerable pause.

This is not to say that democracy is under imminent threat. The long-term legacies of war discussed above are deep and institutionalized in laws and practices. Yet, in nations where ethnic identity is less and less homogenous, the absence of the cohesion of the "national" wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will leave a significant hole in a political fabric. Such communities, constantly fed rhetoric of menace and xenophobia, may be far too willing to sacrifice liberties in order to feel safer in a dangerous world.

Yet the demographics of military service and even being in Iraq certainly are not that of the aristocratic and white state often deplored. The decades-long African American over-representation in the Army has been reduced, and whites are marginally more likely to serve in Iraq. The upper class is notable in its absence, but the recruits come mostly from the storied middle than the bottom. The most difficult demographic issue can actually be regional, with the South and rural areas in general over-represented. See Segel and Wechsler Segal 2004.

The term of recent "video-ad" for the National Guard, for example, could be troubling: https://nationalguardwarriors.com. See Segel and Wechsler Segal 2004.

References


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