McGeer, V. (Forthcoming). “Mindshaping is key to remedying social injustice”. Australian Philosophical Review.
McGeer, V. (2015). Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility. Philosophical Explorations , 18 (2), 259-281. Publisher's VersionAbstract
This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative"
"view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view” (encompassing both theory- theory  and  simulation  theory,  as  well  as  hybrid  variations).  On  the  regulative  view, folk-psychology  is  conceptualized  in  fundamentally  interpersonal  terms  as  a  “mind- making”   practice   through  which   we  come   to   form  and   regulate   our  minds  in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms.  It  is  not,  as  the  standard  view  maintains,  simply  an  epistemic  capacity  for coming  to  know  about  the  mental  states  and  dispositions  already  there.  Importantly, the regulative view can meet and beat the standard at its own epistemic game. But it also does more. In Section 2, I show how the regulative view makes progress on two other problems that remain puzzling on the standard view:  (1) the problem of “first- person authority”  –  accounting for the special features of self-knowledge; and (2) the problem of “reactive responsiveness”  –  accounting for our deep concern with calling"
"one another to account for normatively untoward behaviour, both generally and in the moral domain.
Reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual (2016) vol. 35
McGeer, V. (2009). The skill of perceiving persons. The Modern Schoolman , 86 (2/3), 289-318.Abstract
What do we ordinarily perceive when we see a person? This paper examines the virtuoso capacity of typical human beings to see others as minded – as possessed of a rich variety of mental states that animate their activities. The central message of the paper is that we become adept at perceiving the minds of others through developing our expertise in becoming so minded ourselves. “Normal psychological knowing” is what I call a “practice-dependent” skill or expertise. The paper shows this approach deals overcomes certain difficulties often associated with more standard explanations of our capacity for knowing other minds (simulation theory and theory-theory).
McGeer, V., & Schwitzgebel, E. (2006). "Disorder in the Representational Warehouse". Child Development , 77 (6), 1557-1562.
McGeer, V., & Pettit, P. (2002). "The Self-Regulating Mind". Language and Communication , 22 (3), 281-299.
McGeer, V. (2001). "Psycho-practice, Psycho-theory and the Contrastive Case of Autism: how practices of mind become second-nature". Journal of Consciousness Studies , 8 (5-7), 109-32.
McGeer, V. (1996). "Is 'Self-Knowledge' an Empirical Problem? Renegotiating the Space of Phlosophical Explanation". Journal of Philosophy , 93 (10), 483-515.