Graduate Public Finance
Local Public Finance: Tiebout, Sorting, and Fiscal Federalism

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Lecture 4
Outline

1 Overview
   - Key questions in local public finance
   - Local public goods
   - Club model of local provision of public goods

2 Preliminaries
   - Quality Differences
   - Hedonics
   - Hedonic Model Example: Travel time and Rent Gradients

3 Tiebout and Sorting
   - Tiebout (JPE, 1956)
   - Ellickson (AER, 1971)
   - Bayer Ferreira McMillan (JPE, 2007)
   - Social Interactions, Sorting, and Peer Effects

4 Fiscal Federalism
   - Oates (1972) and Oates (JEL, 1999)
   - Intergovernmental Grants
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Brief intro to local public finance and fiscal federalism

We should also know over which matters several local tribunals are to have jurisdiction, and in which authority should be centralized —Aristotle, Politics 4.15

The federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages which result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations —Alexis de Tocqueville (1835)
Fiscal federalism deals with the role of different levels of government in providing goods and services. 

- In the US, approximately 1/3 of public spending is provided by state and local governments.
- Local fiscal autonomy varies considerably across countries and over time.

Sub-federal public good provision can better satisfy geographically heterogeneous preferences.

But decentralized provision:

- Misses economies of scale.
- May not fully internalize externalities of local spending.

What is the optimal allocation of responsibilities across levels of government?
Some key questions in local public finance

1. How large should local governments be? (theory of clubs)
2. Will equilibrium exist and is it efficient (Tiebout model and its issues)
3. What is the demand for local public goods (hedonics, sorting)?
4. Which public services can best be provided and financed at federal, state, or local level (fiscal federalism/IO of public sector)?
   - How much fiscal autonomy of local governments?
   - Effects of local versus national control?
   - Can/should state and local governments redistribute?
   - Can/should state and local governments play a role in stabilizing economies?
   - Effects of transfers from higher levels of government?
   - Effects of competition across governments?
   - Effects of (educ) financing approaches on spending and outcomes?
Local public goods
The usual approach (individualistic) to public goods assumes location does not matter for consumption of public goods.

We'll derive optimality condition of Samuelson (1954).

Later we will compare it to the Tiebout (1956) solution that takes location into account.
A pure public good is defined by two attributes:

- **Non-rival in consumption:** One individual’s consumption of a good does not affect another’s opportunity to consume the good.

- **Non-excludable:** Individuals cannot deny each other the opportunity to consume a good.

- **Private provision may result in under-provision of public goods due to free-rider problem and non-excludability.**
Optimal Production of a Public Good

- \( n = 1, ..., N \) consumers consume \( x_i \), a private good, and \( z_i \), a public good and get utility \( U(x_i, z) \)

- The social planner selects \( x_i \) for all \( n \) consumers as well as \( z \) to maximize total utility subject to 2 constraints:
  - Total resource constraint:
    \[ \sum_i^n x_i + x = X \]
  - Production constraint:
    \( z \) is produced through the cost function \( x = g(z) \)
Formally, the social planner solves the problem

\[
\max_{\{x_1, \ldots, x_N, z\}} \sum_{i=1}^{N} U_i(x_i, z) \quad \text{subject to} \quad \sum_{i} x_i + g(z) = X
\]

Set-up the Lagrangian:

\[
L = \sum_{i=1}^{N} U_i(x_i, z) - \lambda \left( \sum_{i} x_i + g(z) - X \right)
\]

FOC w.r.t. \( x_i \) is \( \frac{\partial U_i}{\partial x_i} = \lambda \) for all \( i \).

This means \( \frac{\partial U_i}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial U_j}{\partial x_j} \) for all \( i \) and \( j \).
Optimal Production of a Public Good

- FOC w.r.t. $z$ is
  \[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, z)}{\partial z} = \lambda g'(z) \]

- Divide by FOC w.r.t. $x_1$ to get
  \[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\frac{\partial U_i(x_i, z)}{\partial z}}{\frac{\partial U_1(x_1, z)}{\partial x_1}} = g'(z) \]

- Recall all FOC w.r.t. $x_i$ are the same, so we can rewrite:
  \[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, z)}{\partial z} \frac{\partial U_i(x_i, z)}{\partial x_i} = g'(z) \]
  \[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} MRS_{x_i, z} = MRT_{x, z} \]
In the US, most of the public goods and services that people consume are provided by local jurisdictions, not federal or state governments.

There are many types of local governments, including cities, counties, school districts and special districts.

People can change their consumption of public goods and services by changing the jurisdiction where they live.
Moving jurisdictions to get a different level of public goods is called “voting with one’s feet”

Public good provision is socially optimal when the social benefits and costs are equal

Voting with one’s feet can overturn suboptimal governmental allocations

The ideas of this model apply to cases in which local jurisdictions have substantial autonomy
Consider the good of police protection, and let $z$ denote the number of policemen.

Person $A$ lives in a large house, $B$ lives in a medium house, and $C$ lives in a small house.

Additional policemen reduce potential burglary losses, generating benefits depending on house size.
### Table 8.1
The socially optimal number of policemen (policeman’s salary = $24,000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of policemen (z)</th>
<th>Marginal benefit for consumer A</th>
<th>Marginal benefit for consumer B</th>
<th>Marginal benefit for consumer C</th>
<th>Marginal social benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$19,000</td>
<td>$16,000</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
<td>$14,000</td>
<td>$11,000</td>
<td>$42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
<td>$36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td>$7,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$11,000</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$24,000</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>$6,000</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>$7,000</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure:** Socially Optimal Number of Policemen
• Marginal benefits decline with the number of policemen.

• Adding a policeman to the force is desirable as long as the total marginal social benefit is ≥ his salary.

• Marginal benefit numbers generate demand curves for the good.
Figure: Socially Optimal $z$

Figure 8.1
Socially optimal $z$. 
The height of the curve at a particular $z$ value shows the marginal benefit from an increase in $z$, starting at that value.

Marginal social benefit can be represented by a curve equal to the vertical sum of the individual demand curves ($D_\Sigma$).

If the cost per unit of the public good is denoted by $c$, the socially optimal level $z^*$ is at the intersection of $D_\Sigma$ and $c$. 
Democratic societies choose $z$ through a voting process.

If consumers pay a uniform tax to cover the public good, cost per person becomes $\frac{c}{3}$.

A consumer’s preferred level of $z$ lies at the intersection of his demand curve and the $\frac{c}{3}$ cost curve.
Figure: Majority Voting

Figure 8.2
Majority voting.
Since consumers prefer different levels of $z$, a voting process is needed to reduce disparity.

In the “median voter model”, candidates can attract the most votes by promising a $z$ in the middle of the range of preferred levels.

This median value must be compared with the socially optimal value to judge the voting result.
- In our example, the outcome is socially optimal because the curves are evenly spaced.

- If one of the individual curves were higher, the socially optimal level would exceed the median, leading to underprovision.

- If one of the individual curves were lower, overprovision would occur.
Figure 8.3
Inefficiency of majority voting.
Unlike a social planner, the voting process doesn’t register the intensity of the preferences of non-median voters.

This problem doesn’t occur only when the pattern of demands is symmetric.

Under median voting, C gets more public good than he wants and A gets less than he wants, which motivates voting with one’s feet.
Consider two types of consumers: high demand A and low demand C

Jurisdiction I has 10A and 90C, jurisdiction II has 90A and 10C

Under median voting, public good is underprovided in I and overprovided in II
Figure: Voting With One’s Feet

Figure 8.4
Voting with one’s feet.
10 type A increase consumption by moving to II, 10 type C reduce consumption by moving to I

Public good provision in socially optimal in the new homogenous jurisdictions because the mean and median demands are equal

Changing the population composition leads to an increase in consumer surplus

- From $J + K$ to $J + K + L$ for the A-types
- From $J - M$ to $J$ for the C-types
Voting with one’s feet creates freedom of choice of public good levels

Theory predicts that this “shopping” process would result in homogeneous demand jurisdictions

Real-world results differ because public goods aren’t the only determinant of location choice

Nevertheless, public goods play a substantial role in location decisions for many households
Separation of rich and poor into different jurisdictions may be viewed as inequitable.

Consider education: the poor may end up living in districts with low incomes, low taxes and poor schools.

State aid to local school districts is designed to ensure poor school districts get more aid than rich ones.

Nevertheless, differences in school quality remain.
Capitalization refers to the link between housing prices and public good levels.

Households should be willing to pay higher prices to live in a jurisdiction with better public goods.

Most empirical research focuses on house values, which are equal to \( \frac{R_j - T_j}{\theta} \).

\( R_j \) is the rent earned by house \( j \), \( T_j \) is the property tax, and \( \theta \) is the interest rate.
According to this model, the capitalization effect includes both property taxes and public good levels.

- Higher taxes lower the house’s value.

- Regressions demonstrate the predicted positive effect of $z$ and negative effect of property taxes (following Oates, 1969).
By choosing the property-maximizing value of $z$, the government achieves the socially optimal level of provision.

Suppose all houses in a jurisdiction are occupied by renters, and set interest rate to 1.

Aggregate property value $V = \sum_{j=1}^{n} (R_j - T_j) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} R_j - \sum_{j=1}^{n} T_j = \sum_{j=1}^{n} R_j - c(n)z$
Aggregate property value equals the aggregate rent in the jurisdiction minus the cost of the public good.

House rents rise as a jurisdiction’s level of $z$ increases.

Given the individual WTP, there exists a value-maximizing level of $z$. 
An increase in rent from hiring a policeman is equal to the sum of the marginal benefits.

Aggregate property value goes up only if the sum of marginal benefits exceeds the salary.

The value-maximizing $z$ is equal to the socially optimal level, because value stops increasing when costs and benefits become equal.

It is reasonable to pay attention to property values when evaluating the desirability of public policies.
Local Public Goods and Services

Tax Competition

- Interjurisdictional competition for residents has a downside when property taxes are used instead of head taxes.

- Jurisdictions are inclined to lower their tax rates to compete for investment capital, leading to an underprovision of public goods.

- A uniform national level of tax may eliminate tax competition.

- Centralization may be better under some circumstances and worse under others.
Welfare spending differs by state, with some offering more generous benefits than others.

High welfare benefits could incite the poor to move to the state, increasing the tax burden.

In this case, welfare benefits are underprovided.

A remedy can be implemented through federal matching grants, in which the federal government pays a percentage of the state’s benefit level.
Local governments may be inefficient producers of public goods, or engage in “rent seeking” for local officials

- Competition between jurisdictions can limit such behavior

- Problem jurisdictions will fail to attract residents as well as housing developers
Local Public Goods and Services

Summary

- At the socially optimal provision level, the marginal social benefit of a public good is equal to its cost

- Voting with one feet and property-value maximization are some of the ways residents and governments can ensure optimal allocation

- Real-world frictions such as tax competition prevent model predictions from being fully realized
Club model of local provision of public goods
Optimal Provision of Local Public Goods

Overview:
- Goal: characterize optimal size of local governments
- Agents: individuals identical in taste and in incomes
- Pure public good is unaffected by $N_c$ number of people in the community
- Private consumption must be forgone to produce public good

Relationship to Tiebout Model:
“The club model provides a natural introduction to the Tiebout model because it describes optimal public good provision within communities as well as optimal jurisdiction (or club) size. The Tiebout model focuses primarily on interjurisdictional optimality in a world of varying tastes and incomes, and should be viewed simply as an analysis of the optimal provision of public goods in a series of clubs or jurisdictions” Rubinfeld (Handbook of Public Economics, 1987).
Optimal provision for a fixed population

- Production function $Y = f(N)$ for both public and private goods
  - $Y = XN + G$
  - $X$ is per capita private consumption; $G$ is the level of the public good
- For a given population,
  $$\max_{X, G} U(X, G) - \lambda(XN + G - f(N))$$
  - FOCs:
    $$\frac{\partial U}{\partial X} - \lambda N = 0$$
    $$\frac{\partial U}{\partial G} - \lambda = 0$$
- Combining FOCs gives the Samuelson condition, $N \frac{\partial G}{\partial U} = 1$,
  - LHS sum of MRS, i.e., $N \frac{\partial G}{\partial U}$
  - RHS is MRT, i.e., the marginal cost in terms of forgone units of $X$ from producing another unit of $G$, which is 1
Opportunity Set for a fixed population

For a given level of $G$,

- From the production function and resource constraint, $X = \frac{f(N) - G}{N}$
- Maximizing $X$ wrt $N$ gives: $f'(N) = X$
- Equates MC and MB of higher population
  - MC: less private good available because with higher $N$, $f(N)$ increases but $f(N)/N$ decreases (from greater congestion and other externalities in a more realistic model)
  - MB: public good costs less per person (i.e., $G/N$) decreases with $N$
- We can re-express the FOC as $G = f(N) - Nf'$
  - Since $f'$ is the MPL, $f(N) - Nf'$ is output minus wage payments
  - Thus, when $G$ is fixed and $N$ is variable, $N^*$ that maximizes per capita consumption is such that rents equal public good expenditure
  - Stiglitz (1977) calls this the “Henry George Theorem” since not only is the land tax non-distortionary, but it is also the “single tax” required to finance the public good
When \( N \) and \( G \) can both vary, the full club model analyzed

- Higher \( N \rightarrow \) aggregate income and \( G \) increase, but per capita private consumption decreases b/c MPL decreases (i.e., \( f(N) \uparrow \) but \( \frac{f(N)}{N} \downarrow \))
- The following figure shows how opportunity sets change with \( N \)
- The next figure shows that optimal size may be zero, the entire population, or somewhere in between depending on the share of the opportunity locus and indifference curves

See (Buchanan, 1965) for the original formulation of this optimal “club” problem.
Opportunity Set for variable population

Optimal population size

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Modeling quality vs. quantity problem

Why do people increase quality as income goes up (rather than quantity)?

There are physical constraints – stomach capacity, time in the day, etc.

\[ U(x, NV(q)) + \lambda[M - x - NP(q)] \]
\[ \equiv U(x, Z) + \lambda \left[ M - x - Z \frac{P(q)}{V(q)} \right] \]

- \( x \): other goods that have price of 1
- \( N \): quantity of main good
- \( q \): quality of main good with price \( P(q) \)
- \( Z = NV(q) \): “effective consumption” as it combines \( N \) and \( q \)
- \( \frac{P(q)}{V(q)} \): cost per unit enjoyment

In general, people prefer lower prices and higher quality.
Consumers prefer higher quality and lower price

Suppose Indifference Curves are Concave
Consumer Chooses $q$ s.t. Indiff Curve is Tangent to $P(q)$
Producer Problem: Homogeneous Firms

- Assume a large number $M$ of producers
- Each produces 1 unit of good at some quality level $C(q)$: cost of production
- Assume $M > N$
  - $N$: number of consumers
  - Some producers don’t produce in equilibrium
  - $\Pi = 0$ and $P(q) = C(q)$
Equilibrium

\[ P(q) = C(q) \quad [\Pi = 0] \]

*Note:* Consumer still chooses \( q \) s.t. indiff curve is tangent to \( P(q) \)
What happens if someone’s income increases?

Quality is a normal good
Continuum of Firm and Consumer Types

\[ P \]

\[ q \]

\[ P(q) \]
Hedonics
Hedonics Introduction

- Hedonics is fundamentally a model of sorting (i.e., individuals sort over houses, neighborhoods, cities, employment sectors), trading something pecuniary (i.e., housing price/rent, wage, commute time) for something non-pecuniary (air quality, fatality risk)
- Sorting is an inherently equilibrium phenomenon - Individuals’ behavior will depend upon what other individuals are doing and vice-versa. Hedonics just uses the equilibrium outcome of the sorting process
  - Creates a variety of econometric problems
  - Sorting models deal with these problems by modeling the sorting process itself, not just the equilibrium outcome
Consider a single relevant dimension $z_i$ on which houses differ:

$$\max_{x,z} u(x, z_i) \text{ s.t. } x + p(z_i) = I$$

Choosing a level of $z_i$ is the equivalent of choosing a house. Makes it easier to draw pictures.

We can combing utility and budget constraint to yield a bid curve, $\theta(z, \bar{u})$, defined implicitly by

$$u(I - \theta(z, \bar{u}), z) = \bar{u}$$
"Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition" (Rosen, 1974)

\[ \theta(z, \bar{u}) \] tells us how much the individual would be willing to pay for a house with \( z \) and get utility \( \bar{u} \)

- Lower curves yield higher utility (lower price and/or more \( z \))
- Heterogeneous individuals will have different bid curves (B has a stronger preference for \( z \))
Hedonic Equilibrium

At any particular point, the MWTP of the person living there is just equal to the builder's MC of supplying $z$, which is just equal to the hedonic price of $z$, $P'(z)$.
Segmentation and Welfare

The problem is that the hedonic gradient \( \frac{\delta P}{\delta z} \) only tells us one point on each of these lines.

Using the hedonic gradient \( \frac{\delta P}{\delta z} \) as an approximation will therefore not give us an accurate representation of the individual’s total WTP for a change in \( z \).

\( \frac{\delta P}{\delta z} \) works okay for a small change.
Hedonic Model Example:
Travel time and Rent Gradients
Q: how do rental costs vary with distance from the city center?

- All city residents work at a Central Business District (CBD)
- Utility function $U(C, L)$
- Budget constraint: $C = (24 - L - t)w - R(t)$
  - $t$: travel time to CBD from location $t$
  - $R(t)$: rent for living at $t$
  - Individual works constant $24 - L - t$ hours
The Lagrangian is

\[ \mathcal{L} = U(C, L) + \lambda [(24 - L - t)w - R(t) - C(t)] \]

FOCs:

\[ \frac{\partial U}{\partial C} = \lambda \]
\[ \frac{\partial U}{\partial L} = \lambda w \]
\[ -R'(t) = w \]

- I choose to work where the savings I get in rent from living another hour further away is equal to the wage rate
Rent Curve

Not only downward sloping, but also convex b/c people’s wages are decreasing as we move along the curve (i.e., slope gets flatter)

\[ R(t) \]

Curve is convex since \( w \downarrow \) as \( t \uparrow \)

\[
\text{slope} = -w_{\text{MAX}} \\
\text{slope} = -w_{\text{MIN}}
\]
Solving for $R(0)$

We know the *slope* but not the *level* at $R(0)$:

- Suppose at $t_{MAX}$, no workers are willing to drive to the CBD
- Let $\bar{R}$ be the “reservation rent”
- Then $R(t_{MAX}) = \bar{R}$
- Since we know $-R'(t) = w$, we can back out $R(0)$

What would happen if we raised incomes of just the top half of the distribution?
- There would be no effect on the lower half of the income distribution, but the rent gradient for the upper half would get steeper, and rents would rise. (Assuming no supply side response)
Suppose $w$ Increases for Lowest Income Workers

Increasing $w$ for lowest income makes the rent gradient steeper for lowest income people

$\Rightarrow R \uparrow$ for every $t$
Suppose Inequality of $w$ Increases

- Assume average wage $\bar{w}$ stays constant, but wage inequality increases
- same $\bar{w}$ $\Rightarrow$ new rent gradient has same end points
- Recall that a worker’s rent is determined by the wages of people who live further away from CBD
- For any given worker not at endpoints, wages of those closer to CBD have increased and of those further have decreased, on average
- So rents decrease across the board
Effect of Increase in Wage Inequality

$$R(t)$$

\[ t_{\text{MAX}} \rightarrow \bar{R} \]
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Tiebout (JPE, 1956)
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
Tiebout’s insight

What is it about the private market that guarantees optimal provision of private goods that is missing in the case of public goods?

- Tiebout’s insight was that the factors missing from the market for public goods were shopping and competition
- The situation is different when public goods are provided at the local level by cities and towns
- Competition will naturally arise because individuals can vote with their feet: if they don’t like the level or quality of public goods provision in one town, they can move to the next town
- This threat of exit can induce efficiency in local public goods production
A simple stylized model

Suppose

- Local government $j$ provides a non-rival local public good that may be limited (e.g., public park or police protection)
- Avg cost of provision across individuals is u-shaped
- Good is non-rival but excludable (i.e., residents of $j' \neq j$ cannot consume in $j$)
- There are no externalities across jurisdictions
- Individuals are perfectly mobile
- Governments cover the cost of spending through uniform, jurisdiction-based lump-sum taxes $t_j$ on residents
- There is a large $\#$ of jurisdictions relative to $\#$ of individuals with different preferences for gov spending
Tiebout hypothesis: outcome of local government provision is efficient, with individuals sorting into jurisdictions based on their preferences for the level and mix of public goods

- Local governments provide different level and mix of public goods
- Individuals choose among locations (i.e., “vote with their feet”)
- In equilibrium, competition ensures efficient public good production
- Intuition: local governments will provide a bundle of goods, for which the lump-sum tax paid by residents serves as a price
Relaxing assumptions from the stylized model

The Tiebout hypothesis may not hold if

1. Spending is financed through distortionary (i.e., not lump-sum) tax instruments because benefit-tax link can be broken
2. There are fiscal externalities
3. Individuals’ mobility is constrained
4. There are economies of scale in public good provision
5. Goods are not locally excludable
6. There are not enough jurisdictions relative to preferences for spending

We’ll focus on (1) and (2). See Bewley (1981) for more analysis
1. Spending is financed through distortionary taxes

- Suppose spending is now financed through property taxes

- Sources of distortion added:
  1. Once in a jurisdiction $j$, individuals don’t buy more housing because property taxes ↑ without ↑ in public good consumption
  2. Individuals pay different absolute amounts for the same level of public goods in $j$, so can have different valuation of public good in a given jurisdiction. Wealthy may seek to exclude poor
  3. Heterogeneous valuation of public goods $\rightarrow$ unlikely that provision level set by majority will be efficient

- Can potentially resolve the Tiebout hypothesis in this case by adding *residential zoning* (Hamilton, 1975)
Residential Zoning

Can resolve the Tiebout hypothesis in case (1) by adding *residential zoning* (Hamilton, 1975)

- Community can set minimum level of housing such that sorting into $j$ produces the same outcome as lump sum taxation

- Jurisdictions will not have individuals who want to purchase less than the min level of housing

$\Rightarrow$ Zoning can induce efficient allocation if public goods are funded with property taxes

- Note: If there’s a minimum level of housing, then preferences for public goods and housing must be homogeneous in $j$

Aside: Allen, Arkolakis, Li have a recent paper on zoning in Chicago called optimal city structure
2. Fiscal spillovers

- Allow spending in $j$ to affect spending in $j' \neq j$
  - E.g., If $j$ increases sales tax, the sales tax base increases in neighboring jurisdictions due to fleeing shoppers

- In the presence of fiscal externalities, local policy may not be *nationally* efficient

- Federal government can implement a Pigouvian policy, such as matching grants or state and local tax deductions

Will discuss this in more depth at the end of the lecture
Hoxby (2000) considers public school districts in the US. She compares cities where:

- There are few large school districts and hence little choice for residents (such as Miami)
- There are many small school districts and hence a lot of choice for residents (such as Boston)

**Finding #1**: Cities with few districts have less sorting across neighborhood (in terms of school quality) than cities with many districts (this result is well established)

**Finding #2**: Cities with many districts have higher test scores on average: this result is controversial (see Rothstein, 2007 critique)

Many other papers on evidence or lack thereof on Tiebout model (see, e.g., J. Donahue (JEP, 1997) and Rhode Strumpf (AER, 2003).
Ellickson (AER, 1971)
Ellickson (AER, 1971)
“Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Residential Choice”

Model to operationalize the idea of "voting with one’s feet." Provides a modeling structure for the first empirical sorting models

\[ \Phi^i(p_c, \bar{p}_d^j, g^j, w^i) \]  

- \( p_c \) = Price of consumption goods (same everywhere)
- \( \bar{p}_d^j \) = After-tax price of housing in \( j \)

\[ \bar{p}_d^j = p_d^j(1 + \tau^j) \]

- \( p_d^j \) = Price of constructing a house in \( j \)
- \( g^j \) = Public services quality in \( j \)
- \( w^i \) = Household \( i \)'s wealth
Bid Price Curve: the set of \((\overline{p}^j_d, g^j)\) that yield the same level of utility, \(\hat{u}\), implicitly defined by

\[
\Phi^i(p_c, \overline{p}^j_d, g^j, w^i) - \hat{u} = 0
\]

Holding all else equal, a higher \(g^j\) will require a higher \(p^j_d\) to keep utility constant
Feasibility Set

Cost of providing government services quality $g^j$ to population $N^j$ ($g^j$ is a congestable public good)

- $G^j = G(N^j, g^j) = \overline{G}(g^j)N^j$ (Constant returns to scale)
- $T^j = \tau^j p_d^j D^j$ Tax Revenue (Given residential land $D^j$)


\[ \bar{G}(g^j) N^j = \tau^j p'_d D^j \]

\[ \bar{p}'_d = p'_d (1 + \tau^j) = p'_d + \tau^j p'_d \]

Rearranging 1, we get:

\[ \tau^j p'_d = \frac{\bar{G}(g^j) N^j}{D^j} = \bar{G}(g^j) \eta^j \]

(2)

where \( \eta^j \) = population density

Thus, \( \bar{p}'_d = p'_d + \bar{G}(g^j) \eta^j \)
Equation defines a set of \((\bar{p}_d^j, g^j)\) that could be made available by local governments (Higher \(g^j\) requires higher \(\bar{p}_d^j\))
Which Community people will choose to live in is a very complicated problem without further restrictions on the model. We assume preferences take a shape that ensures perfect stratification by wealth.

As \( w \) increases, bid function in \((\bar{p}_d^j, g^j)\) space gets steep

← ”Single Crossing” property
Stratification by Wealth

High wealth individuals will maximize utility by choosing to locate in community B.

Low wealth individuals maximize utility by locating in community A.

There is an intermediate individual with indifference curve $\tilde{u}$ who is indifferent between the two locations.
In general, decentralizing gov’t provisions of public goods improves welfare as it lets individuals find \((\bar{p}_d^j, g^j)\) combinations that better match their preferences.

Starting with both types of individuals in (2), they are both made better off when (2) splits into a low \(g^j\) low tax community (1) and a high \(g^j\), high tax community (3).
Things get more complicated if the tax base changes along with the congestion of the public good.

Suppose higher wealth individuals consume more land. When the split occurs, $\eta_1 > \eta_3$ (i.e. higher population density in the poor community) This raises the cost of providing any level of $g$. Poor now face a worse option in (1). Poor would prefer to stay in a community with the rich, vote against decentralization. Rich vote for zoning requiring big plots to keep poor out.
Embeds boundary discontinuity design in discrete choice residential sorting model. Addresses endogeneity of school and neighborhood characteristics

**Summary of Results:**

- Households are willing to pay less than previously thought for improvements in school quality. May instead reflect WTP for neighborhood attributes that form b/c of sorting in response to school quality differences.
- Willingness to pay for more educated, wealthier neighbors is really explained by correlation between these attributes and neighborhood unobservables.
- Negative correlation between % black & house price is driven by blacks living in lower quality neighborhoods.
- Lots of heterogeneity in preferences. Demonstrates how sorting model nests hedonic model, with adjustment for preference heterogeneity.
Want limited geographic space to limit unobservables, but still want variation in school quality.

Rely on fact that school quality changes discretely at catchment zone boundary, but other neighborhood unobservables will be the same of both sides.

Use fixed effects for small neighborhoods defined around the boundary. Exploits "within" variation.

Use to deal with endogeneity of race variable (i.e., sociodemographics correlated with unobserved neighborhood quality).

Sorting across boundary based on (observable) school quality creates an exogenous source of variation in neighbors' race that can be used to identify households' preferences for these social interactions.
1990 restricted access census (15% of pop long-form)
Block-level (approx. 100 individuals)
SF Bay Area
  - Alameda
  - Contra Costa
  - Marin
  - San Mateo
  - San Francisco
  - Santa Clara
1,100 census tracts
39,500 blocks
Add information about:

- Crime Rates
- Land Use/Topography
- Urban Density
- Local Schools

School Quality = Average of 4th grade math and reading scores, averaged over two years

Only have school attendance zones for 1/3 of the elementary schools in the bay area. Mostly lose San Francisco - Leads to lower housing prices and income in boundary sample

Back-up with data describing housing transactions between 1992-1996 (dataquick). Merge with HMDA data on race and income
Regress each variable on boundary fixed effects and dummies for distance to the boundary. Census and transaction data.

Clear discontinuity in test scores at the boundary. Similar jumps seen in housing price.
Analysis of Boundary Effects

Fig. 2.—Census housing characteristics around the boundary. Each panel is constructed using the following procedure: (i) regress the variable in question on boundary fixed effects and on 0.02-mile band distance to the boundary dummy variables; (ii) plot the coefficients along with bands of 95% confidence for each bandwidth.
Fig. 3.—Transactions data housing characteristics around the boundary. Each panel is constructed using the following procedure: (i) regress the variable in question on boundary fixed effects and on 0.02-mile band distance to the boundary dummy variables; (ii) plot the coefficients on these distance dummies. Thus a given point in each panel represents...
Things are very different when we look at the attributes of the people who have chosen to live on each side of the boundary.

High-side individuals have more income and education and are less likely to be black.

Ignoring attributes of neighbors is likely to yield biased estimates of value in school quality.
Hedonic Regressions

\[ p_h = \beta x_h + \theta_{bh} + \xi_h \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

- \( x_h \) = housing and neighborhood characteristics
  - Owner occupied
  - Number of bedrooms
  - Year built
  - Population density
  - Crime
  - Land use (% Commercial, etc.)
  - Avg. Test Score
  - % College degree
  - Average block income
- \( \theta_{bh} \) = boundary fixed effects
### TABLE 3
KEY COEFFICIENTS FROM BASELINE HEDONIC PRICE REGRESSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Within 0.20 Mile of Boundary (N = 27,548)</th>
<th>Within 0.10 Mile of Boundary (N = 15,122)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boundary fixed effects included</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Excluding Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average test score (in standard deviations)</td>
<td>123.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Including Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average test score (in standard deviations)</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% census block group black</td>
<td>(8.1)</td>
<td>(5.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% block group with college degree or more</td>
<td>(33.4)</td>
<td>(38.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average block group income (/10,000)</td>
<td>220.1</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>(39.9)</td>
<td>(32.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adding BFE’s dramatically lowers estimated WTP for test score improvements. This implies test scores are correlated with neighborhood unobservables (geographically restricting variation to a small area around the boundary reduces role of unobservables).
WTP for school quality drops even further once neighborhood sociodemographics are included. BFE’s alone can’t deal with bias imposed by sorting and individuals having a preference for the attributes of their neighbors.

$17 per month = 1.8\%$ of average monthly user cost of housing.

**TABLE 3**

**KEY COEFFICIENTS FROM BASELINE HEDONIC PRICE REGRESSIONS**

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<tr>
<td>A. Excluding Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average test score (in standard deviations)</td>
<td>123.7 (13.2)</td>
<td>33.1 (7.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Including Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average test score (in standard deviations)</td>
<td>34.8 (8.1)</td>
<td>17.3 (5.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% census block group</td>
<td>-99.8 (33.4)</td>
<td>1.5 (38.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% block group with college degree or more</td>
<td>220.1 (39.9)</td>
<td>89.9 (32.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average block group income (/10,000)</td>
<td>60.0 (4.0)</td>
<td>45.0 (4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—All regressions shown in the table also include controls for whether the house is owner-occupied, the number of rooms, year built (1980s, 1960-79, pre-1960), elevation, population density, crime, and land use (% industrial, % residential, % commercial, % open space, % other) in 1, 2, and 5 mile rings around each location. The dependent variables are average test scores and $R^2$ values.
Look at the effect of BFE’s on sociodemographic coefficients. Boundary provides an exogenous source of variation in race (B/C of sorting) as long as we control for the things that differ across the boundary (i.e., school quality).

Adding the BFE’s changes the coefficient on % black from -99.8 to 1.5. Similar impacts for education and income of neighbors.
Analyses that fail to control for correlation of neighborhood sociodemographics and unobserved neighborhood quality will overstate the capitalization of the former into housing prices

* Assumption: controlling for school quality wipes out impact of anything else that might have been correlated with race
Goal

- Use to clarify the relationship between the true distribution of preferences and the hedonic price function coefficients
- When do the hedonic price function coefficients provide a reasonable estimate of the mean marginal willingness to pay?
Sorting Model

\( \max_h V^i_h = \alpha^i_x x_h - \alpha^i_p p_h - \alpha^i_d d^i_h + \theta_{bh} + \xi_h + \epsilon^i_h \) \hspace{1cm} (4)

- \( x_h \) = observable attributes of house \( h \)
- \( p_h \) = price of house \( h \)
- \( d^i_h \) = distance of house \( h \) to place of work of household \( i \)
- \( \xi_h \) = unobservable attribute of house \( h \) (valued the same by all households)
- \( \epsilon^i_h \) = idiosyncratic utility of house \( h \) for household \( i \)

Each household’s marginal utility of each attribute is allowed to vary with its observable attributes

\[ \alpha^i_j = \alpha_0 j + \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_{kj} z^i_h \]
Estimation

\[ V_h^i = \delta_h + \lambda_h^i + \epsilon_h^i \]

\[ \delta_h = \alpha_0 x_h - \alpha_0 p_h + \theta_{bh} + \xi_h \text{ Baseline utility} \]

\[ \lambda_h^i = \left( \sum_{k=1}^{k} \alpha_{kx} z_k^i \right) x_h - \left( \sum_{k=1}^{k} \alpha_{kp} z_k^i \right) p_h - \left( \sum_{k=1}^{k} \alpha_{kd} z_k^i \right) d_h^i \] (5)
Maximum likelihood returns estimates of $\delta_h$’s and parameters in $\lambda_h$

\[ P_h^i = \frac{\exp d_h + \lambda_h^i}{\sum_l \exp d_l + \lambda_l^i} \]  \hspace{1cm} (6)

\[ L = \sum_i \sum_h l_h^i \log(P_h^i) \]  \hspace{1cm} (7)

Maximize the likelihood of seeing the households choose the houses that they actually pick

- Vector of $\delta_h$’s should be that which makes the predicted share of the population choosing each house equal the actual share ($1/N$)

- Predicted share is just the sum of the probabilities that each household picks the house
Decompose $\delta_h$ into its component parts

$$\delta_h = \alpha_{0x} x_h - \alpha_{0p} p_h + \theta_{bh} + \xi_h$$

This equation can be re-arranged to look a lot like the hedonic regression equation

$$P_h + \frac{1}{\alpha_{0p}} \delta_h = \frac{\alpha_{0x}}{\alpha_{0p}} x_h + \frac{1}{\alpha_{0p}} \theta_{bh} + \frac{1}{\alpha_{0p}} \xi_h$$
Estimation: Step #2

\( \delta_h \) provides an adjustment to the hedonic price function when households have heterogeneous preferences. MWTP estimate reflects preferences of marginal household who consumes attribute.

Fig. 5.—Demand for a view of the Golden Gate Bridge
The hedonic price will be determined by the marginal household.

- This will only equal the mean preference if all households are identical (MWTP is a horizontal line)
- \( \delta_h \) "corrects" for the first-stage heterogeneity in preferences (i.e., it formally represents mean utility).
- When everyone is identical, \( \delta_h = k \forall h \) and the correction is absorbed into the constant

If a small share of households purchase a particular amenity, the WTP of the marginal household may be quite high.

- This would get reflected in the hedonic estimate, even though the mean MWTP is much lower
- In this case, \( \delta_h \) will be low for houses with this attribute to explain why so few households want them. This will pull down the estimates in the adjusted regression
Price is likely correlated with unobserved neighborhood attributes. Use attributes of houses more than 3 mi. away as IV’s, as these are only likely to affect the price by determining the availability of substitutes, but are otherwise excluded from utility.

Use BFE’s in stage 2 as well to account for neighborhood unobservables that may be correlated with race, average income, school quality, etc.
With BFE’s and sociodemographics, MWTP for school quality ($19.70) is similar to the hedonic estimate. This is because the attribute varies continuously (i.e., MWTP not determined by marginal consumer consuming the attribute)
Adding BFE’s reduces magnitude of coefficients on sociodemographics, but MWTP for % black is still negative and significant

Suggests that households can self-segregate based on race without requiring equilibrium price differentials

Mean preference = White (Majority)

B/C there are so many white neighborhoods, the marginal white household (reflected in hedonic estimates) doesn’t care very much about % black
### Heterogeneity in Marginal Willingness to Pay for Average Test Score and Neighborhood Sociodemographic Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Sociodemographics</th>
<th>Average Test Score +1 SD</th>
<th>+10% Black vs. White</th>
<th>+10% College-Educated</th>
<th>Block Group Average Income +$10,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean MWTP</td>
<td>19.69</td>
<td>−10.50</td>
<td>10.46</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income (+$10,000)</td>
<td>(7.41)</td>
<td>(3.69)</td>
<td>(3.18)</td>
<td>(6.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18 vs. no children</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>−1.23</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black vs. white</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College degree or more vs. some college or less</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>−16.07</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.58)</td>
<td>(3.03)</td>
<td>(2.25)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>−14.31</td>
<td>98.34</td>
<td>18.45</td>
<td>−1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.36)</td>
<td>(3.93)</td>
<td>(4.52)</td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.03</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>58.05</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.57)</td>
<td>(3.14)</td>
<td>(2.33)</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** — The first row of the table reports the mean marginal willingness to pay for the change reported in the column heading. The remaining rows report the difference in willingness to pay associated with the change listed in the row heading, holding all other factors equal. The full heterogeneous choice model includes 135 interactions between nine household characteristics and 15 housing and neighborhood characteristics. The included household characteristics are household income, the presence of children under 18, and the race/ethnicity (Asian, black, Hispanic, white), educational attainment (some college, college degree or more), work status, and age of the household head. The housing and neighborhood characteristics are the monthly user cost of housing, distance to work, average test score, whether the house is owner-occupied, number of rooms, year built (1980s, 1960–79, pre-1960), elevation, population density, crime, and the racial composition (% Asian, % black, % Hispanic, % white) and average education (% college.
Discontinuous amenities induce sorting along boundaries. Because households care about neighbor sociodemographics, BFE analysis will yield biased results if these factors aren’t controlled for.

Use boundary variation to measure value of sociodemographics (as long as you can control for differences across boundary with observables. Normally, it would be hard to find exogenous variation in neighbor attributes).
Social interactions/ peer effects are important in local PF

Sorting + human capital spillovers from neighbors → interesting issues

- Benabou (QJE, 1993) explores a steady state model where local complementarities in human capital investment, or peer effects, generate occupational segregation and studies its efficiency properties.

- Benabou (Restud, 1996) shows minor differences in preferences can create a “tipping” effect that leads to severe stratification by income.

- Fernandez and Rogerson (QJE, 1996) show how sorting, community formation, and spillovers manifesting through the tax base and determine local education spending in GE.

- Fogli and Guerrieri (2018) build calibrated OLG model where parents choose the neighborhood where to raise their kids/invest in their human capital. Segregation and inequality amplify each other b/c of a local spillover that affects the returns to education.

Outline

1 Overview
- Key questions in local public finance
- Local public goods
- Club model of local provision of public goods

2 Preliminaries
- Quality Differences
- Hedonics
- Hedonic Model Example: Travel time and Rent Gradients

3 Tiebout and Sorting
- Tiebout (JPE, 1956)
- Ellickson (AER, 1971)
- Bayer Ferreira McMillan (JPE, 2007)
- Social Interactions, Sorting, and Peer Effects

4 Fiscal Federalism
- Oates (1972) and Oates (JEL, 1999)
- Intergovernmental Grants
Oates (1972)

Question: what form of government is best for resolving allocation, distribution, and stabilization problems?

- Musgrave (1959): Three roles of government
  - Ensure an efficient use of resources
  - Establish an equitable distribution of income
  - Maintain stable employment and prices

- Case for centralized government
  - A central agency should manage monetary policy, so stabilization at local levels depends on fiscal policy which may have spillovers, have small effects, and encourage debt financing and affect financial flows. Also shocks are likely correlated across locations.
  - Local redistribution would create strong incentives for wealthy to flee and for the poor to migrate into the community (e.g., Stigler (1957), Epple and Romer (1991), Feldstein and Wrobel (1998))
  - Central gov must provide certain “national” public goods (like national defense) that provide services to the entire population of the country.
  - Risk and income can be more easily spread and distributed
  - Central governments consolidate bargaining power against external agents

Graduate Public Finance (Econ 524)

Local Public Finance

Lecture 4 119 / 133
Oates (1972): case for a decentralized government

Question: what form of government is best for resolving allocation, distribution, and stabilization problems?

- There a local public goods whose consumption is limited to their own jurisdictions
- Uniform levels of consumption may not be efficient if preferences and local technologies are heterogeneous. Tiebout sorting can restore efficiency with local provision.
- Local governments do not do any redistribution: individuals receive in local public goods exactly what they are paying in taxes (= benefit principle of taxation)
- Decentralization may result in greater experimentation and innovation due to competitive pressures across governments
- Local gov’t may provide a better institutional setting that promotes better decision making by compelling more explicit recognition of the costs of public programs and having better information about local performance and preferences (see, e.g., Besley and Coate (2003))

See Oates (JEL, 1999) for more details
Considerations re centralized vs decentralized allocative role

- Optimal size of jurisdiction (clubs) can vary
- Inter-jurisdictional externalities exist
  - A fiscal externality is one where the tax base of one community is affected by the tax policy of another.
  - E.g., one location increasing spending on police enforcement might increase crime in a neighboring community.
  - E.g., if a place increases sales tax, the sales tax base increases in neighboring jurisdictions due to fleeing shoppers
- Costs of decision making may be lower for small groups
- Costs of congestion resulting from mobility
- See Gordon (QJE, 1983) for a classic analysis of some of these issues

Intergovernmental grants can help address issues related to broadening responsibility beyond the local population
Intergovernmental Grants
Background on grants

- In the US, federal gov provides grants to state and local govs
  - Similarly, state govs provide grants to local govs

- Why grants?
  1. Fiscal externalities
  2. Economies of scale in tax collection (e.g., fixed cost to administering the tax collection)
  3. Redistribution/Medicaid spending could have positive externalities for other jurisdictions
  4. Address discrepancies (e.g., school funding) between rich and poor locations

- Trade-off between federal provision of a public good and a grant to states
  - Federal gov might be better at internalizing externalities
  - but local gov can better adapt to local conditions and tastes
Federal transfers per capita (2015)

Federal IG transfers to state+local governments. 2015 USD.
State and local revenue from federal grants per capita (1)
2015 USD

Per Capita Federal Grants to State+Local Govs

AK  AL  AR  AZ  CA
CO  CT  DE  FL  GA
HI  IA  ID  IL  IN
KS  KY  LA  MA  MD
ME  MI  MN  MO  MS
State and local revenue from federal grants per capita (2)

2015 USD

Per Capita Federal Grants to State+Local Govs

MT | NC | ND | NE | NH
NJ | NM | NV | NY | OH
OK | OR | PA | RI | SC
SD | TN | TX | UT | VA
VT | WA | WI | WV | WY
Types of grants

1. Block grants: unrestricted, fixed amount

2. Matching grants:
   - Amount is tied to the amount of public good spending by the local community
   - Higher level of gov pays for a fraction of costs at the margin (e.g., Medicaid)

3. Categorical grants:
   - Provided for a specific expenditure
   - Goal is to shift budget constraint, inducing substitution into other spending categories
     - Some evidence of a flypaper effect, where spending on specific expenditure actually increases after grant
     - Knight (2002) suggests that evidence of flypaper effect is actually due to endogeneity in allocation of grants
Education finance

- Education finance is a large share of local spending in the US
- Largely financed through local property taxes → can lead to large differences in spending per student across districts
- State gov can mitigate spending inequality through alternative funding formulas
  1. Foundation level funding
  2. Power equalization funding

See Hanushek (2002) handbook chapter on publicly provided education for details
Education finance

- Education finance is a large share of local spending in the US
- Largely financed through local property taxes → can lead to large differences in spending per student across districts
- State gov can mitigate spending inequality through alternative funding formulas
  
  1. **Foundation level funding**
     - $B_j$: tax base per pupil
     - $N_j$: number of students
     - $r_0$: “normal” property tax rate
     - Higher level of gov wants foundation level of funding $F$ per pupil
     - So provides a grant $G_j = N(F - r_0B_j)$

  2. **Power equalization funding**

See Hanushek (2002) handbook chapter on publicly provided education for details
Education finance

- Education finance is a large share of local spending in the US
- Largely financed through local property taxes → can lead to large differences in spending per student across districts
- State gov can mitigate spending inequality through alternative funding formulas
  1. Foundation level funding
  2. Power equalization funding
     - State compensates tax base differences from some “normal” level $B_0$
     - So provides a grant $G_j = Nr(B_0 - B)$

See Hanushek (2002) handbook chapter on publicly provided education for details
Incentives associated with funding formulas

1. Foundation level funding
   - \( dG/dr = 0 \Rightarrow \) only income effect

2. Power equalization funding
   - \( dG/dr = N(B_0 - B) \Rightarrow \) income and substitution effect

So for a given \( G \), expect a stronger impact on spending by poorer districts and greater equalization under *power equalization formula*
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EQUALIZATION

In 1960s-1970s, California used to have one of the best K-12 public school systems in the nation, now it has one of the worst

California used to have no school finance equalization and hence big disparities across areas

1976: Serrano vs. Priest case: Supreme court ruled that disparities above a threshold were unconstitutional

⇒ Wealthy districts forced to give all their tax revenue above the threshold to the common pool to fund poor districts

⇒ local government has no incentive to raise taxes ⇒ taxes and school funding fall in rich districts
FMSZ (Restud, 2018): Tax Harmonization
FMSZ (Restud, 2018): Tax Harmonization

Question: what are aggregate effects of dispersion in tax rates across U.S. states?

1 Quantitative Geography Model with U.S. State Tax System
   - States with heterogeneous fundamentals (productivity, amenities, trade costs, factor shares, fixed factors, ownership rates)
   - Workers and firms sort across states according to idiosyncratic draws
   - Firms are monopolistically competitive
   - 3 major state taxes and federal transfers, which finance state \( g \) valued by workers and firms

2 Estimation
   - Elasticities of worker and firm location with respect to taxes
   - Fundamentals match distribution of employment, wages, and trade

3 Counterfactuals
   - Vary or eliminate tax dispersion keeping government spending constant
   - Also analyze GE impact of the North Carolina income tax cuts, rolling back tax system to 1980, and eliminating state and local tax deduction

4 Results: heterogeneity in state tax rates leads to aggregate losses
   - Harmonizing state taxes increases worker welfare by 0.6% with fixed \( G \), 1.2% if government spending responds endogenously
   - Harmonization within Census regions achieves most of these gains