

Asian Americans: A Demographic Portrait*

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Asian Americans: A Demographic Portrait

By *Asian Americans* we refer to a diverse group of American residents who are either descendants of immigrants from a general area in Asia or are themselves such immigrants. Although there is some debate about the originating countries of Asian Americans, the common practice is to include East Asia (China, Japan, and Korea), Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam), and South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan). Cultural heritages, economic conditions, political systems, religious practices, and languages are quite different across these countries (and in some cases have changed over time). As a result, Asian Americans vary greatly by country of origin – a variation we call *ethnic differences* in this book. In fact, as we will show, ethnic differences among Asian Americans are so large that they call into question the overarching category used to group them.

The broad category of Asian Americans is used for several reasons. Besides the practical need to collapse racial categories in statistical tabulations, there are also many ways in which Asian Americans are distinct from other major racial groups in the U.S. First, Asian Americans are physically and culturally distinguishable from whites and other minorities. Second, except for those of Japanese descent, most Asian Americans recently arrived in the U.S. as beneficiaries of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (in the cases of Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and Asian Indians) or as refugees (in the case of Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians). Finally, again with the exception of Japanese Americans, most Asian Americans speak their native languages at home and maintain their distinct ethnic cultures and values, signaling that they either face difficulties fully assimilating into the American mainstream or purposefully resist full assimilation. As we will show, Asian Americans have socioeconomic experiences and demographic profiles that are overall distinct from those of whites and blacks. In this book, we call differences across these three major groups *racial differences*.

A story about Asian Americans should tell us both how Asians differ from other major racial groups and how they vary among themselves by ethnicity. These dual emphases characterize our

approach in this book. We use available census data and supplemental material to document racial differences in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics between Asian and non-Asian Americans, as well as ethnic differences in the same characteristics among Asian Americans. Although our approach makes it impossible to summarize our findings with simple statements about Asian Americans, we feel that a true understanding of Asian Americans necessitates this level of complexity. Indeed, in our view, if there were a simple word that would accurately characterize Asian Americans, it would be “diversity”: Asian Americans differ greatly by ethnic origin, immigration history, socioeconomic standing, assimilation path, family characteristics, and community environment. Furthermore, the experiences of Asian Americans have also changed over time. In the pages that follow, we will demonstrate these patterns of diversity.

We begin with an historical review of the immigration history of the major Asian groups in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, we compare the educational achievements of Asian Americans relative to whites and blacks and across Asian ethnicities over the 1960-2000 period. In Chapter 3, we then examine the labor force outcomes of Asian Americans relative to whites and blacks, and explore variations across Asian ethnicities and over time. Chapter 4 is a study of Asian Americans’ family characteristics and marriage patterns. In Chapter 5 we report on Asian Americans’ spatial distribution and residential patterns in the U.S. Chapter 6 concludes the book.

I. HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS

In this chapter, we briefly review the immigration history of Asian Americans and their experiences of living in America. We intend the review to serve as an historical background for the demographic portrait of Asian Americans that we will illustrate with numerical information later in this book. Although different Asian ethnic groups in the U.S. have had diverse immigration and settlement experiences, we can identify two broad historical periods demarcated by the 1965 landmark Immigration and Nationality Act. The first period, prior to 1965, is characterized by a U.S. economy hungry for low-wage labor and a history fraught with severe racial conflicts. In this period, Asian Americans faced much competition, racial violence, and discrimination. The second period, after 1965, reflects a growing need in the U.S. economy for an educated, skilled labor force and a relatively more tolerant racial environment following the Civil Rights movement. It is during this time that Asian Americans have been perceived more positively as a “model minority.”¹ We begin our discussion with a brief review of the immigration histories of the most populous Asian ethnic groups in the U.S., beginning with the Chinese. Here we highlight some of the similarities and differences in immigration experiences by Asian American ethnicity. Next, we provide a snapshot of the contemporary Asian American population. Finally, we discuss the perception of Asian Americans as a racial group, exploring both the negative and positive images that have been attached to Asian Americans. In two boxes, we provide a chronology of significant laws, treaties, and court cases affecting Asian Americans (Box 1) and an overview of enumerations of Asian Americans on historical and recent U.S. censuses (Box 2).

¹ For a discussion of the origins of the term “model minority,” see Chan, Sucheng. 1991. *Asian Americans: An Interpretive History*. Boston: Twayne Publishers. Chan argues that this term was used politically to divide Asian Americans from other minority groups.

Chinese

The Chinese were among the first Asians to settle in the United States.² While small numbers of Chinese were present in Hawaii as early as 1835, thousands of Chinese arrived both in Hawaii and on the mainland during the 1840s and 1850s. The 1860 U.S. Census documented almost 35,000 Chinese on the mainland. These Chinese immigrants came to the U.S. for a variety of reasons. Some were seeking shelter from wars and rebellions in the mid-1800s. Others were seeking better economic opportunities.

Accompanying tremendous social and political turmoil in China during this period were high taxes to the Imperial Qing Dynasty, and peasants often lost their land trying to pay them. Frequent floods destroyed crops, and the population lived under the threat of starvation.

Early Chinese immigrants were primarily peasants, with little or no formal schooling. Large waves of them came to the U.S. as manual workers when the rapid development of the West demanded cheap labor. Immigrants were also drawn by the promise of the discovery of gold in California. Most Chinese immigrants to the U.S. in the nineteenth century were men. They envisioned making money in the U.S. and then returning to China at some future date. Married women remained home to care for their children and husbands' parents. At the turn of the century, only 5% of all Chinese on the mainland, and 13.5% in Hawaii, were female.

Chinese immigrants initially settled in rural areas but soon gravitated toward urban centers: San Francisco, and later New York and Boston. By 1900, 45% of the Chinese in California lived in the city of San Francisco. Chinese in urban areas were predominantly employed in service sector jobs, like laundries, and lived in their ethnic communities. Chinese in these communities were highly isolated from mainstream American society, so many children of Chinese immigrants grew up speaking only Chinese and interacting with few whites. Some supplemented their American public school experiences with Chinese schools at the end of the day or on weekends.

² Most of the information in this chapter was drawn from Takaki, Ronald. 1989. *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.

Chinese immigrants found work outside their enclaves in agriculture, in construction, in mining, and as shopkeepers. Chinese laborers represented 90% of the workforce responsible for the construction of the Central Pacific Railroad. Chinese workers were often brought into factories after white workers went on strike over labor disputes. Because of this, Chinese in the U.S. were perceived as a threat to white workers and often a target of hatred and racial violence. In the late 1870s, federal courts ruled that Chinese immigrants should be barred from naturalization as “aliens ineligible for citizenship.” Later, Chinese immigration was legally restricted by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Immigration of all Asians, except Filipinos who were residents of a U.S. territory at that time, was prohibited by the National Origins Act of 1924, which barred the immigration of all “aliens ineligible for citizenship.” From a high of over 107,000 in 1890, the Chinese population in the U.S. dwindled over the following decades. Chinese immigration practically stalled until 1965, when major changes to immigration laws were enacted.

Although small numbers of Chinese were allowed to immigrate following the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, immigration of Chinese and other Asians to the U.S. did not really flourish until the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965. This act repealed all previous quotas and immigration restrictions, and established preferences for immigrants who wished to reunite with family members or who had skills valued in the U.S. labor market. Following the passage of this landmark 1965 Act, Chinese immigrating to the U.S. tended to be highly educated, to have professional and technical occupations, and to arrive with their families. Many came via Hong Kong and Taiwan, places where they had taken refuge after the 1949 military defeat of the Nationalists in China. Some of these new immigrants settled in urban ethnic enclaves like Chinatowns, while others, especially those with professional occupations, established themselves in suburban communities. Prior to 1900, Chinese comprised the largest Asian group in the U.S., though eventually the Japanese grew larger. Since 1970, Chinese have again been the most populous Asian ethnic group in the U.S. (see Table 1). Currently, there are more than 2.5 million Americans of Chinese descent in the U.S.

Table 1 about Here

Japanese

Japanese first started immigrating to the U.S. in the nineteenth century. Like the Chinese, they came as agricultural workers; but, unlike the Chinese, a large proportion of Japanese immigrants became plantation workers in Hawaii. In the 1920s, 43% of the Hawaiian population was Japanese. On the mainland, many Japanese who were initially employed as agricultural workers soon became self-employed merchants and farmers. By 1925, 46% of Japanese immigrants were involved in agriculture. In cities like San Francisco, they established small enclaves where they could support and socialize with each other, eat familiar food, and speak their native language. After Japanese had established themselves with farms or businesses, they sent for wives, and wives worked with their husbands in businesses and on farms. Japanese, more than other early Asian immigrants, came to the U.S. to settle and raise families.

Given their intention to settle, Japanese emphasized to their children the importance of learning to be American to avoid discrimination. Japanese sent their children to American public schools and encouraged their fluency in English. They saved money for their children to go to college, believing education would help them overcome discrimination.

Their efforts did not protect them from massive government-sponsored discrimination, however. Because white workers saw the Japanese, similar to the Chinese, as unfair competition, immigration of Japanese was restricted by the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907-8. Japanese immigration was later completely prohibited in 1924. Further, during World War II, over 100,000 Japanese from California and other states in the Pacific Northwest were placed in internment camps by the U.S. government. Whole families were herded into camps under suspicions that they had colluded or would collude with Japan to enable an attack on the mainland U.S. Many Japanese families lost their land while residing in these camps. Some Japanese Americans fought in the U.S. army to show their loyalty to the U.S.

Because many Japanese had settled in the U.S. with their families, their numbers increased through natural population growth. They were the most populous Asian American group from 1910 to

1960. Because Japan's economy was well developed by 1965, relatively few Japanese entered the U.S. after the major overhaul of immigration laws in 1965. And because of this, many Japanese ethnic enclaves have not been sustained. Greater proportions of Japanese speak English well, and Japanese tend to be more structurally assimilated than other ethnic groups such as Chinese and Koreans. Currently, less than 1 million people are estimated to be Japanese Americans.

Filipinos

Few Filipinos lived in the U.S. before the turn of the twentieth century. Most of the early Filipino immigrants arrived as American nationals after 1898, the year that the U.S. acquired the Philippines at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. Filipinos immigrated to the U.S. in search of employment on plantations in Hawaii and other agricultural work on the mainland. Filipinos also worked in fisheries in the Pacific Northwest and as domestic and other service workers. Many Filipino workers organized labor unions during the early twentieth century, but their efforts to win wage increases were met with hostility not only from their employers but also from white workers who feared competition. More likely to intermarry than Chinese and Japanese, Filipino men also provoked racial hatred and violence by marrying white women. Because a large portion of the Filipino population worked as plantation or migrant agricultural workers, they did not establish ethnic communities in urban centers. Due to their geographical dispersion and their propensity to intermarry, Filipinos soon became more structurally assimilated in the U.S. than Chinese and Japanese.

Filipinos were the only Asian ethnic group not prohibited from immigrating by the 1924 National Origins Act, because they came from an American territory. However, when the Philippines was established as a commonwealth of the U.S. in 1934, severe restrictions were placed on Filipino immigration. The Filipino population in the U.S. dropped from about 108,000 to 98,000 in the following decade.

After changes to immigration laws were enacted in 1965, many Filipinos came to the U.S. fleeing the repressive Marcos regime and seeking better economic opportunities. For example, Filipino doctors,

nurses, and pharmacists were better compensated for their skills in the U.S. than in the Philippines. From 1980 on, Filipinos comprised the second most populous Asian American group in the U.S. Currently, Filipino Americans number slightly over 2 million.

Koreans

Most early Korean immigrants, both men and women, began their journey to the U.S. mainland working on plantations in Hawaii. Plantation owners in Hawaii capitalized on ethnic enmity, using Korean plantation workers to break strikes of Japanese workers. About 40% of Korean immigrants were Christians. They built many churches and formed Christian associations in Hawaii. By 1907, almost 1,000 had left Hawaii for the U.S. mainland.

Other Koreans came to the mainland after Japan annexed Korea in 1910. The 1910 Census counted around 4,500 Koreans. Koreans maintained strong loyalty to Korea and a strong desire to liberate their country from Japanese rule. Korean Christian churches often served to maintain this nationalism, as did Korean language schools, in which second-generation Koreans learned not only to speak Korean, but also about the culture and politics of Korea.

Many Koreans immigrating to the mainland worked in mines and fisheries; others formed gangs of migrant farm workers. Some Koreans also became business owners, running laundries and hotels that served whites. Because they were so few in number, they did not establish ethnic enclaves, though they maintained a distinct sense of Korean identity. Along with Japanese, Koreans were prohibited from immigration by the 1924 National Origins Act.

The majority of the present Korean population in the U.S. is the result of an immigration wave that began after 1965. Since then, in major metropolitan centers such as New York and Los Angeles, Korean ethnic enclaves have sprung up. Most post-1965 immigrants were middle class and well educated. In the 1960s and 1970s, educational attainment increased in Korea, but there was no corresponding increase in skilled jobs in densely populated cities like Seoul. Skilled professionals, such as doctors and pharmacists, immigrated to many places, including the U.S. Some Koreans arrived with capital and

established grocery stores and other small businesses upon immigration. As a result, Koreans have the highest rate of self-employment among all Asian ethnic groups in the U.S. Today, there are over 1 million Korean Americans.

Asian Indians

The first Asian Indian immigrants to the U.S. were recruited to work on plantations in Hawaii. Others came to Washington and California to find agricultural work, and Asian Indian workers were often used as strike breakers in both construction and mining industries. Many early Asian Indian immigrants were from the Punjab, and about 80% were of the farming caste. By 1920, about 6,400 Asian Indians were in the U.S. The majority of South Asian immigrants to the U.S. during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were single Sikh men, who kept the Sikh tradition of wearing long hair wrapped in a turban. Unlike Chinese and Japanese, Asian Indians did not concentrate geographically.

Asian Indians in the U.S. were first classified in court decisions of 1910 and 1913 as Caucasians. These decisions permitted Asian Indians to become naturalized and intermarry with native whites. However, these decisions were reversed in 1923, when Asian Indians were legally classified as non-white because their ancestry could not be traced to Northern or Western Europe. Asian Indian immigrants, reclassified as “non-white,” were prevented from becoming citizens and barred from further immigration, as were other Asians, in 1924. Anti-miscegenation laws prevented Asian Indians from marrying Caucasian women. However, many Asian Indian men married newly immigrated Mexican women.

Because the initial Asian Indian immigration was small, and Asian Indians were not allowed to bring families to the U.S., few Asian Indians lived in the U.S. prior to 1965. Since then, many highly educated professionals from India have immigrated to the U.S. in search of skilled employment. Most had been exposed to Western culture and education in India and had little trouble finding professions in which their education and skills were needed. Today, over 1.5 million Asian Indians live in the U.S.

Vietnamese

Very few Vietnamese immigrated to the U.S. prior to 1970. However, U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War resulted in substantial Vietnamese immigration in the 1970s. In 1972, after the U.S. withdrew all its forces from Vietnam, many Vietnamese left the country. And in a few short months prior to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government in 1975, over 100,000 people were evacuated or airlifted out of the country. Many Vietnamese who left had prospered under the South Vietnamese government. Others left because they had aided the U.S. in some way, and the U.S. military made provisions for them. Refugees leaving Vietnam prior to 1975 were generally better off economically than the overall population of Vietnam.

The Communists captured Saigon in 1975 and placed segments of the Vietnamese population in reeducation camps. Fearing political persecution, some Vietnamese left Vietnam as political refugees. Those who left after 1975 tended to be poorer than the earlier wave, often leaving without capital or possessions. Many were Chinese-Vietnamese who were ethnically Chinese but had lived in Vietnam for generations. This group was concentrated in the South and was particularly persecuted by the Vietnamese Communists, who were suspicious of their class as merchants. Many escaped by boat, crossing the Mekong River into Thailand or crowding onto boats to cross the South China Sea. These “boat people” were desperate and faced extortion by those helping them escape. Once boat people were spotted on the sea or had made it safely to ports, they were sent to refugee camps in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, where many spent years waiting to be admitted to the U.S. Children in refugee camps were schooled in the English language and Western etiquette, but lost years of learning math, science, and other school subjects.

Vietnamese who came as political refugees were originally sponsored by Midwestern churches and other charitable organizations in the U.S. They provided refugees with shelter and food, and helped them obtain temporary government assistance. Many immigrants got job training, and their children were settled in public schools. After several years in the U.S., Vietnamese began to know family members and friends settling in other parts of the United States and initiated a wave of secondary migration,

concentrating in such communities as Orange County, California; Houston, Texas; and even New Orleans, Louisiana. Vietnamese Americans now number over 1 million.

Other Asians

There are other Asian ethnic groups in the U.S. They include Southeast Asians from countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, and Cambodia. Cambodians and Laotians are similar to Vietnamese in that they immigrated to the U.S. primarily as refugees from the Vietnam War. Other Asians came from South Asian countries such as Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. They are similar to Asian Indians in that they were primarily immigrants seeking better economic opportunities. Like the groups discussed above, these Asian Americans represent a diversity of languages, cultures, national heritages, and immigration and settlement experiences.

Present Asian American Population

After the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, Asia quickly became the second largest source of immigrants to the U.S., and, as a result, the Asian American population has grown rapidly (Figure 1). For example, Asian Americans represented 1.4% of the population in 1980 and almost 4% in 2000 (see Table 1)—a growth of more than threefold in population size. With the exception of Japanese Americans, all Asian ethnic groups have significantly increased (i.e., more than doubled) in population since 1980. By comparison, the total U.S. population increased by only 24% in this period.

Figure 1 about Here

Table 1 about Here

Most of the increase in the Asian American population is due to immigration rather than natural growth, a circumstance reflected in the proportions of foreign-born among Asians in the U.S. (Table 2). Although these proportions vary greatly by ethnicity, with Japanese at the low end (41%) and Koreans at the high end (79%), overall 64% of Asians in the U.S. were born abroad.

Table 2 about Here

The 2000 U.S. Census provided the first opportunity to enumerate individuals of more than one race and/or multiple Asian ethnicities. The option to choose one or more races on the 2000 Census form presents difficulties for comparing Asian populations both over time and across Asian ethnic groups in 2000. Here, we take two approaches to the problem in this book. First, in comparing population sizes over time (i.e., Table 1), we use a simple a 50% rule to reallocate multiracial and multiethnic Asians. (See Box 3)³ Second, we focus mostly on individuals who reported only one Asian ethnicity when we discuss ethnic differences. Using the first approach, we adjusted the figures for the 2000 population of Asians presented in Table 1 to be consistent with past data.

The first and the third columns of Table 2 present the population counts for Asian Americans that were officially released by the Bureau of the U.S. Census. For each ethnicity, the third column represents the number of people who chose that racial/ethnic category only, and the first column includes additional persons who chose that racial/ethnic category in combination with another racial/ethnic category. For simplicity, we label the breakdown represented in column 3 as “single-ethnic classification” and use it throughout the book. In the 2000 Census, 10,019,405 individuals reported being of only one Asian ethnicity, and 11,898,828 chose an Asian ethnicity either alone *or* in combination with some other category. The difference between the two numbers, 1,879,423, is further divided into 1,655,830 multiracial Asians (who reported an Asian category and a non-Asian category) and 223,593 multiethnic Asians (who reported two Asian categories), reported in the last two rows.

The second column of Table 2 displays the ratio of the third column to the first column—that is, the percentage reporting a single Asian ethnicity among all who reported that ethnicity. The percentage roughly gauges the extent to which an Asian group does not have mixed ancestry. It varies greatly by ethnicity, with the highest rate among Vietnamese (92%) and the lowest rate among Japanese (69%).

³ We based our calculations in Tables 1 and 2 on the numbers that were released by the Census Bureau, in Barnes, Jessica S. and Claudette E. Bennett. 2002. *The Asian Population: 2000*. U.S. Census Bureau c2kbr01-16 (<http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr01-16.pdf>, or through www.yuxie.com).

In the last five columns, we report a few key demographic characteristics computed from the 5% PUMS by single-ethnic classification: percent foreign-born, percent speaking a language other than English at home, percent female, percent children (aged 0-17), and percent elderly (65 and older). The percentages for both foreign birth and speaking non-English at home are crude measures of assimilation into American society. The highest foreign-born fraction is found among Koreans (at 79%), and the highest percentage of non-English speaking at home is among Vietnamese (at 93%). Other than multiracial Asians, the Japanese have the lowest rates of foreign birth and of non-English speaking at home—both well below 50%. The multiethnic and multiracial Asians are similar to the Japanese in having low rates both of being foreign-born and of speaking non-English at home.

Despite a long history of disproportionately male immigration, we find the sex ratio among Asian Americans overall to be either balanced or in favor of women. The only ethnic group with an under-representation of women is Asian Indians, among whom 47% is female. The age composition varies greatly by ethnicity. The Japanese American population shows signs of aging, with 20% at 65 years or older and 12% below age 18. Among all the other groups, children constitute a much larger percentage (21-45%), and the elderly a much smaller percentage (4-10%). The relative youth of the other Asian groups is clearly due to immigration, as immigrants tend to be young people who either bring children to America or rear children soon after immigration.

Asian American Racial Identity

For the convenience of statistical reporting, Asian Americans are often treated as a single race and compared to other major racial groups such as whites and blacks. This is also the practice that we adopt in this book. However, as we argued earlier, cultural heritages and immigration paths vary greatly by country of origin among Asian Americans. Owing to this diversity, most Asian Americans would not accept the proposition that they belong to a single Asian race. When given a choice, they often would rather identify themselves as part of an Asian ethnic group (such as Chinese, Japanese, or Vietnamese) than as simply Asian American. However, because Asian groups are all numerically small and as a result

lack access to many resources, including political and legal resources, some Asian Americans feel the need to develop a panethnic Asian American identity.

In this context, we distinguish race and ethnicity in three aspects. First, it is commonly accepted that race refers to distinctions drawn from physical appearance whereas ethnicity refers to distinctions based on cultural markers such as national origin, language, religion, and food. Second, race has serious social consequences for individuals' life chances, whereas ethnicity is for the most part considered optional in contemporary America. Third, individuals' freedom of racial identification is limited in the sense that racial identification requires external consent from others, whereas ethnic identity can be internal.

Therefore, regardless of their own views concerning whether or not they belong to a single race, Asian Americans face categorization into a single race in America, as they are often defined in contrast to the other racial groups, i.e., whites, blacks, and American Indians. This categorization of Asian Americans as a racial minority has differed historically and in different regions of the country. In Hawaii, Asians often adopted the identity of Hawaiian, speaking a dialect of English called pidgin, which mixed elements of English, Portuguese, Native Hawaiian, and Asian languages. In Mississippi, early Chinese immigrants were subject to the same segregation as blacks, though later they would achieve "honorary" white status as they became economically successful. Despite these regional differences, Supreme Court cases such as *People v. Hall* (1854) and *Saito v. U.S.* (1893) ruled that Asians were either classified as "a lesser caste similar to Indians" (in the case of the Chinese) or "Mongolian" (in the case of the Japanese), but not "Caucasian" or "white." These two court cases, among others, reaffirmed that Asian immigrants could not obtain citizenship, as citizenship was only possible for "free whites" or for those born on U.S. soil. Asian Indians, first considered Caucasian according to two separate court cases in 1910 and 1913, were denied citizenship in 1923 (*U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind*) because they were not of Northern or

Western European descent.⁴ The restriction on naturalization was later lifted for Chinese immigrants in 1943 and for other Asian immigrants in 1952.

How Asian Americans were defined racially affected whether or not they could be citizens of the U.S., own land, and hold certain jobs. Because the courts defined Asians as non-white, most Asian immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were prevented from becoming citizens of the U.S. However, children of Asian immigrants, born on U.S. soil, were citizens. In 1913, alien land law acts prevented Asian immigrants from owning land or leasing land for more than three years. Taxes were levied on “foreign” miners’ earnings in California in 1850. Race also determined where Asians lived and who they could marry. Chinese attempting to settle in Tacoma, Washington were prevented from doing so by white residents of the town. Koreans were prohibited from settling in Riverside County, California. Anti-miscegenation laws forbidding marriage specifically between whites and “Mongolians” were enacted in some states as early as 1880.

In different places and at various points throughout U.S. history, Asian Americans have also been subjected to prejudice, hatred, and racial violence. An 1870 poem, entitled “The Heathen Chinese” reflected a negative sentiment toward the Chinese at that time. The poem was reprinted and republished across the country, and “its sensational popularity made Bret Harte [its author] the most celebrated literary man in America in 1870.”⁵ It begins with:

Which I wish to remark,
 And my language is plain,
 That for ways that are dark
 And for tricks that are vain,

⁴ Almaguer, Tomás. 1994. *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

⁵ <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/railton/roughingit/map/chiharte.html>, or through www.yuxie.com.

The heathen Chinese is peculiar,

Which the same I would rise to explain.

Mob violence against Asian Americans was first documented in 1871 when European Americans entered neighborhoods in Los Angeles' Chinatown and shot and hanged 21 Chinese. Settlements of Asians were burned, and Asian residents were forced out of towns. Fear of and prejudice toward Asian immigrants eventually led to the prohibition of all Asian immigration, which was enacted in stages. Chinese immigration was first limited in 1882 with the Chinese Exclusion Act; Japanese immigration was restricted in 1907-8; and then in 1924 all Asian immigration was prohibited. Changes were not made to these discriminatory immigration laws until 1943.

The generally negative image of Asian immigrants in America between the 1860s and 1920s is far from the "model minority" label that has been widely used in popular media to characterize Asian Americans in recent decades.⁶ Since the 1960s, Asian Americans' success in education and their high concentration in professional occupations have been widely publicized by the popular press. Asian Americans' values have been declared compatible with the Protestant work ethic of the U.S.⁷

Demographic changes in the population of Asian immigrants are in part responsible for the shift in the public's portrayal of them from negative to positive. When the prohibition of Asian immigrants was repealed in 1965, immigration priority was given to family members of immigrants, and workers with needed skills. Therefore, Asian immigrants to the U.S. after the 1960s were more likely to be highly

⁶ Hurh, Won Moo and Kwang Chung Kim. 1989. "The 'Success' Image of Asian Americans: Its Validity, and Its Practical and Theoretical Implications." *Racial and Ethnic Studies* 12(4):512-38 and Kao, Grace. 1995. "Asian-Americans as Model Minorities? A Look at Their Academic Performance." *American Journal of Education* 103(2):121-59.

⁷ Despite this generally positive portrayal of Asian Americans, discrimination and hatred against Asian Americans has persisted. In 1982, for example, Vincent Chin, a Chinese American mistaken as Japanese, was beaten to death by unemployed autoworkers near Detroit.

skilled workers than those who immigrated during the nineteenth century, and many had been exposed to the English language and Western culture.

Political refugees formed another major component of immigration to the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1970s, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Lao, and Hmong refugees who aided the U.S. in military operations were helped to escape from their countries. Other refugees left Vietnam after 1975, when the Communist Northern forces gained control over the South. Citizens of the U.S. were sympathetic to the plight of these non-Communist refugees, having waged war on behalf of these people against what they perceived to be a Communist threat. Many aid organizations and churches organized the immigration and settlement of these groups.

Another popular explanation for the portrayal of Asian Americans as a “model minority” is that immigrant Asian Americans invest heavily in their children’s education – a topic we will immediately turn to in the next chapter. Cultural explanations for this investment stress the compatibility of Confucian cultural values with the “Protestant work ethic.” Other research adds that anticipation of discrimination and marginalization in the labor force leads Asian Americans to choose education as a viable means to achieve upward mobility.

We devote the remainder of the book to documenting the current situation of Asian Americans, both in comparison with whites and blacks, and across Asian ethnic groups. We also examine changes across recent decades. In doing so, we hope to add complexity to the images of Asian Americans portrayed in popular media. For example, as we will show later, despite the overall educational and economic successes of Asian Americans, heterogeneity among Asian Americans is high. Just as the image of the model minority is a naive characterization of Asian Americans, the attribution of all observed disadvantages of Asian Americans to racial discrimination is too simplistic. Complex by nature, social phenomena routinely defy simple explanations and require nuanced analyses. The experience of Asian Americans is no exception. In this book, we focus on the empirical question of how Asian Americans have fared in terms of measurable indicators of socioeconomic status relative to whites and blacks in this

country. Only after we have adequately answered such empirical questions can we begin to speculate about explanations.

II. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

One important empirical finding that distinguishes Asian Americans is that they have indeed attained socioeconomic status that is overall comparable, and in some instances superior, to that of whites. In the next chapter, we will present the evidence pertaining to a number of labor force outcomes. In studying the relatively high socioeconomic status of Asian Americans, scholars have invariably pointed out that Asian Americans have successfully attained high levels of education.⁸ Hence, a fruitful examination of the socioeconomic conditions of Asian Americans requires the knowledge of their educational experiences. In this chapter, we provide a detailed account of Asian Americans' educational attainment, from the 1960-2000 U.S. Censuses and other data sources.

Educational Attainment of Adult Asian Americans

In Table 3, we examine two indicators of educational attainment for groups of Asians, whites, and blacks in the U.S.— the percentage of each group that attained at least a high school education and the percentage that attained at least a college education. The percentages were computed from 1960-2000 U.S. census data for those aged 25-34, who constituted new entrants to the labor force. This age restriction prevents the overlapping of cohorts across the different censuses. The table compares all Asians as well as the six largest Asian ethnic groups—Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans, Asian Indians, and Vietnamese—to whites and blacks (bottom two rows). For Asians, we further break down the data by nativity. For the 2000 data, we included in the individual ethnic groups only those who

⁸ See, for example, Hirschman, Charles and Morrison G. Wong. 1984. "Socioeconomic Gains of Asian Americans, Blacks, and Hispanics: 1960-1976." *American Journal of Sociology* 90:584-607; Xie, Yu and Kimberly Goyette. 2003. "Social Mobility and the Educational Choices of Asian Americans." *Social Science Research* 32:467-98.

identified with that specific Asian ethnicity alone, including multiracial and multiethnic Asians in the category of “all Asians.”

The table shows that Asian educational attainment was higher than that of both blacks and whites as early as 1960, with 70% of Asians completing a high school education compared to 61% of whites and 33% of blacks. However, the gap in high school completion narrowed over time. In 1990, whites showed slightly higher rates of high school completion than Asians, due to the influx of new refugees from Southeast Asia. In 2000, Asians overall have a slightly higher rate of achieving high school degrees.

Table 3 about Here

The gap between Asians and whites in college completion is far more dramatic. In 1960, 19% of Asian Americans had completed college compared to about 12% of whites. This gap increased throughout subsequent decades. In 2000, 53% of Asians had completed a college degree compared to 30% of whites.

A substantial portion of the widening gap between Asians and whites in college completion was driven by foreign-born Asian Americans, particularly those who immigrated after 1965. The impact of changes in immigration laws, which established preferences for skilled workers, is seen in the dramatic differences in college completion among foreign-born Asian Americans from 1960 to 1970. In 1960, 19% of both foreign and native-born Asian Americans had attained a college degree. In 1970, this percentage jumped to 46% for the foreign-born. Although some foreign-born Asian Americans were educated in the U.S., the immigration of highly educated Asians is largely responsible for this jump. By comparison, the percentage of college completion among native-born Asian Americans in 1970 was 26%, while whites' college completion was at 16%.

Variation in Asian Americans' educational attainment is evident not only by nativity but also by ethnicity. In 1960, Japanese had the highest level of high school attainment, but Chinese had the highest level of college attainment. In later decades, Chinese, Korean, and Asian Indians are among the most educationally successful, with college completion rates of 67%, 59%, and 76% in 2000. Vietnamese are among the least successful, with rates of high school and college completion below whites, and rates of high school completion below blacks.

The comparison by nativity does not follow the same pattern over time. Among Filipinos, for example, the foreign-born seem to have had an advantage in education even before 1965. Foreign-born Japanese had a lower college completion rate than the native-born in 1960, but this reversed in 1970 and reversed again in later years. Koreans show a different pattern still. While in earlier decades foreign-born Koreans had more education than their native-born counterparts, in 2000, 58% of foreign-born Koreans had completed college compared to 70% of native-born Koreans. It should be noted that while some foreign-born Asians came as immigrant children who received all or most of their education in the U.S., most foreign-born Asian Americans had completed their education prior to their immigration to the U.S.⁹

Elementary and Secondary School Experiences

Asian American children were not always educationally advantaged. Data from the 1910 Census, for example, reveal that Chinese and Japanese children ages 7-17 were less likely to be enrolled in school than were whites (77% for Chinese and 73% for Japanese versus 88% for whites). In part, this disadvantage was due to segregation laws that prevented Chinese and Japanese children from attending schools with majority whites. In California in the late 1800s, the effect of such laws was to restrict Chinese and Japanese children to segregated schools for “Orientals.” In states with smaller Asian populations, like Mississippi, Asian children were required to attend segregated schools with blacks. Asians, like other minorities, fought vehemently for integration and educational opportunity. And, as early as 1930, Chinese and Japanese enrollment in elementary and secondary schools surpassed that of whites, although segregation laws were not removed officially in many states until the 1950s.

In today’s elementary and secondary schools, the academic performance of Asian American students is generally high. According to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), in 1999, only 7% of Asians in grades K-12 had ever repeated a grade, compared to 9% of whites. In Table 4, we

⁹ See Zeng, Zhen, and Yu Xie. 2004. “Asian Americans’ Earnings Disadvantage Reexamined: The Role of Place of Education.” *American Journal of Sociology* 109:1075-1108.

report additional results drawn from the 1988-1994 National Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS), administered by NCES to a nationally representative sample of eighth graders in 1988. The second column shows that Asian Americans scored higher on a standardized math test than whites by more than 0.4 standard deviations. Differences in verbal scores are statistically insignificant between whites and Asians (first column).

Table 4 about Here

These results are confirmed by SAT scores in the academic year 2000-2001. On the verbal SAT, Asian American students taking the test scored slightly lower than their white peers (501 versus 528) but higher than blacks and Hispanics (at 430 and 460, respectively). On the math SAT during that same year, Asians scored higher than all the other groups with an average score of 566, with whites at an average of 531. Asian American high school students also earn higher grade point averages than do their white counterparts, by as much as a quarter of a standard deviation. Asian American eighth and tenth graders in NELS reported grade point averages of 3.2 and 3.0 on a four-point scale, compared to 2.9 and 2.7 for whites.¹⁰ Furthermore, Asian American students take more advanced math and science courses than do students of other race and ethnic groups. In 1998, NCES reported that 74% of Asian high school graduates had taken advanced science and that 56% of them had taken advanced math. The comparable percentages for whites are 64% and 45%.

Asian American teenagers seem to have fewer behavioral problems in schools as well. From the 1999 National Household Survey, the NCES reports that the percentages of students in grades 7-12 who had ever been expelled or suspended from school were 13% for Asians, 15% for whites, 20% for Hispanics, and 35% for blacks. Asian American students are also unlikely to drop out of high school. According to data from the October 2000 Current Population Survey, 3.8% of Asian American 16-24 year

¹⁰ Kao, Grace, Marta Tienda, and Barbara Schnieder. 1996. "Racial and Ethnic Variation in Academic Performance." Pp. 263-297 in *Research in Sociology of Education and Socialization*, vol. 11. Aaron M. Pallas, ed. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

olds were considered high school dropouts, while the corresponding percentages are 6.9% among whites, 13.1% among blacks, and 27.8% among Hispanics. The high school completion rates among 18-24 year olds in 2000 were 95% among Asians and 92% among whites. Similarly, our analysis of the NELS data shows that 92% of the Asian eighth graders received their high school diploma within 6 years, compared to about 85% of whites (third column, Table 4).

Asian Americans' academic achievement in elementary and secondary schools is related to attitudes and behaviors of both Asian American children and their parents. Asian American parents expect their children to achieve higher levels of education than the parents of other racial groups. For example, data from NELS show that over a third of the mothers and fathers of Asian tenth graders expect their children to achieve some graduate education compared to less than a fifth of whites. Further, Asian American children themselves expect to achieve more education than their white, black, and Hispanic peers. Over 20% of Asian tenth graders in this same study reported the expectation of achieving a PhD degree compared to 14% or less among blacks, Hispanics, and whites.¹¹ It has been suggested that Asian American parents perceive effort rather than ability as the key to children's educational attainment, while white parents believe more in innate ability.¹² To achieve the goals that parents set for them and they set

¹¹ See Goyette, Kimberly and Yu Xie. 1999. "Educational Expectations of Asian American Youths: Determinants and Ethnic Differences." *Sociology of Education* 71:24-38, and Cheng, Simon and Brian Starks. 2002. "Racial Differences in the Effects of Significant Others on Students' Educational Expectations." *Sociology of Education* 75(4):306-27.

¹² Chen, Chuansheng and Harold Stevenson. 1995. "Motivation and Mathematics Achievement: A Comparative Study of Asian-American, Caucasian-American, and East Asian High School Students." *Child Development* 66(4):1215-34.

for themselves, Asian American children also expend more effort on academic matters, doing on average close to one hour more of homework per week than do whites.¹³

Asian Americans in Postsecondary Institutions

Academic successes in high school well prepare Asian Americans for entering postsecondary institutions. The NELS data show that Asian Americans of all ethnic groups, except Filipinos, apply for admission to two- and four-year colleges at much higher rates than do whites.¹⁴ Furthermore, detailed analysis of the data reveals that Asian Americans tend to apply to more colleges than do whites, and that these colleges are more likely to be the top-tier schools (as measured by the average SAT scores of entering classes). Whites tend to prefer smaller, less expensive, and less selective schools.

The NELS data also indicate that Asian Americans have rates of acceptance to their first-choice schools that are comparable to those of whites overall. This is significant in light of the fact that, in recent decades, the admission policies concerning Asian American applicants at highly selective schools like Harvard, Princeton, Brown, and Stanford have been closely scrutinized. At issue is whether or not academically qualified Asian applicants are disadvantaged in admission processes that prioritize non-academic factors such as extracurricular activities and athletic abilities. Despite perceived difficulties, the desire of Asian American applicants, or more precisely their parents, to enroll in these elite universities

¹³ Kao, Grace, Marta Tienda, and Barbara Schneider. 1996. "Racial and Ethnic Variation in Academic Performance." Pp. 263-297 in *Research in Sociology of Education and Socialization*, vol. 11. Aaron M. Pallas, ed. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

¹⁴ Much of the material in this section based on NELS was extracted from Goyette, Kimberly. 1999. *The College Attendance of Asian Americans*. Doctoral dissertation: University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

remains very high. Our analysis of the NELS data reveals that Asian Americans do gain admission to and later attend the top tier universities in this country in large numbers.

Table 2 shows that Asian Americans are much more likely to enroll in a postsecondary institution than are whites and other minority groups. Among those who were eighth graders in 1988 who later received their high school diplomas, 80% of Asian Americans compared to 68% of whites had enrolled in either a two-year or four-year postsecondary school (Table 2, last column) by 1994. The enrollment rate varies by Asian ethnicity, ranging from 86–87% among South Asians, Chinese, and Southeast Asians to 76% among Filipinos.

Some Asian American ethnic groups are more likely to attend two-year colleges than are whites. For example, Filipinos in the 1988 eighth grade cohort of NELS were almost twice as likely to be enrolled in two-year colleges as whites. Japanese and Southeast Asians also report higher rates of enrollment in two-year institutions than do whites. Two-year schools may be perceived as less expensive paths to four-year degrees, with many students who cannot immediately afford tuition at four-year schools receiving their first two years of education at community colleges. These students may later transfer to four-year institutions to complete coursework for a bachelor's degree.

Much media attention has been focused on Asian Americans' over-representation in America's elite colleges. The NCES found that Asians were over two times as likely as whites to attend "Tier 1" national universities (top 50 national universities according to *U.S. News and World Report*).¹⁵ Our analysis of the NELS data shows that the proportion attending such universities among Asian students is very high, ranging from 44% and 42% among Chinese and Korean students to 18% and 22% among Japanese and South Asians. This can be compared to whites' rate of about 9%. However, Asian Americans are not more likely than whites to attend first-tier liberal arts colleges.

¹⁵ National Center for Education Statistics. 1998. "Who Goes to America's Highly Ranked 'National' Universities?" NCES 98-095. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Education.

Asian American college students differ from white students in the choice of majors. Asians are disproportionately more likely than whites to major in science, math, and engineering and less likely than whites to choose fields in the humanities, art, music, and education. Using data from the 1993-1994 Baccalaureate and Beyond study, we find that 19.8% of Asian American graduates were granted bachelor's degrees in science or math, compared to 13.3% of whites. By comparison, 9.4% of Asians received degrees in the humanities compared to 14.0% of whites.

For 1999-2000, the NCES reports that Asian Americans received about 5% of all the associate's degrees and 6.5% of all the bachelor's degrees conferred in the U.S.

Postgraduate Education

Earlier data from the Educational Testing Service show that Asian Americans' scores on the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) during the 1980s were close to those of whites, with higher quantitative scores and slightly lower verbal scores. For example, Asian Americans in 1984-85 scored 479 on verbal, 603 on quantitative, and 533 on the analytic portions of the test, compared to 513, 537, and 550 for whites. Similar Asian-white patterns have been observed in scores for the GMAT, LSAT, and MCAT entrance exams.¹⁶

Asian Americans appear to be about as likely to enroll in master's and doctoral graduate degree programs as whites. However, our analysis of data from the Baccalaureate and Beyond study reveals that Asian Americans are more likely than whites to enroll in graduate professional programs even when family background, test performance, and other undergraduate characteristics are taken into account. Among those in professional schools, Asians are more likely to be in medical school, while whites are more likely to be in law school. Similar to the situation for undergraduate majors, Asian Americans in

¹⁶ Hsia, Jayjia. 1988. *Asian Americans in Higher Education and at Work*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

doctoral programs are more likely than whites to be found in science and engineering programs and less likely to be in the liberal arts.

According to the NCES, Asian Americans received 5% of the master's degrees, 11% of the professional degrees, and about 5% of the doctoral degrees conferred in 1999-2000.

Explanations

What accounts for Asian Americans' overall high educational achievement? Below, we review five potential explanations.

Socioeconomic Background. The socioeconomic explanation highlights the role of family socioeconomic resources in Asian American children's educational success. Many Asian ethnic groups arrive in the U.S. with high levels of education (see Table 3). Others arrive with financial capital to enable them to set up small businesses. Asian parents may make good use of these socioeconomic resources to facilitate their children's educational achievement. However, it is important to recognize the diverse backgrounds of Asian Americans. Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians immigrated with little human or financial capital, and variation in income within groups like Chinese and Koreans is also very high. As we will show later in the book, poverty rates among Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese are higher than they are among whites. Thus, the socioeconomic explanation is simply not applicable to all Asian Americans.

Ability. The second popular explanation for high Asian American academic achievement focuses on their ability. On various standardized tests, Asian Americans show a greater proficiency in math and only slightly lower verbal aptitude than do whites. Popular attention to racial differences in tested proficiency has led to much speculation about the sources of these differences. While some contend that the differences are biological in nature, others attribute differences in measured proficiency to parents' socioeconomic resources, neighborhood and community environments, immigration selectivity, and perhaps culture.

Community and Identity. Another explanation for Asian American educational success considers the community-level support, encouragement, and information that is available to students. Because Asian Americans hold high educational expectations, they serve as examples for each other, encourage and support each other's achievement, and serve as sources of information about colleges and application procedures. For example, Asian American adults who have attended college act as role models for Asian American high school students. Asian Americans may also benefit from peer groups composed predominantly of other Asian Americans. Students in close-knit ethnic communities, like the New Orleans Vietnamese community, benefit from the supervision and support of community members. Children who maintain their ethnic distinctiveness through their native language use and ethnic self-identification link themselves to this community. They are then accountable to the community and closely supervised by its members. Children not only learn norms that contribute to their success from this community, but also benefit from the interconnectedness of its members.¹⁷

Attitudes, Values, and Beliefs Concerning Education. Attitudes, values, and beliefs held by Asian Americans that differ from those of whites may have their origins in Asian cultures or in the self-selection of immigrants. One group of values and beliefs that is thought to influence Asian American achievement concerns the connection between effort and educational success. Researchers suggest that one legacy of Confucianism in many Asian countries (notably China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam) is the notion that human beings are perfectible if they work hard to improve themselves. Given this cultural heritage, some Asian Americans may be more likely than whites to believe that hard work in school will be rewarded. It is also argued that Asian Americans may presume greater returns to education, both material and symbolic, than do whites and other minorities, based on beliefs originating in Asian home countries. In traditional Confucian societies, individuals of low social origin are encouraged to achieve upward

¹⁷ Zhou, Min and Carl L. Bankston III. 1998. *Growing Up American: How Vietnamese Children Adapt to Life in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

mobility through intensive study. In particular, sought-after civil service jobs are tied to the successful completion of examinations. Because of this culture, Asian American parents and their children may be more likely to view education as a prominent, if not sole, means to greater occupational prestige, social standing, and income. In addition, Asian Americans may be more likely to hold particular values, attitudes, and beliefs because they are “voluntary” immigrants to the United States. That is, voluntary immigrants are self-selected in having high motivations to achieve, evidenced by the fact that they chose to immigrate. Therefore, values encouraging success and hard work may be a product of the self-selected immigration process itself rather than any particular ethnic or cultural heritage.

Blocked Opportunities. The blocked opportunities perspective is closely related to the last two explanations. It suggests that Asian Americans use education as a means to overcome obstacles to social mobility.¹⁸ As recent immigrants, Asian Americans lack social networks to help them obtain good jobs in the mainstream economy, although they may have ethnic networks that are conducive to educational attainment. For example, Asian Americans may lack access to social networks that will help them obtain well-paid manufacturing jobs after graduating from high school because few Asian Americans work in such occupations. They also lack population bases for political careers. Thus, Asian parents stress education as a means for their children to overcome their disadvantages in achieving social mobility. In an economy where the demand for knowledge-based skill is high and meritocracy is held as a norm (even if not fully implemented in practice), this strategy for social mobility is quite appealing, especially when

¹⁸ See Kao, Grace, Marta Tienda, and Barbara Schneider. 1996. “Racial and Ethnic Variation in Academic Performance.” Pp. 263-97 in Pallas, Aaron M. ed. *Research in Sociology of Education and Socialization*, Volume 11. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press; Sue, Stanley and Sumie Okazaki. 1995. “Asian-American Educational Achievements: A Phenomenon in Search of an Explanation.” Pp. 133-45 in Nakanishi, Don T. and Tina Yamano Nishida, eds. *The Asian American Educational Experience: A Source Book for Teachers and Students*. New York: Routledge; and Xie, Yu and Kimberly Goyette. 2003. “Social Mobility and the Educational Choices of Asian Americans.” *Social Science Research* 32:467-98.

accompanied by the Confucian cultural norm that human imperfections can be improved by persistent learning and practice. Asian Americans' strong belief in the connection between hard work and success underlies their heavy investment in education as a means to achieve the social mobility that might otherwise elude them.

The five explanations we have reviewed overlap. Together, they provide plausible explanations of the educational achievement of Asian Americans. Many Asian American youths have highly educated parents and/or high family incomes. Overall, Asian Americans perform better on standardized math tests than do whites. Asian American students may also have highly-educated role models and motivated peers, and reside in interconnected ethnic communities. Some Asian Americans, either due to the fact that they are selective immigrants or because of their cultural backgrounds, may believe hard work is rewarded with success and may perceive high returns to education. Further, these values – coupled with limited opportunities for Asian Americans' social mobility through means other than education – may lead Asian American families to stress education as a means to high social standing and economic success in the U.S.

III. LABOR FORCE OUTCOMES

Socioeconomic status is multidimensional, with education and labor force profiles as two of its main components. Thus, racial inequality or ethnic inequality usually refers to racial or ethnic differences in education and labor force outcomes. In the last chapter, we examined education and found that Asian Americans overall have surpassed whites in key outcomes, despite substantial differences across ethnic groups among Asian Americans. In this chapter, we turn our attention to labor force outcomes.

Before we proceed, let us note that labor force outcomes are quite different from educational outcomes in some respects. First, labor force outcomes have direct economic consequences for individuals and their families, whereas the consequences of educational outcomes are indirect, mostly mediated by their effects on labor force outcomes. Second, labor force outcomes are not only affected by individuals' own efforts and family resources, but also by relationships with others – employers, supervisors, and coworkers. In other words, labor force outcomes result from the interplay between supply and demand. While also affected by both supply and demand, educational outcomes are more subject to supply factors in the sense that they are more within the control of individuals and their families. Third, except for slots in prestigious universities, racial competition for education is usually seen as non-zero sum, as education has been expanding in the United States over the past century. This means that the educational achievement of Asian Americans does not necessarily pose a threat to whites and other minorities. However, some workers see competition for jobs as zero-sum, feeling that as more positions are taken by Asians in the labor market, fewer are available for non-Asians.

Because labor force outcomes are more likely than educational outcomes to be influenced by racial resentment or discrimination, they are more direct indicators of Asian Americans' social status in American society. In this chapter, we focus on three dimensions of labor force outcomes: labor supply, earnings, and occupation. We use PUMS data from the U.S. Census between 1960 and 2000 to track historical changes in recent decades. We focus on comparisons by race and ethnicity as well as by gender.

A focus on gender is necessary because work has been traditionally segregated by gender in American society.

Labor Supply

The labor force participation rate refers to the proportion of the adult population that is either employed or actively looking for work. Measuring “labor supply,” labor force participation excludes persons who are not employed and not seeking employment. If non-participation in the labor force reflects not only an individual’s own choice but market forces (such as little hope of finding meaningful employment), labor force participation confounds labor supply with demand.

In this section, we first analyze labor force participation (LFP) as an outcome. Our analysis is restricted to all persons between ages 21 and 64. For workers actively employed, we also report number of hours worked per week. To interpret number of hours worked as labor supply, it is necessary to assume that workers can increase the number of hours worked at will. That is, part-time workers can work full-time if they wish, even if this change may require them to change employment. We do not present results concerning employment, for two reasons. First, employment (or unemployment) measures demand more than supply. Second, our preliminary analysis indicates only very small, unsystematic racial differences in employment rates between Asians and non-Asians and across Asian ethnic groups.

In Table 5, we present labor force participation rates (in percent) and mean number of hours worked, by race/ethnicity, gender, and census year. As in earlier tables, we separate Asians into six major ethnic groups. The “All Asian” category refers to all Asians, including those outside the six major ethnic groups, as well as multiethnic and multiracial Asians in 2000. One interesting pattern that emerges from Table 5 is that gender differences vary by race. In the earlier decades, gender differences are much larger for whites than for blacks, because a lower fraction of black men than white men, and a higher fraction of black women than white women, participated in the labor force. Black women’s higher rates of labor force participation are a reflection of greater economic need – in part because of black men’s lower LFP

rates, and in part because of black women's lower marriage rates. For Asian Americans, both men and women have had relatively high LFP rates.

Table 5 about Here

In particular, Japanese and Chinese women had high rates of labor force participation during the period examined. In 1960, for example, the LFP rate was 51% for Japanese women and 45% for Chinese women, in comparison to 39% for white women and 51% for black women. However, unlike the situation for blacks, relatively few Chinese and Japanese women remained unmarried (see the next chapter). From these results, we hypothesize that these working Asian women contributed significantly to family income, in part because not many Asian husbands had high incomes—a point we will return to later in this chapter.

A clear trend from 1960 onward is the steady increase in women's labor force participation. Although all the racial/ethnic groups experienced the increase, it was sharpest among whites, for whom labor force participation increased rapidly from 39% in 1960 to 71% in 2000. For Asian women, the LFP rate increased from 48% to 68% in 1990 and leveled off to 65% in 2000—a trend that was very similar to that of black women. By 1990, the LFP rate for white women was close to blacks' and had surpassed Asians'. Similar to whites and blacks, Asian men's labor force participation rates declined gradually over the decades.

We also observe substantial ethnic variation in labor force participation. Among Asian American men, Vietnamese had the lowest participation rates (74 –81%). Among Asian American women, both Vietnamese and Koreans had low participation rates (between 36 and 63 percent). Because Vietnamese Americans were mostly refugees, they were disadvantaged in the labor market by a lack of both human and financial capital. Korean women's low levels of labor force participation in part reflect a cultural norm that women stop working outside the home after marriage and childbirth. While this cultural norm is shared to some degree by all the groups (as revealed in the data), its influence on labor force participation is more pronounced among Korean Americans than the other racial/ethnic groups. Low

levels of labor force participation among Korean women may also reflect the under-reporting of their participation in family-owned businesses.

Table 5 also shows the average number of hours worked per week, by race/ethnicity and gender, 1960 to 2000. The measurement of the variable changed in 1990. Before 1980, census respondents were asked how many hours they worked in the previous week at all jobs, with categorical responses (1-14, 15-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40, 41-48, 49-59, and 60+). We inserted mid-values to the categories to obtain an interval measure. In 1980 and 1990, two questions were asked on the census form, one about hours worked in the previous week and the other about hours usually worked per week in the previous year. For the labor supply analysis reported in Table 5, we use the first measure for consistency. However, because the first measure of hours worked in the previous week was not collected in the 2000 Census, we use the second measure for 2000. Our preliminary analysis with 1980 and 1990 data assured us that conclusions about group comparisons would not differ whether we used the first measure (number of hours worked in the previous week) or the second measure (number of hours usually worked per week in the previous year), although we found the first measure to be about 2% higher on average than the second measure. That is to say, the entries for 2000 are slightly but systematically lower than the other entries when comparisons are made across years (i.e., by column). For the earnings analysis reported in the next section, we use the second measure of hours typically worked per week in the previous year, if available.

In terms of overall average hours worked, Asian men worked slightly less than white men and Asian women worked slightly more than white women (by one to two hours per week overall). The real divergence between Asians and whites lies in gender differences. While women overall worked fewer hours per week than men, the gender disparity is wider for whites than for Asians—a difference that emerged after 1970, as the gender gap substantially narrowed for Asians but remained at a similar level for whites. In 1980, for example, Asian men worked an average of 43 hours, and Asian women worked 38, a gender difference of about 5 hours. In contrast, white men worked 44 hours, and white women worked 36 hours, an 8-hour difference. We also note that the gender differences in hours worked were even smaller among blacks (4 hours in 1990 and 2000).

The extent to which the gender gap in hours worked is smaller for Asians than whites varies by ethnicity. The smallest gender gap is found among Vietnamese: 2 hours in 1980 and 1990, and 3 hours in 2000. After 1960, the gender gap in hours worked was also very small for Filipinos: 2 hours in 1970, 1990, and 2000. We also know that Vietnamese and Filipinos on average had lower socioeconomic status than the other major Asian ethnic groups. As with blacks, the narrowing gender gap in hours worked among Vietnamese and Filipinos is attributable both to a lower number of hours worked by men and to a higher number of hours worked by women, who needed to compensate for men's lower labor supply and earnings.

Earnings

We now turn to an analysis of Asian Americans' earnings relative to whites'. A study of earnings differences between Asians and whites is important because it addresses some controversial issues of general and scholarly interest about Asian Americans. In contrast to education and labor supply, earnings directly reflect the demand for a worker's skill and productivity in the labor market. Money is always of limited supply and is universally valued by all workers and employers. In this sense, relative earnings are a "zero-sum" game. If there is a discrimination against Asian Americans because of their race or country of origin, it is more likely to be reflected in earnings than in any other indicator.

As we have mentioned previously, the popular press often portrays Asian Americans as a model minority. In Chapter 2, we showed that Asians have indeed surpassed whites on most indicators of educational attainment. However, in the scholarly community, the model minority portrayal has been criticized from two prominent viewpoints. The first major criticism is that Asians are heterogeneous, and the model minority label simply mischaracterizes a large portion of them. We call this the "heterogeneity" criticism. In this book, we pay close attention to differences by ethnicity, nativity, gender, and other observed characteristics. We will also report in Chapter 4 that a larger portion of Asians live in poverty than do whites, further illustrating diversity in the economic situations of Asians. The second major criticism of the model minority label is that Asians only achieve economic parity with whites through

“over-education” and thus suffer a net disadvantage within levels of education. We call this the “net disadvantage” thesis. The implication is that this net disadvantage is indicative of discrimination against Asians. This position is well stated in a popular sociology book on race: “Perhaps the clearest indicator of continuing discrimination is the fact that the incomes of Japanese Americans are lower than they should be, given this group’s high level of education.”¹⁹

In Table 6, we report an analysis comparing Asians’ earnings to whites’ earnings, separately by gender. Our analysis excludes foreign-born workers, as it is necessary to control for human capital to test the net disadvantage thesis (and thus the discrimination hypothesis). Because education attained abroad may not be as highly valued in the American labor market as education acquired in the U.S., Asian American immigrants who completed their education prior to immigration may suffer an earnings disadvantage.²⁰ Thus, inclusion of immigrant workers without knowing their place of education would confound human capital factors with labor market factors. To conduct a conservative test, we restrict our earnings analysis to native-born Asians and whites ages 21-64 who worked full time, year-round and reported positive earnings in the previous year.²¹ The outcome variable, earnings, was the total income earned in the year prior to the census year. To estimate the residual differences in earnings by race/ethnicity, we employ linear regression after a logarithm transformation. We control for years of

¹⁹ Feagin, Joe R. and Clairece B. Feagin. 1993. *Racial and Ethnic Relations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall (p.354).

²⁰ Zeng, Zhen, and Yu Xie. Forthcoming. “Asian Americans’ Earnings Disadvantage Reexamined: The Role of Place of Education.” *American Journal of Sociology*.

²¹ Full-time employment is defined as working for at least 35 hours per week. For data from the 1960 and 1970 Censuses, hours worked were for the last week. For data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses, hours worked were for a usual week in the last year. Year-round employment is defined as working for at least 50 weeks in the last year.

schooling and years of work experience through a standard human capital model.²² This approach is crude, as it ignores other relevant factors (such as occupation, location, and effort) that may differ by groups and assumes that the influences of human capital factors are the same across groups. While our analytical strategy follows the standard practice for testing the net disadvantage thesis, it does not directly test the discrimination hypothesis. Another limitation of our analysis is that, being based only on native-born Asian Americans, it excludes most Asians (see Table 2).

Table 6 about Here

The entries in Table 6 are the Asian-white earnings ratios. For each year by group combination, we report two numbers, “observed” and “adjusted.” An observed earnings ratio means just that, the ratio of Asians’ average earnings to whites’ average earnings. An adjusted earnings ratio accounts for education and experience. Comparison of the “observed” versus the “adjusted” columns highlights the residual approach: whether or not Asian Americans suffer an earnings disadvantage after adjustment for human capital. Since Asian Americans are advantaged relative to whites in education but not in work experience, we attribute the difference between observed earnings ratios and adjusted earnings ratios to Asians’ higher educational attainment.

Technically, both observed and adjusted measures were estimated with regression models, using logged earnings as the dependent variable. The ratios in Table 6 are calculated by exponentiating the appropriate coefficients for Asians. A number of 1 means equity. A number smaller than 1 indicates Asians’ disadvantage. Likewise, a number greater than 1 indicates Asians’ advantage. For example, the first cell of the table means that in 1960 Asian men earned 98% as much as white men on average, but the racial difference is not statistically significant. However, in the next cell, we show that, after adjusting for human capital, Asians earned 94% as much as comparable whites in 1960, and this racial difference is

²² We closely follow Mincer’s human capital model of earnings. As in Mincer’s work, we approximate the work experience by the difference between age and the normative year of completing schooling. See Mincer, J. 1974. *Schooling, Experience, and Earnings*. New York: Columbia University Press.

statistically significant. Thus the apparent equality of (observed) earnings represented in the first cell is the result of Asians' higher levels of educational attainment.

Several main findings emerge from the earnings results reported in Table 6. First, Asian Americans compared more favorably to whites in observed earnings than in adjusted earnings. This is not surprising given that we know that Asians have higher levels of educational attainment. Asians' advantage over whites in observed earnings is particularly large in 1990 and 2000, in part reflecting the increased return to higher education in the U.S. labor market during this period. Second, there is a significant and steady trend over the decades in Asians' favor. Without adjustment, Asian men earned about as much as white men between 1960 and 1980, but earned 9% more in 1990 and 14% more in 2000. After adjustment, Asian men experienced an earnings disadvantage of 6% in 1960 and 5% in 1980, but a 4% advantage in 2000. Similar increases in the Asian-white ratio for the six major ethnicities are also apparent. Third, Asian women have fared well relative to white women. Throughout the period and for all the groups we consider, Asian women's earnings were not significantly lower than white women's. In fact, Asian women's observed earnings and adjusted earnings began to surpass those of whites in 1970, and their advantage over whites grew rapidly. By 2000, Asian women earned 32% more than whites before adjustment and 17% more after adjustment.

Finally, we note substantial variation across Asian ethnic groups. Of the three major Asian groups that were observed throughout the four-decade period, Filipinos did not do as well as Chinese and Japanese. In 1960, Filipino men earned 79% as much as whites before adjustment and 87% as much as whites after adjustment. The gap between Filipino men and white men gradually narrowed to a close by 2000. However, in no year were the earnings of Filipino men higher than those of white men, either observed or adjusted. The Filipino-white gap for women was not statistically significant between 1960 and 1980, after which the gap turned to Filipinos' favor. In fact, in 2000, Filipino women earned 9% more than white women, in both observed and adjusted earnings. While Vietnamese overall had relatively low earnings, the only statistically significant disparity between Vietnamese and whites was for observed earnings in 1990. Contrary to common expectations, we find that Asian Indians actually had low earnings

as recently as in 1980, when Indian men earned 74% as much as whites before adjustment and merely 67% as much after adjustment. After 1990, Asian Indian men reached parity with whites in both observed and adjusted earnings. Asian Indian women had about one third higher observed earnings than whites in 1990 and about one fifth higher adjusted earnings in 2000.

These results suggest that the net disadvantage thesis may be a valid characterization of the experiences of Asian American men prior to 1990. However, it does not appear to hold true for either Asian American women in general, or Asian American men since 1990. Due to both their higher educational attainment and higher earnings within levels of education, Asian American women have had an advantage over white women since 1970. Relative earnings of Asian American men also dramatically improved to the point of surpassing whites, even after controlling for human capital factors. If there is some evidence that Asian American men's lower adjusted earnings than white men reflected racial discrimination from 1960 to 1980, this ceased to be true after 1990.

Occupation

The earnings analysis reported in the preceding section shows that Asians had observed earnings that were either similar to whites (in the case of men before 1990) or higher than whites (in the case of women after 1970 and men after 1990). The improvement in Asians' relative earnings between 1960 and 2000 was drastic. Of course, part of the reason for these results is that Asian Americans have had high levels of educational attainment, which in turn has led to relatively high earnings. Given these high earnings, we expect that Asian Americans have relatively high-status occupations, and that their positions in the occupational structure have improved over time.

Occupation has been of central interest to sociological studies of inequality for several reasons. First of all, one's occupation is usually known to friends, relatives, and acquaintances, and it is often considered a short-hand description of social status. In contrast, one's earnings are customarily private and are seldom used by others to describe one's social status. Second, occupation is a relatively stable attribute that does not change much over the life cycle or business cycle. In some ways, occupation can be

thought of as a proxy measure of one's permanent income. Third, occupations are concrete social positions that are filled by actual workers. Forces such as technological innovation or economic development change the occupational structure and generate new positions, which in turn provide opportunities for social mobility. Sociologists have long been interested in who benefits and who loses as a result of such structural changes.

Occupation is significant for another reason when we consider racial inequality for Asian Americans. Some occupations may provide channels of mobility that are less subject to potential discrimination.²³ First, we observe that the extent to which objective criteria can be used for performance assessment varies, or is perceived to vary, from occupation to occupation. For example, universalism is a core normative principle in science, where "extraneous" factors, such as race, gender, nationality, and religion, should not play a role in affecting the evaluation of performance. Similarly, in occupations such as engineering and computer programming, delivery of products and services can be more directly observed and assessed than in other occupations such as the military, teaching, and clerical work.

Furthermore, there is a direct correspondence between educational credentials and entry into certain occupations. For example, it usually takes a doctoral degree in science to be a scientist and a medical degree to be a physician. Attaining such credentials is a long and arduous process. No matter how privileged a person is, either because of family background or race, he/she cannot become a scientist or a physician without the requisite educational credentials. However, regardless of one's social origin (including race), job opportunities in these fields are widely open once one attains the educational credentials. This close link between education and entry into many prestigious occupations makes it reasonable for Asian Americans to use educational attainment as an effective channel of mobility to overcome either real or perceived barriers to some high-status occupations.

²³ For a fuller account of the argument, see Xie, Yu and Kimberly Goyette. 2003. "Social Mobility and the Educational Choices of Asian Americans." *Social Science Research* 32:467-98.

Given that Asian Americans have achieved high educational and academic credentials, they may rationally seek to work in occupations in which they can demonstrate their skills, and in which objective criteria are used to evaluate performance. To quote a thirty-year-old Korean American:²⁴

I don't think that Asians prefer the sciences. Sometimes it is the only avenue open to them. In the sciences, empirical results matter more than in the esoteric discussion of humanities. So that at least as an engineer, you know how to put machines in, and you can be a useful bolt and nut. And I think the job opportunities for us lie in this field.

Asians, then, may be concentrated in certain occupations on the basis of their rational desire to maximize socioeconomic outcomes. However, racial concentration in certain occupations can also occur through other social mechanisms. An historical example illustrates how this can happen. In San Francisco in the late 19th century, a small group of Chinese began working in the laundry service occupation in response to discrimination and labor competition from whites. Their success demonstrated that they could operate laundries, but not necessarily that they were best-off running laundries relative to other kinds of work. Somehow, through social networks and role modeling, many other Chinese followed suit and started their own laundry businesses, thus creating a concentration of Chinese in laundry service through the 1920s.²⁵ We call this the "reflection effect."²⁶

In Table 7, we present the percentage of Asians in 41 occupational categories by census year. To make the table, we regrouped 3-digit coded occupations in the different censuses into this common set of

²⁴ Quoted by Lee, Joann Faung Jean. 1991. *Asian American Experiences in the United States*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, p.53.

²⁵ Takaki, Ronald. 1989. *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Pp. 240-243.

²⁶ Xie, Yu and Kimberlee A. Shauman. 1997. "Modeling the Sex-typing of Occupational Choice: Influences of Occupational Structure." *Sociological Methods and Research* 26:233-61.

occupational categories. The occupations comprising these 41 categories are available from the website for the book (www.yuxie.com). We tried to achieve consistency across the years, but some compromises were made out of necessity. The data presented in Table 7 were computed for active workers in the civilian labor force between ages 21 and 64, from the 1960-2000 1% PUMS series. For the 2000 data, we also used a subsample of Asian Americans from the 5% PUMS to improve precision and to account for multiracial identification with the 50-percent rule. Data were collapsed over ethnicity and gender because sample sizes within cells would otherwise be very small. The entries simply represent the percentage of Asian workers clustered into each occupation. They should be compared to the second row from the bottom, the total percentage of Asian workers in the civilian labor force within each census year. A number greater than the total percentage indicates an overrepresentation of Asians for a particular occupation. Likewise, a number smaller than the total percentage represents an underrepresentation of Asians. The last row of the table presents the index of dissimilarity measuring the occupational segregation of Asians from non-Asians.

Table 7 about Here

In 1960, only 0.5% of all workers were Asian. They tended to be concentrated in such occupations as life scientists (3.6%), architects (1.5%), physicians and dentists (1.4%), textile operators (1.1%), farmers and farm laborers (1.1%), and cleaning and food service workers (1.1%). Occupations where Asians were underrepresented included lawyers and judges (0.3%), religious workers (0.2%), health service workers (0.2%), protective service workers (0.1%), and a few skilled manual laborers (such as electricians, construction workers, craftsmen, metalworking and transport equipment operators, at 0.3%). Some of these numbers are consistent with the argument that Asians may consciously pursue certain occupations, such as life scientists, architects, physicians, and dentists, to maximize their chances for upward social mobility, since these are high-status occupations requiring educational credentials. Asians' presence in some other occupations, like farmers and textile operators, reflects the labor niches that early Asian immigrants occupied.

As we showed in Chapter 1, the Asian population grew rapidly after 1965. This growth is reflected in the steady increase in the percentage of Asians in the labor force, from 0.5% in 1960 to 4.1% in 2000—an eight-fold increase in four decades. However, the increase in Asian representation was much steeper in some occupational areas than in others. Foremost among these areas were scientific and engineering occupations. For example, the percentage of Asians in physical science jobs jumped from an unremarkable 0.7% in 1960 to an astonishingly high 15.3% in 2000. The percentage of Asians among computer specialists, an occupation that did not exist in the 1960 census occupation classification, increased from 1.2% in 1970 to 13.2% in 2000. Also, Asians' representation increased in all other professional jobs except for elementary and pre-school teachers, secondary and vocational teachers, lawyers and judges, and social and recreation workers. For example, the percentage of Asians among physicians, dentists, and related occupations increased rapidly from 1.4% in 1960 to 13.6% in 2000. Third, and surprisingly, Asians rapidly increased their share in skilled manual work, such as textile operators, craftsmen, and other operators (respectively to 10.1%, 4.7%, and 4.0% in 2000). Finally, Asian representation increased among personal service workers and barbers, both in absolute terms (from 0.5% in 1960 to 5.1% in 2000) and in relation to the increase in the representation of Asian Americans in the labor force (from 0.5% in 1960 to 4.1% in 2000). Asian Americans' representation among cleaning and food service workers, at 1.1% in 1960, increased in absolute terms (to 4.7% in 2000) but not in relative terms.

Asians' presence remained small and underrepresented in several occupations: elementary and pre-school teachers; secondary and vocational teachers; librarians, archivists, and curators; social and recreation workers; secretaries; bookkeepers; and clerical workers. Although these are all white-collar jobs, they are relatively low-status and low-paying occupations with flat career trajectories, and they tend

to be filled predominantly by women. Somehow, Asians have avoided these occupations,²⁷ which may help explain why Asian women earn more than white women. However, we note that Asian Americans were underrepresented in 2000 in two high-status occupations: lawyers and judges (2.7%), and administrators and public officers (2.4%). Another group of occupations where Asians' presence is hardly felt is in skilled manual work: carpenters, electricians, and construction workers. One reason for Asians' absence is historical, as competition between whites and minority workers in skilled trades has been fierce, and Asians were discriminated against in dominant trade unions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, like the AFL. Another related reason is a lack of social networks and role models, as few Asians worked in these occupations. Finally, it is interesting to observe that Asians' representation in farming stayed low, although many Asians (especially Japanese) historically were engaged in these occupations. While many Japanese Americans may have left farming after losing land while interned in camps during World War II, other Asians, especially new Asian immigrants, may now view the lifestyle associated with farming as undesirable and prefer to work and live in urban settings.

It is important to consider the source of changes in Asians' representation across the census years. There is a great inertia in labor force composition in the sense that the structure of the labor force does not change much within a ten-year window. Aside from job mobility, two demographic factors account for the changes in Asian representation that we observed earlier: cohort replacement and immigration. Cohort replacement means that older workers (55 and older) in an earlier census left the labor force, and a new cohort of young workers who were 11-20 years old ten years ago entered the labor force. However, this source of change can only contribute a small part to the changes in Table 7. Most of the changes in occupational patterns are due to the influx of new immigrants and their children into the labor force.

²⁷ Indeed, in preliminary analyses of the 2000 Census data, Emily Greenman has found that Asian American women are more likely to be in certain professional (and traditionally male-dominated) fields than white women, particularly science and engineering.

The preceding discussion highlighted occupations in which Asians are either overrepresented or underrepresented. It is important to keep in mind that the overall differences in the distributions of Asians and non-Asians across occupations are small. This is shown in the last row of Table 7, which presents the index of dissimilarity measuring the racial occupational segregation. According to this index, which varies between 18% (in 1970, 1990 and 2000) and 20% (in 1980), levels of racial segregation are low. The index indicates that only 18-20% of all Asians (or non-Asians) would need to change occupations in order for Asians and non-Asians to have identical distributions across the occupational classifications.

Summary

Asian Americans have had high levels of academic achievement and educational attainment. Since 1960, both high school completion and college degree attainment rates have been much higher among Asians than among whites. In standardized tests, Asian students (including immigrant children) have persistently performed better than white students in math and had only slightly lower scores than whites in English.

Education is at the core of Asian Americans' social mobility process. Their high educational achievement has facilitated their entry to many high-status professional occupations that normally require college and advanced degrees. Asian Americans' large presence in professions such as science, engineering, and medicine evolved gradually from 1960 to 2000. While part of this transformation is attributable to the influx of new immigrants and their children, who increased the overall share of Asian Americans in the labor force, the main explanation is that a large portion (indeed most by 2000) of Asian Americans, either native-born or foreign-born, attained postsecondary education. High educational credentials ushered Asian Americans into professional jobs in the labor market.

Asian Americans' high educational attainment is also a major reason for their relatively high earnings. Among native-born workers, Asian American men reached parity in earnings with whites in earlier decades (1960-1980) because of their higher educational attainment. Within levels of education, however, Asian American men suffered an earnings disadvantage of 5%. That is, education accounted for about a 5% difference in observed earnings between Asian Americans and whites between 1960 and

1980. The difference attributable to education increased to 10% in 2000. By then Asian American men earned more than white men not only in observed earnings (by 14%) but also in adjusted earnings (by 4%). Among women, Asian Americans consistently outperformed whites in earnings throughout the period, in both observed and adjusted earnings. In recent decades, education seems to play a particularly large role in the higher earnings of Asian American women. In 2000, Asian American women's observed earnings were 32% greater than those of white women. This premium goes down to 17% for adjusted earnings, suggesting that education accounts for almost half of the observed advantage enjoyed by Asian American women. Again, Asian Americans' higher earnings, either observed or adjusted, did not happen instantly. In fact, Asian American men experienced a net disadvantage in the 1960s.

Finally, we observe that there are substantial ethnic differences across Asian groups. In both education and earnings, Filipinos and Vietnamese lagged behind the other major Asian groups. Indeed, the Vietnamese (even native-born Vietnamese) are the only Asian group that had a lower rate of college education than whites. However, socioeconomic conditions for Filipinos and Vietnamese have significantly improved over time, and they had earnings roughly comparable to whites in 2000.

IV. MARRIAGE AND FAMILY

One conclusion we drew in the last chapter is that Asian Americans have effectively used education as a channel of social mobility. However, educational attainment normally occurs early in the life course, when an individual is still dependent on parents for both financial and emotional support. Because parents' emotional encouragement and financial support facilitate educational attainment, the high levels of education found among Asian American youth reflect the large investment of Asian American parents. Seen in this light, achieving social mobility through education is more a family strategy than an individual strategy. If education is the primary route to success among Asian Americans, the family is the main engine that drives progress along the route. Thus, our knowledge of Asian Americans' situations and experiences in the U.S. would be incomplete without understanding the Asian American family.

In this chapter, we take a close look at family characteristics and marriage patterns of Asian Americans, relative to those of whites and blacks. For simplicity, we present only the results from the 2000 Census.²⁸ We acknowledge the tremendous changes affecting American families in recent decades, such as increases in age of marriage (i.e., the postponement of marriage), a growing prevalence of non-marriage, and increases in divorce and premarital cohabitation rates. These trends have affected all racial groups, and analyzing the 2000 Census data allows us to provide sharp comparisons between Asians and non-Asians, and across different Asian ethnicities.

Another important trend associated with recent changes in U.S. family-related behaviors is the steady increase in women's labor force participation, as we earlier observed when discussing Table 5. Some scholars hypothesize that women's growing involvement in the labor force has contributed both to their postponement of marriage and to their non-marriage, as it provides financial stability for women

²⁸ In order to compute reliable estimates across Asian ethnicities, we used the 5% PUMS from the 2000 Census for the analysis of Asian Americans. We then combined the results with those pertaining to whites and blacks from the 1% PUMS.

outside of marriage. This hypothesis may also explain why marriage rates are lower among blacks than among whites. Historically, black women have been more active than whites in the U.S. labor force; sizable fractions of black men have lacked steady employment, which made them less appealing as marriage partners.

As we reported in the earlier chapter, the labor force participation rates of Asian women were historically higher than whites', and close to blacks', prior to 1990. Asian women also tended to work long hours, and to earn more than their white or black counterparts. Thus, all available evidence indicates that Asian American women have been active in economic pursuits, although there are ethnic variations, with Korean women less so than other groups. However, this greater economic independence among Asian women has not caused them to avoid marriage. In fact, as we will show, marriage rates are relatively high, and divorce rates relatively low, among Asian Americans.

Family Characteristics

We first examine family living arrangements in detail. In the first column of Table 8, we present the percentage of persons living in families headed by a married couple, or "husband-wife families." Note that in our definition a husband-wife family is not the same as a nuclear family, which includes solely a married couple and their own children, but it encompasses a nuclear family. For instance, an elderly woman who lives with her daughter and her son-in-law is considered to live in a husband-wife family, as is a child who lives with his/her grandparents. Individuals who live by themselves or in families headed by unmarried adults are not considered to live in a husband-wife family. We intend the living arrangement in a husband-wife family to measure the stability and resourcefulness--both emotional and material--of family life that are commonly associated with marriage. For each racial/ethnic group, we present two numbers, one for all persons regardless of age (in Panel A) and one for children under age 18

(in Panel B). We separate out children in our analysis because they are particularly vulnerable to the harmful consequences associated with living in families headed by single parents or non-parent adults.²⁹

Table 8 about Here

Table 8 shows that the percentages living in husband-wife families are higher among Asian Americans than among whites or blacks. For all persons regardless of age, the percentage is 73% among Asian Americans, compared to 67% among whites and 40% among blacks. For children, the percentage is 84% among Asians, compared to 78% among whites and 40% among blacks. There is some cross-ethnic variation among Asian Americans. Most notable is that only 65% of all Japanese, the most assimilated Asian group, live in husband-wife families. However, the percentage of Japanese children living in husband-wife families is very high, at 88%. The only Asian American group with a significantly lower percentage of children living in husband-wife families is multiracial Asians, who look similar to whites on this measure. The overall picture that emerges from these numbers is that an overwhelming majority of Asians, especially Asian children, live in families headed by married couples and thus benefit from this form of family living arrangement.

The second column of Table 8 presents the percentage of persons living in multigenerational family households. A family household is considered multigenerational if family members living in the same household are related to each other by blood and belong to three or more generations. An archetypical example of a multi-generational family consists of children, parents, and grandparents. Since we do not specify marital status, parents and grandparents in such a multigenerational family can be single, married, divorced, or widowed.

That elderly parents live with adult married children is a cultural tradition that has long been practiced in many Asian societies.³⁰ While this practice is less prevalent among Asian Americans than

²⁹ McLanahan, Sara, and Gary Sandefur. 1994. *Growing up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps*. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.

Asians in Asia, it is still evident. Table 8 shows that high percentages of Asian Americans live in multigenerational families. Among all Asians, the percentage is 15%; among Asian children, the percentage is 17%. These numbers are much higher than those among whites (5% and 7%, respectively) and very similar to those among blacks (14% and 18%, respectively). However, the seeming similarity between Asians and blacks in percentages living in multigenerational families is misleading. Recall that Asian children live predominantly in husband-wife families. For them, having grandparents living in the same household usually means additional resources. For black children, grandparents often substitute for parents as primary caretakers. In additional analysis of the Census data, we found that most (about two thirds) of black children who live in multigenerational families do not live with two biological parents, whereas this type of family arrangement only constitutes a small fraction (about 18%) among Asian American children.

Multigenerational living arrangements vary by Asian ethnicity. The prevalence of living in multigenerational families among Japanese is low, both for all persons and for children. The rate is very high among Filipinos (22% for all persons and 27% for children), “other Asians” (19% for all persons and 21% for children), and Vietnamese (16% for all persons and 17% for children). One reason that a high proportion of Asian Americans lives in multigenerational families is cultural, as noted earlier. Another reason is economic, since pooling resources across multiple generations saves money and reduces economic risk. A third reason is related to immigration. Recent immigrants may initially reside with other family members before establishing independent households of their own.

The third column reports family size--the number of immediate family members living in the same family household. It shows that, except for Japanese, Asian Americans live in larger families than whites and blacks. Note that family size is affected by many factors: the marital status of the household head, the number of children (i.e., fertility), and the presence or absence of elderly adults. However, we

³⁰ Hermalin, Albert (editor). 2002. *The Well-Being of the Elderly in Asia: A Four-Country Comparative Study*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

know that fertility among Asian Americans is relatively low.³¹ Thus, the larger family size on average among Asian Americans than among whites and blacks is not due to Asian Americans having more children per family but due to their higher rate of stable marriages and higher rate of elderly persons living with married adult children. Thus, it is not surprising that there is a correspondence, across Asian ethnicities, between the percentage living in multigenerational families and family size, with Filipinos, Vietnamese, and “other Asians” at the end high and Japanese at the low end on both measures.

In the fourth and fifth columns of Table 8, we present the mean and median family income. Since the units of analysis remain at the individual level, these numbers are not the mean and the median of income across families, but the mean and the median of family income across all individuals in a subpopulation. The numbers show that Asian Americans overall have much higher family incomes than blacks, and that, except for Vietnamese and other Asians, they also have higher family incomes than whites. However, this comparison of family income obscures the fact that family size is larger among Asian Americans than among whites and blacks. Adjusting for family size substantially reduces, or even reverses, Asian Americans’ advantage in family income relative to whites. For example, in Panel A, the mean family income is \$77,000 for all Asians, compared to \$70,000 for whites. If we take into account the difference in family size and divide column 5 by column 3, we find that per-capita mean family income is around \$18,000 for all Asians, lower than \$20,000 for whites. There is also a large ethnic variation in family income across Asian ethnicities. At the high end, Japanese have the highest median family income (\$74,000) and the second highest mean family income (\$91,000); Asian Indians have the highest mean family income (\$94,000) and the second highest median family income (\$70,000). At the low end, Vietnamese and other Asians have mean and median family income at levels substantially lower than those of whites.

³¹ Bachu, Amara and Martin O’Connell. 2001. *Fertility of American Women: June 2000*. Current Population Reports P20-543RV. U.S. Census Bureau.

Family living arrangements have direct consequences for economic well-being. This is true because the family is usually the basic unit at which both income and consumption are shared. Everything else being equal, it is economically more efficient to live in a larger family due to economies of scale. In the last column of Table 8, we present the poverty rate. A person is considered to live in poverty if the combined gross cash income of his/her family falls below the official threshold income determined necessary for subsistence, which adjusts for family size and composition. That is, like family income, poverty status is a family attribute, although we compute the poverty rate at the individual level.

Contrary to the “model minority” image, a larger proportion of Asian Americans than whites live in poverty. Overall, 13% of Asians lived in poverty in 2000, compared to 9% among whites. Among children, the figures are 14% among Asians and 11% among whites. However, these poverty rates are much lower than those among blacks (at 24% for all persons and 32% for children). The ethnic variation is large. The poverty rate is low among the Japanese and Filipinos (in fact, lower among these groups than among whites) and high among Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, and “other Asians.” The poverty rate is high among Vietnamese because they came to the U.S. as refugees. However, we already know that the average economic conditions for Chinese and Koreans are good -- either comparable or superior to those of whites. These results suggest that there is a polarization in the economic conditions of Chinese and Korean Americans: whereas a large portion of these groups has realized the “American dream” by achieving middle-class status, another large portion has been left behind and economically deprived. This economic diversity of Asian Americans within the same ethnic group is often overlooked in the popular media’s rush to proclaim Asian Americans a model minority.

Prevalence and Timing of Marriage

We now consider Asian Americans’ marriage patterns. This is not an easy task because census data provide information only about current marital status but not marital history. In particular, for respondents who are currently married, we do not know for how long they have been married and whether they had

been married and divorced before the current marriage. For those who are divorced, we do not know the timing of divorce and marital history preceding the divorce.

To use the census information for an estimate of the prevalence of marriage, we assume that the age gradient in marriage rates represents the experience of a hypothetical cohort who follows the gradient. That is, we assume away period and cohort effects and construct a synthetic cohort out of age-specific marriage rates. We use information from two age-specific rates: rate of current marriage (rate C), and rate of ever marriage (rate E). Obviously, rate E is greater than rate C, with the difference due to those who are divorced or widowed but not yet remarried. Although this difference is confounded by several factors, we can use it as a crude indicator of divorce when we compare groups, under the unrealistic simplifying assumption of ignoring remarriage and widowhood. Of course, remarriage and widowhood undoubtedly exist. However, as long as the rates of remarriage and widowhood are not large and do not vary much by groups being compared, relative results yielded by this crude method are still valid for group comparisons.

Note that through the life course of a cohort, rate E is necessarily a non-decreasing function of age. We can select a reference age at which to compare marriage rates across groups. For simplicity, we first chose ages 35-44 and denote the two marriage rates for the age group respectively as C_{35-44} and E_{35-44} . If we pick an advanced age beyond which few first marriages occur (say 45-54), the rate of ever marriage at this age, denoted as E_{45-54} , approaches a limit-- the proportion that will ever marry. Now we can go back to the age gradient of age-specific rates of ever marriage and locate the age that corresponds to half of E_{45-54} . Under the assumption of a synthetic cohort, this age can be interpreted as the median age of marriage.

In the first column of Table 9, we present C_{35-44} , the rate of current marriage for ages 35-44. We observe that proportionately more Asian Americans are currently married than are whites and blacks. Among men ages 35-44, 78% of Asian Americans are currently married, compared to 69% of whites and 52% of blacks. Among women ages 35-44, 80% of Asian Americans are currently married, compared to 71% of whites and 42% of blacks. There is some evidence that relative to whites, Asians' higher rates of

current marriage are attributable to Asians' lower likelihood of divorce. In the second column, E_{35-44} , we observe that the rates of ever being married are comparable between Asian Americans and whites (85% for men and 90% for women). The difference, $E_{35-44} - C_{35-44}$, a crude measure of divorce, is 7% among Asian men and about 10% among Asian women. In contrast, the difference stands at 15% for white men and 18% for white women. Blacks' rates of being currently married are low for two reasons, both because a lower proportion ever marries ($E_{35-44} = 71\%$ for men and 69% for women) and because a higher percentage of those who were previously married is no longer married ($E_{35-44} - C_{35-44} = 19\%$ among men and 27% among women).

Table 9 about Here

There are notable ethnic variations in the percentages currently married and ever married. The Japanese have relatively low marriage rates, and the Koreans and Asian Indians have the highest marriage rates. Furthermore, multiracial Asians have marriage rates that closely resemble those of whites. In particular, the difference in the two marriage rates, $E_{35-44} - C_{35-44}$, is slightly higher among multiracial Asian women (19%) than among white women (18%). This result suggests that multiracial Asians have assimilated to the degree that their marriage patterns resemble more closely those of whites than those of mono-racial Asians.

In the third and fourth columns, we present the rate of current marriage in ages 45-54 (C_{45-54}) and the rate of ever marriage in ages 45-54 (E_{45-54}). The difference between E_{45-54} and E_{35-44} , representing the proportion of first marriages occurring in ages 45 to 54, is twice as high among Asian American men (8%) as it is among Asian American women (4%). We find a similar gender difference between white men (7%) and white women (4%). Overall, the results show that among Asian Americans and whites a very small proportion of people get married for the first time past age 44, because an overwhelming majority of them has already been married before that age. However, the proportion is much higher among blacks (around 12%). The difference between the third column and the first column, $C_{45-54} - C_{35-44}$, represents the change in the proportion currently married. This difference is subject to the influence of several factors: divorce, remarriage, and new marriage, the last of which can be estimated by $E_{45-54} - E_{35-44}$.

The $C_{45-54} - C_{35-44}$ difference is a positive 7% for Asian American men but a negative -2% among Asian American women. This gender difference probably reflects the fact that a higher proportion of divorced men than divorced women get remarried, presumably to younger women. This gender asymmetry is also true for whites and blacks. In any event, in ages 45-54, 85% of Asian American men and 78% of Asian American women are still married, compared to 74% white men and 70% white women. Thus, the data show that Asian Americans, with the exception of Japanese and multiracial Asians, are still more likely to be married than whites in this later age range.

Using E_{45-54} as the proportion that is ever married, we calculated the estimated median age of marriage and report the estimates in the last column. The median age of marriage is estimated to be 28 among Asian men and 25 among Asian women. Comparing these numbers to those of whites (26 for white men and 24 for white women), we draw two observations. First, Asian Americans marry at later ages than do whites. Second, the age gap between men and women in the median age of marriage is also slightly wider for Asian Americans (3 years) than for whites (2 years). The late age of marriage for Asian Americans may reflect a traditional expectation that a person (especially a man) needs to be economically established before marriage. The patterns of late marriage and a high gender gap in the age of marriage are true across all Asian American groups. For example, among Japanese Americans, the most assimilated Asian group, the median age of marriage is estimated to be 30 for men and 27 for women. Interestingly, we also found black women to have a high median age of marriage at 28.

We have used crude information from the 2000 Census data to draw a few observations about Asian Americans' marriage patterns. In comparison to whites and blacks, Asian Americans have relatively high rates of marriage, low rates of divorce, but a high median age of marriage. All of these results seem to suggest that Asian Americans are still influenced by a culture that emphasizes the importance of the family.

Intermarriages

As we reviewed in Chapter 1, early Asian immigrants were predominantly male manual workers. There were very few Asian women in America who could be their marriage partners. To make the situation worse, Asian workers were not allowed to bring their wives to the U.S. In fear of Asian men marrying native white women, many states instituted anti-miscegenation laws to prohibit marriages between Asians and whites. This situation lasted until the end of World War II, when U.S. servicemen who fought and were stationed overseas in Asia began to bring home “war brides” from Asia. This started a new era in which Asian women are accepted, and sometimes even preferred, as wives by white and black men.

However, large-scale immigration from Asia did not occur until the landmark 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. The beginning of this new wave of immigration coincided with the Civil Rights Movement, which resulted in the abolition of anti-miscegenation laws in 1967. Intermarriage between Asian Americans and other racial groups began to increase. Whereas American culture has applied a “one-drop” rule when racially identifying children from white-black mixed parentage, it does not have a similar norm concerning the race of children from white-Asian mixed parentage. This may be because these interracial offspring are a relatively recent phenomenon, born after the Civic Rights movement of the 1960s. Further, Asian-white relationships are not complicated by a history of intricate relationships between whites and blacks dating back to slavery. Our earlier study using data from the 1990 Census found that about half of biracial Asian children are identified as Asian, suggesting that how to racially identify this group is fluid and maybe even optional.³² Earlier in the book, we reported that out of 11,898,828 all Asians in 2000, 1,879,423 were reported as mixed-Asian, with 1,655,830 multiracial Asians (i.e., those with an Asian race plus a non-Asian race) and 223,593 multiethnic Asians (i.e., those with more than one Asian ethnicity) in Table 2. Obviously, these mixed-Asians are mostly children of interracial or interethnic marriages, as only a small proportion of Asian Americans is born out of wedlock.

³² Xie, Yu and Kimberly Goyette. 1997. “The Racial Identification of Biracial Children with One Asian Parent: Evidence from the 1990 Census.” *Social Forces* 76:547-70.

Although most Asian Americans still tend to marry other Asian Americans, intermarriage between Asians and non-Asians has become a significant phenomenon in American society today. In Table 10, we present intermarriage rates among Asian Americans that we calculated from the 2000 Census 5% PUMS, separately by gender. The analysis was restricted to all married Asian Americans, either identified with only one Asian ethnicity or mixed. The first column reports the proportion of spouses who are non-Asian. For example, we observe that 12% of all married Asian American men have a non-Asian wife. The percentage of married Asian American women with a non-Asian husband is much higher, at 23%.

Table 10 about Here

A methodological caution is in order. Interpretation of intermarriage rates is not always straightforward, because their magnitudes are subject to the influences of relative group sizes, also called “exposure” or “opportunity structure.” Suppose that marriage occurs at random so that there is no assortative mating by race/ethnicity. Under this unrealistic ideal situation, the smaller a group, the smaller the probability of marrying a member of the group. Conversely, the larger the size of a group, the higher the probability of marrying someone from that group. Thus, there is a natural tendency for a person in a small group to marry someone outside the group due to the scarcity of supply. Similarly, there is a natural tendency for a person in a large group to marry someone else within the group. This is the primary reason why we did not present the intermarriage rates for non-Asians in Table 10, since they are not comparable. Comparing intermarriage rates across racial groups requires methodological attention and statistical tools that are not suitable for this book. As a compromised solution to the problem, we present the descriptive results for Asian Americans as a whole and then for the major Asian ethnic groups in Table 10. As long as the groups are all small in size relative to the total U.S. population, our cross-group comparisons are still valid.

One of the most interesting results in Table 10 is that Asian American women out-marry at higher rates than Asian American men. Among all Asian Americans, the out-marriage rate for women is about twice the rate for men (23% versus 12%). For Filipinos, the difference is almost three fold (33% versus

13%). Among Koreans, the contrast is even greater (27% versus 4%). Of course, part of the gender difference is attributable to the fact that some military men met and married their wives during their service in Asia. However, the gender difference is so large and so consistent across all ethnic groups that it goes beyond this factor alone. For example, after we restricted the analysis to native-born Asian Americans, we still found a gender difference: whereas 38% of married native Asian American men are married to non-Asians, 49% of married native Asian American women are married to non-Asians. While it is difficult to precisely pin down the social processes that underlie this gender difference, we suspect the social barrier for intermarriage is lower for Asian American women than for Asian American men.

The additional analysis we conducted also clearly shows that intermarriage is far more common among native-born Asian Americans than among immigrant Asian Americans. Part of the reason, of course, is that a large portion of immigrants was already married before they came to America. This pattern is also reasonable because native-born Asian Americans are more assimilated than new immigrants and have had far more opportunities to get to know non-Asians. The high percentages of intermarriage (49% among married native-born Asian American women and 38% among married native-born Asian American men) suggests that the second and higher generations of Asian Americans are now well integrated into American society, as a significant proportion of them meets Park's final criterion of assimilation -- "amalgamation" or racial mixing.³³ However, because high rates of intermarriage among native-born Asian Americans are accompanied by high rates of continuing immigration of Asians, it seems unlikely that Asian Americans as a group will be completely assimilated into the mainstream in the near future.

The ethnic differences in intermarriage rates among Asian Americans also reflect their varying degrees of assimilation. Japanese Americans, the most assimilated group, have high out-marriage rates of 20% for men and 41% for women. Multiracial Asian Americans, who are structurally assimilated because of their mixed parentage, have even higher rates of marrying non-Asians, at 44% for men and

³³ Park, Robert E. 1950. *Race and Culture*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

54% for women. In contrast, Vietnamese Americans have low rates of out-marriage, at 3% for men and 10% for women. Although Asian Indian Americans have high socioeconomic status, they immigrated to the U.S. only recently and have maintained their cultural distinction. They also have low rates of out-marriage (8% for men and 5% for women). Note that Asian Indians are the only major Asian group in which women do not out-marry more often than men.

When an Asian American is married to another Asian American, the husband and the wife are not necessarily of the same ethnicity. In the second and the third column in Table 10, we separate Asian American spouses who are in the same ethnicity (second column) from Asian American spouses who report different ethnicities. There is some evidence in the data for Asian panethnicity. If Asian Americans had no preference for other Asians over non-Asians except for those in their own ethnicity, we would expect the ratio of “other Asian” to “non-Asian” to be comparable to that in the general population. That is not the case. Whereas such ratios according to population sizes are very small (0.04), the ratio of other Asians to non-Asians among spouses of Asian Americans is much higher, ranging between .013 (among Korean women) to 1.24 (among Vietnamese men).³⁴ This indicates that, if Asians do not marry within their own ethnic group, they are much more likely to marry other Asians than non-Asians. For example, this is clear in the marriage patterns of Japanese men. If they do not marry other Japanese, 11% of them marry other Asians (such as Chinese and Koreans), while 20% of them marry non-Asians, resulting in a ratio of 0.56, far above the expected ratio at 0.04.

Summary

In this chapter, we analyzed the marriage patterns and family characteristics of Asian Americans, both in comparison to whites and blacks, and across different Asian ethnic groups. We found both continuity and change among Asian Americans in terms of their family behaviors. By continuity, we mean that Asian Americans still maintain certain practices that have had a long tradition in their countries of origin, such

³⁴ Among Korean women, $4\%/27\% = 0.13$; among Vietnamese men, $4\%/3\% = 1.24$.

as high rates of ever marriage, low rates of divorce (especially when children are present), a relatively large gender gap in age of marriage, and multi-generational co-residence. Furthermore, they tend to marry within their own ethnic groups. When they fail to do so, Asian Americans still prefer to marry members of other Asian ethnic groups rather than non-Asians.

By change, we refer to assimilation into American society. This is manifested in several aspects. With respect to divorce, for example, we observe a non-trivial divorce rate among Asian Americans, albeit low relative to the rates of whites and blacks. In childbearing, Asian Americans have low fertility, although recent Asian immigrants have an age distribution with a larger proportion in young, child-bearing ages and thus have relatively high birth rates. In residence, most Asians do not live in multi-generational families. The clearest manifestation of assimilation is seen in the variation among Asian Americans by ethnicity and nativity. The Japanese, the most assimilated group, exhibit marriage and family behaviors that closely resemble those of whites. In addition, native-born Asian Americans have much higher intermarriage rates than foreign-born Asian Americans. It seems that more assimilated Asians are less familial and less traditional in their family behaviors than less assimilated Asians.

In summary, Asian Americans exhibit a high degree of family orientation. One consequence is that Asian American children overwhelmingly live in two-parent families, sometimes with grandparents, and have fewer siblings. Such family living arrangements undoubtedly benefit Asian children's academic achievement. From our earlier work, we know that Asian parents also hold high educational expectations for their children and are willing to invest family resources in them. For these reasons, we identify the family as the main engine that powers the social mobility of Asian American youth.

V. RESIDENCE

America is a race-conscious society. Race relations take on particular prominence when individuals interact with each other across racial boundaries in concrete settings where social and economic activities take place. Such social settings include schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, public spaces where residents stroll, shop, and enjoy leisure activities, and social, cultural, and religious gatherings that promote shared interests. Despite the rapid development of internet/computer technology and telecommunication, the vast majority of such social settings that draw people together are spatially situated and constrained. Persons who live closer to each other are more likely to interact with each other in such social settings than persons who live further apart. In other words, if Asian Americans live close to other Asian Americans, they tend to interact with other Asian Americans in social settings.

Conversely, if Asian Americans are surrounded by members of another race (say whites), they are compelled by this configuration to have more interracial interactions.

Put into more concrete terms, residential patterns are an important dimension of race relations, because they influence how likely one is to be exposed to persons of different races and thus potentially to interact with persons of different races. For example, one finding in the previous chapter, that Asians tend to marry within their own ethnicity and/or among Asians, may in part reflect the fact that Asians may be exposed more to other Asians (and particularly those of the same ethnicity) than to non-Asians in residence, schools, interest groups, and/or even work settings.

In this chapter, we examine the residential patterns of Asian Americans. We have two simple goals. First, we want to know how Asians are geographically distributed in the country on a macro scale—across states and metropolitan areas. Second, we aim to understand the residential segregation patterns between Asians and non-Asians on a micro level—across census tracts within a metropolitan area. The analyses are based on data from the 2000 Census.

Geographic Distribution of Asian Americans

In this section we first focus on the question of where Asian Americans live in the country. The geographic units are broad--states and metropolitan areas. Here we wish to highlight the states and metropolitan areas where Asians tend to be concentrated.

We start by distinguishing between absolute distribution and relative distribution. Absolute distribution refers to the uneven allocation of Asian Americans to different geographic units (such as states and metropolitan areas); relative distribution refers to the differentials between the spatial allocation of Asians versus that of non-Asians. We need to measure spatial distribution in relative terms because certain geographic units are larger or denser and thus draw more people, both Asian and non-Asian. The absolute distribution of Asian Americans tells us where they tend to live, whereas the relative distribution tells us where Asian Americans are overrepresented relative to other racial groups in the U.S. population.

Again, the analysis of the geographic distribution of Asian Americans using the 2000 Census data is complicated by the fact that almost 14% of all Asians are multiracial (Table 2). Whether or not to include them changes results significantly. Two websites at the U.S. Census Bureau report the percentage of Asian Americans by state, county, and place.³⁵ However, the figures given by the websites are not ideal because they do not include multiracial Asians. As we discussed earlier in Chapter 1, in order to have a single-number estimate of the 2000 Asian population that is also comparable to historical figures, we simply impute one half of multiracial Asians to be Asian and the other half to be non-Asian.³⁶ This raises the percentage of Asian Americans from 3.6% to 3.9% for the whole U.S. Thus, a percentage greater than 3.9 indicates an overrepresentation of Asian Americans in an area. Conversely, a percentage

³⁵ <http://quickfacts.census.gov/> and <http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/phc-t6.html>. Both are linkable through www.yuxie.com.

³⁶ Tables 11 and 12 and Figure 2 were based on data reported by Barnes, Jessica S. and Claudette E. Bennett. 2002. *The Asian Population: 2000*. U.S. Census Bureau c2kbr01-16 (<http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr01-16.pdf>, or through www.yuxie.com).

smaller than 3.9 indicates an underrepresentation. By this criterion, Asian Americans are overrepresented in only ten states (in the order of Asian concentration): Hawaii (49.8%), California (11.6%), Washington (6.1%), New Jersey (6.0%), New York (5.8%), Nevada (5.1%), Maryland (4.2%), Alaska (4.6%), Virginia (4.0%), and Massachusetts (4.0%). Note that the percentage of Asian Americans is very high in Hawaii and California and then drops off in other states. In Figure 2, we present the percentage of Asian Americans by state in a map.

Figure 2 about Here

The percentage of Asian Americans is a relative measure, indicating the geographic distribution of the Asian population relative to that of the non-Asian population. To see how concentrated Asian Americans are geographically, let us also look at their absolute distribution. We find that 41% of all Asian Americans live in just two states –California and Hawaii. California alone accounts for 3.9 million, or 35.5% of all Asian Americans in the U.S. This is a very high degree of Asian concentration. For the total U.S. population, only 12.0% lives in California, and 12.5% lives in California and Hawaii combined. When we further expand the list to the top five states with the highest percentages of Asian Americans (i.e., adding New Jersey, Washington, and New York), they account for 58.7% of Asian Americans but only 24.3% of the total population. Clearly, the geographic distribution of Asian Americans has its own unique patterns.

There are several reasons for Asian Americans' unique geographic distribution. One is historical, as Asian immigrants first came to California and Hawaii as laborers. Another is distance, as Hawaii and the west coast are closer to Asia than the rest of the country. However, there is also a cultural element to this distribution: once Asians settled and established their own communities, they began to attract other, especially newly arriving, Asian immigrants. Nowadays, not only can we find well-entrenched old Chinatowns in almost all the largest cities in the U.S., we can also find vibrant new Asian (Chinese, Korean, and sometimes Vietnamese) communities in middle-class suburbs in metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York.

Besides their affinity with Hawaii and the west coast for historical and geographic reasons, Asian Americans now also tend to be concentrated in major metropolitan centers. This is in sharp contrast to the early waves of Asian immigrants, especially Japanese immigrants, a large portion of whom worked on farms. In fact, Asian Americans' presence in farming can still be seen in the 1960 occupational data presented in Table 7, which shows that their likelihood to be in occupations of "farmers and farm laborers" was twice as high as the average. Asian Americans' concentration in farming declined gradually. By 1980, they were no longer overrepresented in farming occupations. Asian immigrants of the latest waves do not work on farms.

As Chapter 3 shows, Asian Americans are now concentrated in two types of occupations: high-status professional and technical occupations on the one hand and low-skilled service and manual jobs on the other hand. Given their positions in the occupational structure, it is not surprising that Asian Americans tend to live in major metropolitan areas, which offer such job opportunities. Census tabulations show that the percentage of Asian Americans with a single ethnicity is 4.5% among all urban residents, compared to merely 0.5% among all rural residents.³⁷ Between metropolitan versus non-metropolitan areas, we observe a similar gap, with the percentage of Asian Americans at 4.3% among all residents in metropolitan areas and 0.8% among all residents in non-metropolitan areas. Not surprisingly, the lowest presence of Asian Americans is found among rural residents in non-metropolitan areas, at 0.3%.

In Table 11, we present Asian Americans' distributions, both absolute and relative, in the top ten cities with the largest Asian American population. Since the definition of a "city" varies from place to place, it is not clear how to compare the absolute numbers across cities. However, the numbers reported in Table 11 at least give us a sense of how concentrated Asian Americans are in major cities. To derive the numbers reported in this table, we used the 50% rule in reallocating multiracial Asian Americans.

³⁷ http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=D&-ds_name=D&-lang=en&-mt_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_GCTP6_US1, or through www.yuxie.com.

Table 11 about Here

The rows in Table 11 are ordered by the size of the Asian American population. They show in absolute terms where Asian Americans are concentrated. While the second column of Table 11 gives this absolute distribution of Asian Americans, the last column gives the relative distribution of Asian Americans, in relationship to the total population presented in the first column – i.e., the percentage of Asian Americans by place. We observe that New York, the largest city in the U.S., also has the largest Asian population at 829,912. The percentage of Asian Americans in New York is 10.4%, a level more than twice the national average but slightly lower than the percentage of Asian Americans in California (11.6%). Surprisingly, the percentage of Asian Americans in Los Angeles is at the same level as New York, at 10.5%, and we see that in absolute numbers, a large number of Asian Americans live in Los Angeles (388,349). The next eight cities with the largest Asian populations are: San Jose, San Francisco, Honolulu, San Diego, Chicago, Houston, Seattle, and Fremont. The top ten cities can be grouped into three types: (a) very large cities with a slightly higher than average percentage of Asian Americans, (b) very large cities with a relatively high percentage of Asian Americans, and (c) medium-size cities where the percentage of Asian Americans is very high. Chicago and Houston belong to group (a), Fremont and Honolulu belong to group (c), and the rest belong to group (b). Note that Asian Americans are not well-represented in all large cities. Absent from Table 11, for example, are Dallas, San Antonio, Phoenix, and Detroit. The percentages of Asian Americans in these large cities all fall below the 3.9% national average.

To reiterate, across the top cities with the largest Asian populations, the percentage of Asian Americans varies greatly, from a low of 4.6% in Chicago to a high of 61.8% in Honolulu. Combining the ten cities, the percentage of Asian Americans is on average 12.2%, 3 times the national level. Describing Asian Americans' concentration in another way, we find that 22.8% of all Asian Americans live in these 10 cities, whereas only 7.3% of all the U.S. population lives in these same cities. Thus, the concentration of Asian Americans is on average 3 times as high in these cities as the national average.

Residential Segregation with Whites and Blacks

We now turn our attention to the residential patterns of Asian Americans at a micro level within cities. This is necessary, because residential proximity greatly influences the chances of interracial interaction. For example, blacks' residential segregation from whites has long been thought to be both an indicator and cause of racial discrimination in American society, and a major reason for their socioeconomic disadvantage. Earlier Chinese and Japanese immigrants to the U.S. also suffered severe racial discrimination and were restricted to living in ethnic ghettos.

For two reasons, contemporary Asian Americans are much less segregated from whites than either Asian Americans were in the past or blacks are today. First, as we have shown in this book, Asian Americans have achieved relatively high socioeconomic status that on balance either equals or surpasses that of whites. This is particularly true in the realm of education. Second, the Asian American population is small in size, and individual Asian ethnic groups are particularly small. Given their small numbers in most places, when Asian Americans move into a white community, they do not pose the threat of soon dominating the community in the way that blacks are sometimes perceived to do. As a result, even though some whites may still prefer to live in neighborhoods without Asian Americans, they are now unlikely to act strongly on their racial preferences for neighbors. Attitude surveys indeed show that whites are not as hostile to the prospect of having Asian neighbors as they are to the prospect of having black neighbors.³⁸

Except for a few isolated places, the barriers for Asian Americans to living in white neighborhoods are relatively low, compared to those separating blacks and whites. However, even in the absence of such racial barriers, not all Asian Americans wish to live in integrated neighborhoods. Most Asian Americans are recent immigrants and as such maintain a strong identity with their home culture. We showed in Chapter 1 that most Asians speak their native languages at home. We also know that new

³⁸ Bobo, Lawrence and Camille L. Zubrinsky. 1996. "Attitudes on Residential Integration: Perceived Status Differences, Mere In-Group Preference, or Racial Prejudice?" *Social Forces* 74(3):883-909.

immigrants in general rely heavily on ethnic communities for a successful transition to American life.

Ethnic communities offer many practical resources to immigrants, including ethnic -specific goods and services, cultural events, information in native languages, and entrepreneurial opportunities.

Indeed, there are two related theoretical debates in sociology regarding the advantages of living in ethnic communities for immigrants.³⁹ The first debate is concerned with the potential economic benefits of working in an ethnic niche – an ethnic enclave economy. Some scholars argue that an enclave economy provides a protective work environment to new immigrant workers where they can derive economic benefits that would not be available in the mainstream economy. These benefits could include market returns to human capital, social mobility to supervisory positions, and opportunities to be entrepreneurs. However, other scholars contend that an enclave economy primarily benefits business owners of enclave firms rather than their co-ethnic workers, for whom working in the mainstream economy would facilitate assimilation and thus upward mobility.

The second debate is around “segmented assimilation theory,” which is concerned with the long-term (particularly educational) benefits for immigrant children of maintaining a strong ethnic identity and social networks among co-ethnics and thus not being fully assimilated into the American mainstream. The basis for this argument is that America is now extremely diverse and segmented, with an underclass residing in central cities where a large portion of new immigrant families first settles upon arrival. Thus, it is argued that there exist divergent assimilation paths for new immigrants. One path is full and direct assimilation into mainstream American society. Another possible path of full assimilation, to which new

³⁹ The two arguments are made by Alejandro Portes and his associates. See Portes, Alejandro and Robert L. Bach. 1985. *Latin Journey : Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States*. Berkeley : University of California Press and Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut. 2001. *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. For counter-arguments, see Richard Alba and Victor Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

residents of central cities are especially vulnerable, is “downward assimilation” into the urban underclass. To avoid this, according to the theory, it is better for immigrants to maintain their own culture while acquiring skills for the labor market. This “middle” path of assimilation is called “selective acculturation.”

So far, empirical evidence pertaining to the enclave economy debate and the segmented assimilation debate leaves them unresolved. However, even without the hypothesized benefits, many Asians may still wish to live close together to share a common culture or for the convenience of seeing relatives and friends. Thus, we expect to see clustering patterns of residence among Asian Americans.

In the first column of Table 12, we present a commonly used segregation index (the index of dissimilarity) measuring residential segregation between Asian Americans and whites in the top ten cities with the largest Asian population.⁴⁰ As discussed earlier, close to a quarter of all Asian Americans live in these cities. Measurement of segregation is at the level of census tracts. The index varies between a low of 29% in Fremont to a high of 50% in San Diego. A dissimilarity index of 29% means that either 29% of Asian Americans or 29% of whites in the city would need to move to different census tracts for the two groups to reach equal distributions across all census tracts. In the second column, we present the dissimilarity index between Asian Americans and blacks. We also report the dissimilarity index between whites and blacks in the last column for comparison. From Table 12, we observe that the segregation between Asian Americans and whites and the segregation between Asian Americans and blacks are still substantial. Take Los Angeles as an example. The dissimilarity index is 47% between Asian Americans and whites and 69% between Asian Americans and blacks, although the index between whites and blacks is even higher at 73%. These numbers mean that residential segregation is very high between whites and

⁴⁰ Our source is <http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/residentialsegregation>. Another excellent internet source on residential segregation is <http://www.albany.edu/mumford/census/>. Both are linkable through www.yuxie.com.

blacks and between Asian Americans and blacks in Los Angeles. By comparison, residential segregation is moderately high between whites and Asians.

Table 12 about Here

With the exception of Fremont and San Jose, the level of residential segregation between Asian Americans and whites is much lower than that between whites and blacks. Fremont is unusual also for having very low segregation levels between any two of the three groups (29% or lower). For six of the ten cities (i.e., New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Honolulu, Chicago, and Houston), the segregation between Asians and whites is much lower than that between Asians and blacks. However, for the remaining cities, the segregation between Asians and blacks is either comparable to that between Asians and whites (San Diego and Fremont) or even smaller (San Jose and Seattle).

The results presented in Table 12 are crude in the sense that we do not present segregation indices separately by Asian ethnicity. This tends to understate levels of segregation for Asian Americans, if there is a tendency, as is the case, for residential clustering within an ethnicity. Across different ethnicities, we know that Japanese and Filipino Americans are less segregated from whites than are other Asian American groups (such as Chinese and Vietnamese).⁴¹ Still, we can draw an overall observation from Table 12 that Asian Americans live in somewhat concentrated communities that are separate from whites and blacks on the whole. However, Asian Americans' residential segregation is different from what has epitomized the residential segregation between whites and blacks in American cities. The difference is quantitative, in the sense that residential segregation for Asians is smaller in magnitude than residential segregation for blacks. The difference is also qualitative, in that at least in contemporary America, Asian Americans do not face the same kind of racial discrimination and prejudice as do blacks in the housing market. To the extent that Asian Americans' residential patterns show signs of concentration, we think

⁴¹This statement is based on unpublished tabulations provided by John Logan, Lewis Mumford Center, University at Albany.

that they reflect more their own preferences to live near other Asian Americans than external constraints limiting their residential choices.

However, culturally-based preferences to live with co-ethnics do indicate a lack of assimilation into the American mainstream and thus should weaken over time as immigrants become more assimilated. In the literature on immigrants, residence in desirable neighborhoods (such as those in suburbs with a high average family income and a high percentage of non-Hispanic whites) has long been viewed as “spatial assimilation” or “residential assimilation.”⁴² Given the well-known relationship between assimilation and generation, second- and third-generation Asian Americans (such as most Japanese Americans) are likely to be less segregated residentially from whites than first-generation Asian Americans. One consequence of less segregation is a structural increase in Asian Americans’ opportunities for interacting with non-Asians in daily life, thus promoting intermarriage with non-Asians. This partly explains why the Japanese, who are the most assimilated group of Asian Americans, also have the highest rates of outmarriage. In fact, we showed in Chapter 4 that all native-born Asian Americans have high rates of outmarriage.

Summary

For a variety of reasons, Asian Americans tend to live near other Asian Americans. We have shown in this chapter that this statement is true at two geographic levels. At the national or macro level, Asian Americans tend to be concentrated in a few states (such as California and Hawaii) or indeed a few metropolitan areas (such as New York and Los Angeles). At the city or micro level, Asians tend to be concentrated in certain neighborhoods or communities, not fully assimilated into white or black

⁴² Alba, Richard D., John R. Logan, Brian J. Stultz, Gilbert Marzan, and Wenquan Zhang. 1999.

“Immigrant Groups in the Suburbs: A Reexamination of Suburbanization and Spatial Assimilation.”

American Sociological Review 64: 446-460.

neighborhoods. However, in most cities, Asian Americans are more residentially integrated with whites than with blacks, and Asian Americans and whites are more integrated than blacks and whites.

While these empirical findings are clear, theoretical interpretations of them are less so. Do Asian Americans live near other Asian Americans due to their desire to maintain their culture or out of the need to cope with the potential risks of racial discrimination? That is, are the unique residential patterns of Asian Americans really the result of their own choices or a structural constraint imposed on them? Of course, we cannot answer these theoretically interesting questions with Census data. However, we do know that at least compared to blacks, Asians' barriers to living in white neighborhoods are relatively low. And indeed the level of segregation between Asians and whites is also relatively low. If blacks suffer dire socioeconomic consequences because of residential segregation from whites, Asians do not face similar disadvantages.

VI. CONCLUSION

Although Asian Americans were first recorded in the U.S. Census as early as 1860, their social significance in American society was not widely recognized until the post-1965 waves of immigrants fundamentally changed the demographic composition of the U.S. population. Because post-1965 immigrants are primarily from Asia and Latin America, traditional race relations in America constructed around whites and blacks have been further complicated by the presence of sizable and rapidly growing populations of Asians and Hispanics. Should Asian Americans be treated as a single race in the racial landscape of America? While this question was contemplated well before 1965, it is becoming more and more pressing due to the rapid growth of the Asian American population.

Our answer to this question is mixed, depending on one's definition of race.⁴³ We can think of four simple bases for deriving a definition of race: psychological, physiological, social, and external. The psychological definition equates race to the self-identification of group membership based on one's ancestral origin. The physiological definition equates race to shared physical appearance. The social definition connects race to a common set of social consequences (such as confronting racial discrimination and residential segregation). The external definition links race to a common perception of a nominal group by persons outside the group. Asian Americans are clearly not a race according to the psychological definition, as most of them prefer to be identified as members of their ethnic groups – such as Chinese and Koreans—rather than as Asians. Whether they are a race according to the physiological and social definitions is unclear. There is large variation in physical appearance, especially between South Asians (such as Asian Indians) and East Asians (such as Chinese). Further, social outcomes are similar for some Asians groups (e.g., between the Chinese and the Koreans) but quite different for others (e.g., between the Japanese and Vietnamese). It seems to us that the most plausible definition for Asian Americans is external, as others (i.e., non-Asians) may perceive Asian Americans as a homogeneous

⁴³ The authors benefited from informal discussions with David Harris on this topic.

group and treat them as a race. Indeed, the popular “model minority” label implicitly treats Asian Americans as a race, with “minority” meaning a racial minority.

As demographers, we are interested in the question of whether Asian Americans exhibit distinct demographic characteristics that differentiate them from whites and other minority groups. Thus, whether Asian Americans should be treated as a race is a question that can be addressed, in part, with demographic data. Based on the results presented earlier in the book, our answer is a cautionary yes. It is yes because we have observed some distinct demographic characteristics among Asian Americans that set them apart from whites and other minority groups. It is cautionary because we observe great variation in these characteristics by Asian ethnicity and nativity. Further, we do not know the full explanations for these empirical results, nor can we anticipate whether or not these distinct demographic characteristics will endure in the future among Asian Americans. Below, we briefly characterize Asian Americans demographically.

First, the residential patterns of Asian Americans are distinct. They live in different parts of the country, as they tend to be concentrated in Hawaii, California, and a few large metropolitan areas. Within a city, they also tend to be concentrated in communities that attract other Asian Americans. Second, Asian Americans are familial in orientation. They have a high rate of ever marrying and a low rate of divorce, and maintain traditional practices such as living in multi-generational family households. Third, Asian Americans have high levels of educational attainment. Fourth, Asian Americans have dramatically improved their labor force outcomes, such as earnings and occupation, over the decades from 1960 to 2000.

However, we have also observed substantial variations across Asian ethnic groups and by nativity in almost all the demographic dimensions we have examined in this book. These differences make the characterization of Asian Americans with a simple label like “model minority” problematic. For example, the earnings of Filipinos and Vietnamese lag behind those of other Asian Americans. The prevalence of multi-generational living arrangements also varies greatly by ethnicity, with the Japanese being less likely to be in multi-generational families than whites. Further, as the education results in Chapter 2 indicate,

ethnic differences are more pronounced among foreign-born Asian Americans than among native-born Asian Americans.⁴⁴ Assimilation may exert a homogenizing force, making Asian Americans of different ethnicities appear similar. However, it is also plausible that similarities among Asian Americans of different ethnicities arise because of the common difficulties they face. For example, Asian American families may make exceptional investments in their children's education as a conscious strategy to compensate for disadvantages they may perceive they face as a racial minority group, such as racial discrimination and a lack of mainstream social capital.

With further assimilation and continuing success in socioeconomic spheres, Asian Americans may more and more constitute part of the American mainstream rather than a racial minority. Our finding that intermarriage rates are high among native-born Asian Americans supports this prediction. However, given the constant flow of new immigrants from Asia, it is a demographic impossibility that all Asian Americans will be fully assimilated at any time in the near future. Indeed, a large portion of Asian Americans is, and will always be for the foreseeable future, new immigrants. Because of this, it is highly likely that Asian Americans will exhibit certain distinct patterns in demographic characteristics (such as residential segregation from non-Asians). We assert that at least part of this is attributable to the fact that many Asians are new immigrants.

With today's data, it is difficult to separate race effects from immigration effects, because most Asian Americans are immigrants. With time, however, we should observe a steady increase in the share of native-born second- and higher-generation Asian Americans. One possible scenario in the near future is that racial differences between Asians and whites become blurred, but differences between foreign-born Asian Americans and native-born Asian Americans become more pronounced by comparison. Another possible scenario is that the continuous growth of the Asian American population and its gradual assimilation into the American mainstream will heighten the awareness of their racial distinction among

⁴⁴ For similar results on earnings, see Zeng, Zhen, and Yu Xie. Forthcoming. "Asian Americans' Earnings Disadvantage Reexamined: The Role of Place of Education." *American Journal of Sociology*.

second- and higher-generation Asian Americans. Whether or not Asian Americans will be considered a single race in the future, one thing is certain: The ever-changing Asian American population and the diversity of Asian Americans' experiences by ethnicity and nativity present constant challenges to the logic of racial categorizations and the understanding of race relations in the U.S.

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Box 1: A Chronology: Significant Laws, Treaties, and Court Cases Affecting Asian Americans

1790: Naturalization Act. This act established that a candidate for naturalization to the U.S. had to have resided in the U.S. for two years and be a “free white person.”

1878: *In re Ah Yup*. Chinese were not eligible for naturalized citizenship.

1882: The Chinese Exclusion Act. This act prohibited Chinese immigrants from entering the U.S. for a period of ten years and prohibited Chinese from becoming naturalized U.S. citizens. The exclusionary period became indefinite in 1904, and was repealed in 1943.

1907-8: The Gentleman’s Agreement. This agreement between the U.S. and Japan ended the issuance of new passports for laborers in Japan leaving for the U.S.

1913: California Alien Land Law Act. This act, originally passed by California but soon enacted in fourteen other states, prohibited “aliens ineligible for citizenship” from owning land. These laws were not repealed in some states until 1952.

1923: *The U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind*. Thind, an immigrant born in the Punjab, was determined to be “Caucasian” based on earlier court cases but not a “white person,” and thus was deemed ineligible for citizenship.

1924: The National Origins Act. This act prohibited the immigration of all Asians, with the exception of Filipinos (who were residents of an American territory). Quotas were established for immigrants from European countries.

1934: Tydings-McDuffie Act. This act gave independence to the Philippines by first establishing a commonwealth and then guaranteeing independence ten years later (which was later achieved by 1946). Immigration from the Philippines to the U.S. was limited to a maximum of 50 immigrants per year, the smallest quota of any country.

1942: Executive Order 9066. With this presidential order, occurring during World War II, the Secretary of War was given authority to remove people of Japanese descent from certain areas, resulting in their internment in camps. Eventually, 120,000 Japanese Americans were interned.

1943: Repeal of Chinese Exclusion Act. In consideration of China as an ally in World War II, this act repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act by setting a quota of 105 Chinese immigrants per year and allowed for naturalization of Chinese immigrants.

1945: War Brides Act. This act allowed for admission of foreign women married to servicemen. No quota was set. Approximately 700 Chinese and 2,000 Japanese women were admitted as “war brides.”

1952: McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act. This act permitted naturalization of Asians and affirmed the national-origins quota system of 1924.

1965: Immigration and Nationality Act. The most significant change in U.S. immigration law since 1924, this act replaced the national origins system with a preference system designed to unite immigrant families and attract skilled immigrants to the United States.

1967: Loving et. ux v. Virginia. Laws recognizing intermarriage as criminal were deemed unconstitutional.

1980: Refugee Act. In response to the boat people fleeing Vietnam, it granted asylum to politically oppressed refugees.

1988: Civil Liberties Act. The U.S. government gave an official apology to Japanese Americans for their internment in World War II and paid \$20,000 per internee.

Note: this chronology was drawn from Odo, Franklin, ed. 2002. *The Columbia Documentary History of the Asian American Experience*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Box 2: Asian Americans on the U.S. Census

The U.S. Census has counted Asian Americans in different ways since the 1850s. Early Chinese in the U.S. were first documented through questions on nativity. Later, as more Chinese immigrated and sentiment against them among native laborers grew, U.S. state and federal courts struggled with their racial classification and the classification of other immigrants from Asia. In 1870, Chinese were classified as a “race” on the Census form, followed by Japanese in 1890. The practice of enumerating Asian ethnicities as separate racial groups has continued to this day, with new major groups (such as Filipino, Korean, Asian Indian, Vietnamese) added to the list as their populations grew in the U.S. On the 1990 Census, there was a short-lived attempt to group different ethnicities of Asian Americans along with Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders under a heading “Asians and Pacific Islanders.” In this book, we use major ethnic categorizations for Asian Americans to achieve consistency across different censuses, according to which Asians include East Asians, Southeast Asians, and South Asians, but not individuals with ancestry from West Asia, who are identified racially as “white” or “other.” The 2000 Census was the first U.S. census that allowed racial identification with more than one race. The race question from the 2000 Census is shown below:

6 What is your race? Mark one or more races to indicate what you consider yourself to be.

White

Black, African Am., or Negro

American Indian or Alaska Native — *Print name of enrolled or principal tribe.* ↘

Asian Indian Native Hawaiian

Chinese Guamanian or Chamorro

Filipino

Japanese

Korean

Vietnamese

Other Asian — *Print race.* ↘

Other Pacific Islander — *Print race.* ↘

Some other race — *Print race.* ↘

Note: For further reading on the how race is asked on the Census, see Anderson, Margo J. and Stephen E. Fienberg. 1999. *Who Counts? The Politics of Census-Taking in Contemporary America*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; and Mezey, Naomi. 2003. "Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race and the National Imagination." *Northwestern Law Review* 97(4):1701-68.

Box 3: The One-drop Rule vs. the Fifty -percent Rule

The 2000 U.S. Census allowed for the first time the enumeration of multiracials, persons with multiple racial/ethnic affiliations. For comparison with historical data and for simplicity, it is sometimes necessary to reclassify multiracial persons in the 2000 Census into single-race categories in statistical tabulations.

There are two possible simple rules for such an objective: the one-drop rule and the fifty-percent rule. The “one-drop rule” is in reference to the white majority and specifies that anyone with any minority ancestry is considered “non-white.” The fifty-percent rule evenly assigns biracial persons to the two racial groups to which they partially belong for statistical purposes. These two rules serve as ideal-types, as more rules can be devised to allocate multiracial persons based on fourth or eight fractions according to the mixture of their parents’ and grandparents’ races.

In much of the U.S. history and culture, a common rule for categorizing multiracial blacks has been the “one-drop rule,” although it is unclear how rigidly it has been practiced. For multiracial Asians, who are a relatively recent phenomenon, it appears that the fifty-percent rule is a close approximation. Prior research has found children of parents who had one Asian and one white parent (the majority of multiracial Asians) were almost equally likely to be identified as Asian or white, when forced to choose a single race.

For this book, we applied the 50% rule when we needed to reclassify multiracial Asians in the 2000 Census into single-race categories. For example, we estimated the size of the 2000 Asian American population at 11,070,913 (3.93% of total) if the racial classification system had not been changed (Table 1). In most of the analyses reported in the book, we took pains in preserving rich information pertaining to multiracials in the 2000 Census, separating out multiethnic and multiracial Asians.

Note: For prior research on the subject, see Xie, Yu and Kimberly Goyette. 1997. “The Racial Identification of Biracial Children with One Asian Parent: Evidence from the 1990 Census.” *Social*

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Table 1: Asian American Population by Major Ethnicity: 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses

Race/Ethnicity	1980 Census		1990 Census		2000 Census	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Asian Americans	3,259,519	1.44	6,908,638	2.78	11,070,913	3.93
Chinese	806,040	0.36	1,645,472	0.66	2,633,849	0.94
Japanese	700,974	0.31	847,562	0.34	958,945	0.34
Filipino	774,652	0.34	1,406,770	0.57	2,089,701	0.74
Korean	354,593	0.16	798,849	0.32	1,148,951	0.41
Asian Indian	361,531	0.16	815,447	0.33	1,785,336	0.63
Vietnamese	261,729	0.12	614,547	0.25	1,171,776	0.42
Other	806,040	0.36	2,425,463	0.98	3,916,204	1.39
All Persons in US	226,545,805		248,709,873		281,421,906	

Note: the 50-percent rule was applied to multiracial and multiethnic Asian Americans in 2000 Census. (See Box 3.)

Table 2: Population Size and Key Demographic Characteristics by Asian American Ethnicity in 2000

	All Asians or By Single-Ethnic Classification							
	Alone or in Combination	Percent Alone	Single-Ethnic Classification	Percent Foreign Born	Percent Speaking Non-English at Home	Percent Female	Percent Children (0-17)	Percent Elderly (65+)
All Asians	11,898,828	84	10,019,405	64	73	52	27	7
Chinese	2,879,636	84	2,432,585	72	86	52	21	10
Japanese	1,148,932	69	796,700	41	47	57	12	20
Filipino	2,364,815	78	1,850,314	70	71	55	22	9
Korean	1,228,427	88	1,076,872	79	82	56	24	6
Asian Indian	1,899,599	88	1,678,765	76	81	47	25	4
Vietnamese	1,223,736	92	1,122,528	77	93	50	27	5
Other Asians	1,449,087	73	1,061,641	68	87	50	35	3
Multiethnic Asians	223,593	*	223,593	50	61	51	33	4
Multiracial Asians	1,655,830	*	1,655,830	30	35	50	45	4

Note: * indicates undefined cells. For the last five columns, the denominator is the first column for the first row and the third column (“Single-Ethnic Classification”) for all other rows.

Table 3: High School Completion and College Degree Attainment among 25-34 Year Olds (in percent)

	1960		1970		1980		1990		2000	
	High School +	College +								
All Asians	70	19	84	37	87	42	85	43	90	53
Native-born	79	19	87	26	95	44	94	43	94	50
Foreign-born	58	19	82	46	84	42	83	44	89	54
Chinese	62	26	82	44	88	50	85	53	92	67
Native-born	80	28	90	32	97	58	97	63	96	73
Foreign-born	48	25	79	48	85	48	83	51	91	65
Japanese	77	16	90	32	96	45	98	49	97	57
Native-born	83	18	93	30	98	48	98	47	96	57
Foreign-born	63	11	84	37	93	40	97	52	98	57
Filipino	58	18	82	37	88	42	90	37	95	43
Native-born	53	11	76	10	87	15	89	23	97	43
Foreign-born	63	25	85	47	89	47	91	42	94	43
Korean			69	40	83	31	90	42	97	59
Native-born			40	6	91	33	97	57	98	70
Foreign-born			77	51	83	31	90	42	97	58
Asian Indian					90	60	90	60	94	76
Native-born					81	40	94	67	92	74
Foreign-born					90	61	89	60	94	76
Vietnamese					69	14	67	22	72	27
Native-born					*	*	42	8	52	23
Foreign-born					69	14	67	22	73	27
Whites	61	12	74	16	87	25	87	25	88	30
Blacks	33	4	52	6	75	12	77	12	81	15

Table 4: Aptitude Test Scores, High School Completion, and College Enrollment

	Verbal Test 1988	Math Test 1988	High School Degree by 1994 (%)	Enrollment in Postsecondary Institution by 1994 (%)
All Asians	16	44 **	92 *	80 **
Chinese	22	74 **	97 **	87 **
Japanese	25	62 **	95	80
Filipino	9	16	96 **	76
Korean	48 **	87 **	93 *	79 *
South Asian	54 **	73 **	99 *	87 *
Southeast Asian	-10 **	28	88	86 **
Whites	17	17	85	68
Blacks	-53 **	-61 **	73 **	57 **

***=p<.001, **= p<.01, *=p<.05, for the hypothesis that Asians or Blacks are not statistically different from Whites

Note: verbal test and math test are in the scale of 0.01 standard deviation among a cohort of eighth graders.

Table 5: Labor Force Participation Rates and Average Hours Worked among Persons Aged 21-64

	1960		1970		1980		1990		2000	
	LFP (%)	Hours								
All Asians										
Men	92	44	89	42	87	43	86	43	80	43
Women	48	37	56	37	65	38	68	39	65	38
Chinese										
Men	89	44	85	43	86	43	86	42	81	43
Women	45	36	53	37	67	37	69	39	66	39
Japanese										
Men	94	44	93	42	88	42	88	44	84	44
Women	51	37	57	37	65	37	64	38	65	38
Filipino										
Men	90	42	90	41	92	42	91	42	80	41
Women	39	36	61	39	75	38	80	40	73	39
Korean										
Men			77	40	87	44	83	46	78	45
Women			36	37	61	39	61	41	59	39
Asian Indian										
Men					92	44	91	44	85	44
Women					57	39	64	38	59	39
Vietnamese										
Men					74	40	81	41	74	41
Women					53	38	63	39	61	38
Whites										
Men	93	44	91	43	89	44	88	45	84	44
Women	39	37	48	36	59	36	70	37	71	37
Blacks										
Men	86	41	83	40	79	41	76	42	68	42
Women	51	34	57	36	64	37	70	38	69	38

Table 6: Asian-to-White Earnings Ratios

	1960		1970		1980		1990		2000			
	Observed	Adjusted										
All Asians												
Men	0.98	0.94 **	1.04 *	0.98	1.01	0.95 ***	1.09 ***	1.02	1.14 ***	1.04 **		
Women	1.04	1.02	1.13 ***	1.08 ***	1.17 ***	1.09 ***	1.28 ***	1.16 ***	1.32 ***	1.17 ***		
Chinese												
Men	0.99	0.94	1.01	0.90 **	1.03	0.95	1.29 ***	1.11 ***	1.35 ***	1.12 ***		
Women	1.10	1.07	1.18 **	1.09	1.31 ***	1.18 ***	1.44 ***	1.24 ***	1.65 ***	1.35 ***		
Japanese												
Men	1.00	0.95 *	1.08 ***	1.02	1.08 ***	0.99	1.13 ***	1.01	1.19 ***	1.00		
Women	1.04	1.02	1.15 ***	1.11 ***	1.17 ***	1.09 ***	1.31 ***	1.17 ***	1.37 ***	1.15 ***		
Filipino												
Men	0.79 **	0.87 *	0.80 ***	0.89 **	0.80 ***	0.86 ***	0.87 ***	0.95 *	0.93 *	1.00		
Women	0.86	0.88	0.94	0.95	0.99	0.98	1.07 *	1.07 *	1.09 **	1.09 **		
Korean												
Men			0.97	1.00	0.85	0.86	1.04	1.11	1.15 *	1.13 *		
Women			0.92	0.91	1.25	1.18	1.28 **	1.20 *	1.24 **	1.20 **		
Asian Indian												
Men					0.74 **	0.67 ***	1.03	0.94	1.10	1.09		
Women					1.02	0.97	1.33 *	1.15	1.34 ***	1.20 ***		
Vietnamese												
Men					0.94	0.97	0.65 *	0.77	0.87	1.08		
Women					1.02	1.12	1.11	1.24	0.83	0.97		

***= p<.001, **= p<.01, *=p<.05, for the hypothesis that Asians' earnings are not different from Whites'

Note: analysis was restricted to full-time and year-round workers with positive earnings who were 21-64 years old.

Table 7: Percent Asian in Occupation and Index of Dissimilarity by Time

Occupation	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Life scientists	3.6	4.2	4.4	6.7	14.7
Physical scientist	0.7	2.6	4.8	7.0	15.3
Social scientists	0.3	1.3	2.0	2.4	4.3
Mathematicians	0.6	2.7	2.4	5.6	11.1
Engineers	0.9	1.6	4.5	6.7	9.9
Architects	1.5	2.5	5.1	6.3	6.9
Physicians, dentists, and related practitioners	1.4	3.7	7.9	9.0	13.6
Nurses, dietitians, and therapists	0.7	1.4	3.5	4.2	6.2
Elementary and preschool teachers	0.4	0.6	1.1	1.3	1.9
Secondary and vocational teachers	0.5	0.6	1.1	1.7	2.8
Postsecondary teachers	1.7	1.7	3.6	7.0	8.7
Health technicians	0.6	1.7	3.8	4.4	5.4
All other technicians	0.7	1.2	2.6	4.2	4.3
Computer specialists		1.2	4.2	7.0	13.2
Writers, artists, and media workers	0.4	1.0	1.9	2.6	4.1
Lawyers and judges	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.3	2.7
Librarians, archivists, and curators	0.5	1.8	2.0	3.2	3.5
Social and recreation workers	0.9	0.9	1.3	1.7	2.3
Religious workers	0.2	0.4	1.2	2.9	4.0
Accountants and financial analysts	0.8	1.1	2.9	4.3	6.1
Administrators and public officers	0.5	0.6	1.1	1.8	2.4
Managers and proprietors	0.6	0.7	1.6	2.6	4.1
Sales workers, retail	0.4	0.7	1.4	3.3	4.8
Sales workers, other	0.5	0.5	1.3	2.6	3.8
Clerical workers	0.5	0.8	1.8	2.9	3.8
Bookkeepers	0.5	0.8	1.7	2.9	3.8
Secretaries	0.6	0.7	1.2	1.7	2.3
Mechanical workers	0.5	0.5	1.2	1.8	2.5
Carpenters	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.3
Electricians	0.3	0.6	1.1	1.5	1.5
Construction workers	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.0
Craftsmen	0.3	0.4	1.3	3.0	4.7
Textile machine operators	1.1	1.4	3.5	6.7	10.1
Metalworking and transportation operators	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.2	2.3
Other operators	0.3	0.5	1.3	2.5	4.0
Laborers, except farm	0.4	0.7	1.2	1.7	2.1
Farmers and farm laborers	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.5
Cleaning and food service workers	1.1	1.4	2.7	3.9	4.7
Health service workers	0.2	0.6	1.5	2.3	3.3
Personal service workers and barbers	0.5	0.8	1.6	2.8	5.1
Protective service workers	0.1	0.4	0.6	1.1	1.8
<u>Total</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>4.1</u>
Index of Dissimilarity	18.6	17.7	19.7	17.8	18.1

Note: analysis was restricted to all workers aged 21-64.

Table 8: Family Characteristics

	% In Husband- Wife Families	% In Multi- Generation Families	Mean Family Size	Mean Family Income (\$1000)	Median Family Income (\$1000)	% In Poverty
<u>Panel A: All Persons</u>						
All Asians	73	15	4.2	77	61	13
Chinese	73	15	3.9	82	63	13
Japanese	65	5	3.2	91	74	9
Filipino	73	22	4.4	81	70	6
Korean	74	10	3.7	71	53	15
Asian Indian	80	14	4.0	94	70	10
Vietnamese	72	16	4.7	65	52	15
Other Asian	74	19	5.3	56	44	23
Multiethnic Asian	72	13	4.3	78	64	12
Multiracial Asian	66	11	4.1	71	55	13
Whites	67	5	3.5	70	55	9
Blacks	40	14	3.9	45	35	24
<u>Panel A: Children (Ages 0-17)</u>						
All Asians	84	17	4.8	74	57	14
Chinese	88	19	4.5	82	63	13
Japanese	88	7	4.1	98	80	6
Filipino	82	27	5.0	77	67	6
Korean	88	11	4.2	73	56	12
Asian Indian	92	18	4.6	91	66	10
Vietnamese	81	17	5.1	59	45	20
Other Asian	82	21	6.1	49	38	30
Multiethnic Asian	84	15	4.7	80	65	11
Multiracial Asian	77	13	4.4	72	56	11
Whites	78	7	4.4	68	52	11
Blacks	40	18	4.4	39	29	32

Note: mean family size, mean family income, and median family income were computed for persons living in families.

Table 9: Percentages Currently Married and Ever Married, Median Age of Marriage, by Race/Ethnicity and Gender

	% Currently Married, 35-44 (C35-44)	% Ever Married, 35-44 (E35-44)	% Currently Married, 45-54 (C45-54)	% Ever Married, 45-54 (E45-54)	Median Age of Marriage
All Asians					
Men	78	85	85	93	28
Women	80	90	78	94	25
Chinese					
Men	82	87	87	94	29
Women	82	90	81	94	27
Japanese					
Men	64	72	72	84	30
Women	74	85	75	91	27
Filipino					
Men	76	84	83	92	28
Women	77	89	76	92	25
Korean					
Men	85	91	90	98	30
Women	84	94	81	98	27
Asian Indian					
Men	88	92	92	97	27
Women	90	95	87	97	23
Vietnamese					
Men	75	80	84	93	30
Women	76	87	76	93	26
Other Asian					
Men	79	86	86	95	28
Women	81	92	76	94	24
Multiethnic Asian					
Men	76	82	83	93	*
Women	75	88	78	94	*
Multiracial Asian					
Men	67	80	74	90	28
Women	68	87	65	91	25
Whites					
Men	69	84	74	91	26
Women	71	89	70	93	24
Blacks					
Men	52	71	55	82	27
Women	42	69	43	82	28

Note: * indicates cells with insufficient data.

Table 10: Intermarriage Rates by Gender

	<u>Spouse's Race/Ethnicity</u>		
	Non-Asian (%)	Same Asian Ethnicity (%)	Other Asian (%)
All Asians			
Men	12		
Women	23		
Chinese			
Men	6	90	5
Women	13	83	4
Japanese			
Men	20	69	11
Women	41	51	8
Filipino			
Men	13	83	4
Women	33	63	4
Korean			
Men	4	93	3
Women	27	69	4
Asian Indian			
Men	8	90	3
Women	5	92	3
Vietnamese			
Men	3	92	4
Women	10	86	4
Other Asian			
Men	9		
Women	18		
Multiethnic Asian			
Men	13		
Women	26		
Multiracial Asian			
Men	44		
Women	54		

Note: "Other Asian" for spouse's race/ethnicity includes multiethnic and multiracial Asians.

Table 11: Top Ten Cities with Largest Asian Population

City	Population	Asians	% Asian
New York, NY	8,008,278	829,912	10.4
Los Angeles, CA	3,694,820	388,349	10.5
San Jose, CA	894,943	248,973	27.8
San Francisco, CA	776,733	246,521	31.7
Honolulu, HI	371,657	229,637	61.8
San Diego, CA	1,223,400	178,191	14.6
Chicago, IL	2,896,016	133,246	4.6
Houston, TX	1,953,631	108,917	5.6
Seattle, WA	563,374	79,280	14.1
Fremont, CA	203,413	78,072	38.4
Total	20,586,265	2,521,098	12.2
Total US	281,421,906	11,070,913	3.9
Percent of US	7.3	22.8	

Table 12: Residential Segregation Index in Top Ten Cities with Largest Asian Population

City	Asian and White	Asian and Black	White and Black
New York, NY	42	63	63
Los Angeles, CA	47	69	73
San Jose, CA	48	31	41
San Francisco, CA	41	58	59
Honolulu, HI	36	58	47
San Diego, CA	50	50	62
Chicago, IL	48	87	86
Houston, TX	45	68	72
Seattle, WA	48	34	60
Fremont, CA	29	26	24

Figure 1: Growth of Asian American Populations, 1860-2000




Figure 2: Asian Concentration (in percent) across States

